The Town of San Felipe and Colonial Cacao Economies

Eugenio Piñero

TRANSACTIONS
of the
American Philosophical Society
Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge

VOLUME 84, Part 3

The Town of San Felipe and Colonial Cacao Economies

Eugenio Piñero
Department of History
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

Independence Square, Philadelphia

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Cover: A former cacao hacienda house, now part of an institution of higher learning
in Venezuela. Photograph by the author.

Library of Congress Catalog
Card Number-94-71251
International Standard Book Number 0-87169-843-9
US ISSN 0065-9746

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To my wife Marta and my daughters
Mareni, Marta, Lorna and Lilliam.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Any intellectual work incurs a great deal of debts. This one is not an exception. My mentor, Hugh Hamill, encouraged me in my academic endeavors. I inherited his educational and analytical methods. Anybody that participated in his demanding graduate seminar can detect his influence in my writings. Hugh taught us that the acquisition of knowledge mostly is the responsibility of the student, not only the instructor. Few seminars enlightened this scholar more than his. Dale Graden, my best friend, gave me several suggestions to improve my inquiry. To him, I am also indebted for his profound insight on things economic and social in Latin America. He gave me his editorial advice when writing the dissertation. His immense interest on Latin Americana is only surpassed by his eagerness to share his knowledge with colleagues and students. Julia Barstow of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Connecticut-Storrs showed her concern for my career in the way she managed the Fulbright-Hays grant given me in 1984. Jane Rausch of the University of Massachusetts encouraged me to apply for the James R. Scobie grant. This grant opened doors for additional research into my subject. Francisco Scarano directed my dissertation and gave me some advice for its further development. Finally, I express my profound gratitude to Carole Le Faivre, Associate Editor at the American Philosophical Society, for her immense patience and understanding. Without Carole's insight and expertise, not to say anything of her relentless support and encouragement, this book would have never come to final fruition.

From my beloved Venezuela, I want to acknowledge the help and criticism of my work by three promising young scholars: Lcdo. Antonio Gonzales Antias, Marjorie Acevedo and Jorge Escalona. Antonio offered his keen advice on archival holdings in Venezuela. His intellectual unselfishness is attested by his sharing his own research findings with this scholar before their publication. He and his wife Aura shared the legendary Venezuelan hospitality with my family and me. Antonio, Marjorie and Jorge monitored and guided my search for sources. It is to them more than any other scholars that I should be grateful for the felicitous conclusion of my monograph. They incarnate the friendship scholars find in the intellectuals of Latin America. Ermila Troconis de Veracoachea gave me advice in the pursuance of sources for my work. In North America, I have not incurred greater debt of gratitude for the fortunate beginning and ending of my disquisition than to John V. Lombardi, President of the University of Florida system. Prof. Lombardi's name appears on almost all works on the economic history of Venezuela. Even when he did not know me personally, Prof. Lombardi advanced all the assistance a neophyte on the history of the region needs to start on the research path. He examined and criticized my dissertation, my first article and all other works I have presented for publication. I have been fortunate to have his incisive criticism and friendship.

My wife Marta and our daughters Mareni, Marta, Lorna and Lilliam endured prolonged privations to allow this scholar to engage in research and writing of this book. I do not exaggerate when I say that this book is more theirs than mine. Their patience can only be explained in terms of love. Thus, my Marta, my Mareni, my Marta, my Lorna and my Lilliam this is for all of you!

PREFACE

Until recently, the history of Latin American colonial export-led economies was encased in the "dependentistas" analytical paradigm. Now, more works are looking at this historical phenomenon from a different perspective. The perspective that prevails now is that developed by Harold Innis, or perhaps Guy Callender Stevens, in the early twentieth century. The staple thesis of economic growth offers a specificity of analysis not surpassed by other analytical models. Its flexibility allows the scholar to emphasize or de-emphasize linkages between the export driven and domestic economy. In other words, the scholar does not have to force the data to "fit" the model. The model follows the data and highlights those aspects (fields) that are relevant to the economy under analysis. After Innis, others fine tuned the thesis: Albert O. Hirschman (fiscal linkages), Robert Baldwin (technology and education), Archibald Ritter (tests its applicability to twentieth century Cuban sugar economy), Frederick S. Weaver (offers reservations on the fitness of the thesis to nineteenth century Argentina), Jonathan Brown (successfully analyses the eighteenth century Argentinean economy using the thesis), Charles W. Bergquist (traces the influence of the Colombian coffee economy on the nineteenth century national political life), finally, John McClure (scrutinizes colonial British America economy from the perspective of this model).

Scrutiny of the history of Latin American export-led economies is still in need of more scholarly attention. Economic historians, as well as historians in general, must pay heed to the calls of such commanding figures in our discipline as Dauril Alden who in 1976 made a compelling call for the study of that economic activity under the guidance of the staple thesis model of economic growth. Many approaches to the analysis of export economies tend to cloud the contribution that activity has made through the years to the national economies of the area. Some of those very approaches treat the Latin American export driven economies as nineteenth and/or twentieth century phenomena without any connection to the colonial past. This biases their intellectual process and, thus, their conclusions. Awareness of economic institutions created in the past enriches the analysis of these regional economies, especially today when all the world is conscious of the presence of a world economy. No doubt more studies need to be made to unveil the intricacies of export driven economies, the very place where all national economies come into contact with the global economy. My research has taught me that attempts at self-sufficiency on the part of national economies is simply futile. Economic autonomy is no longer a viable alternative, a chimera. Although the world economy was born in the past, it is here to stay. With that premise in mind scholars should proceed in their historical investigation of national economies. To study national economies as if in a vacuum is not intellectually sound nor analytically correct.

The following institutions financially endorsed the writing and research of this book: The National Science Foundation, The Fulbright-Hays Grant for Advanced Training and Research, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (Post-Doctoral fellowship) and the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Connecticut-Storrs.

PART I: CACAO AND THE GENESIS OF AN EXPORT-LED ECONOMY

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the contention of the "dependentistas,"[1] the cacao export-led economy of the eighteenth century province of Caracas did not behave as an enclave economy. An analysis of the quantitative data suggests that from its beginning in the seventeenth century to its boom in the eighteenth century, the cacao economy in the province of Caracas developed strong nodules (linkages) with the domestic economy that prompted the creation of new economic endeavors. Cacao exports created two nodules of extreme importance for the domestic economy: backward and final demand (income-multiplier) linkages. The cacao economy that throve in the north-central, south-eastern and north-western regions of the province sent income-multiplier shocks into the Llanos region fostering the *rationalization* of cattle ranching. A close examination of local markets shows high demand for hides and beef. Hides, which kept humidity out, were used for packing cacao. Cacao growers used beef to feed their slaves, peons and families. High supply of beef lowered its price and made it affordable for widespread consumption. Remarkably, both hides and beef commanded lower prices than chicken. Other regions provided fish, shoes, vegetables and other goods to the cacao region.

Beyond the income-multiplier linkage, the cacao economy motivated other linkages. Some of these nodules accrued to the domestic economy, others to foreign economies. The backward linkage—mainly mule trains and canoes—generated considerable income into the regional economy. The fiscal linkage—sales taxes, import-export tariffs and other duties—was also strong, but it benefited the Spanish Crown more than provinces. Provincials were forced to use their own capital and slaves to build and maintain the infrastructure. The forward nodule—the phase at which cacao is processed into chocolate—went to benefit foreign markets. The comparative advantage of processing the cultigen in the importing country was high.

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[1] Cardoso, Fernando Enrique and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, translated by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). See also, Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969) and Theotonio Dos Santos, *Imperialismo y dependencia*, Serie El hombre y su tiempo, Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1980).

As in Central America, where Spanish entrepreneurs would leave the cultivation of cacao to the Amerindians and poor Spaniards, while they in turn would simply market the product, in the province of Caracas, European and local entrepreneurs would stand at the marketing end of the economic spectrum while cacao growing was in the hands of slaves, Pardos, poor Spaniards and Amerindians. Close scrutiny of market transactions in Caracas did not unveil the presence of the major representatives of the provincial elite. The elite did have cacao haciendas, but it seems, with the marked exception of the Marquesa Del Valle, that they either directly exported their cacao loads bypassing regional markets or they used local agents. None of the elite appears prominently in the Caracas cacao market. A detailed analysis of cacao exports by sectors—cacao growers, Church, merchants and the Guipuzcoana monopoly—ranked merchants and the company as the major exporters of the staple. From the inception of the company in 1730 to the year 1769, merchants and the company never exported less than 80 percent of all legal provincial cacao exports.

The conclusions based on the quantitative analysis of the data are sustained by qualitative evidence. Two traveler accounts commented favorably on the economic linkages between the export-led region and the domestic economy. In 1764, Joseph Luis de Cisneros described a province teeming in intraregional trade. He further stated that the intraregional trade was the result of the response of the domestic economy to stimuli originating in the cacao regions. His *Descripción exacta de la provincia de Venezuela* details how certain regions exchanged with and/or sold their commodities to cacao growers.[2] Later, in 1813, a French traveler, J. J. Dauxion Lavaysse, argued that had France tried to lure Venezuela to become part of the French empire the effort would have failed. In frustration, he asserted that the Venezuelans hardly relied on foreign trade for their survival. Nothing in the economic spectrum could have been used to dislodge the colony from the Spanish empire because Venezuelans produced most of what they consumed.[3]

More importantly, the portrayal of local entrepreneurs as passive agents of foreign interests on the part of the dependentistas, does not correspond to the performance of the Caraqueño cacao hacendados. As the case of the Marquesa del Valle suggests, some cacao hacendados diversified their investments to include enterprises such as sugar cane production, cattle ranching, cultivation of maize and other grains for a regional and foreign market. For the most part flour was sent to Cartagena in Colombia in the seventeenth century. These same local entrepreneurs owned the vessels that carried cacao to Mexico. Thus, Caraqueños did not depend on foreign capital for most of their ventures even though theirs was an export-led economy. That the botanical properties of cacao did not put a premium on capital—on land, on labor—accounts for this phenomenon. After the end of the 1720s, the existence of three outlets for cacao production—Veracruz in Mexico, the Netherlands and Spain—during the late seventeenth century and most of the eighteenth century made for a highly competitive market, rendering high profitability to the majority of cacao growers and traders.

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[2] Joseph Luis de Cisneros, *Descripción exacta de la provincia de Venezuela,* Fuentes para la Historia Colonial de Venezuela, (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1981).

[3] J. J. Dauxion Lavaysse, *Viaje a las islas de Trinidad, Tobago, Margarita y a diversas partes de Venezuela en la America Meriodional,* traducción Lic. Angelina Lemmo and Sra. Hilda T. de Rodriguez, Serie de Fuentes Historicas, (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1967).

Entrepreneurs enticed to colonial Venezuela by the riches expected from cacao production had to contend with the tropical rain forest. Theirs was an arduous enterprise: clearing the jungle, using salaried workers because "slaves are too expensive to risk injury"; transplanting the small cacao trees from the nursery into the fields. To protect the tender groves from the rays of the sun (cacao trees thrive in highly humid environments) the grower would plant trees with dense canopies, providing them with shade. After some five years, the initial demanding work was rewarded by from forty to fifty years of harvest. When the groves were fruitful, the cacao growers would build their residences in a strategic place, usually in the center of the cultivated fields. Growers could thus access all corners of their land. Houses, the cacao groves, the slaves, sometimes the church and the animals found at times in the grower's property were known as the "hacienda." The hacienda was the unit of production that produced the staple bound for foreign markets. Cacao cultivation was and still is an export-led economy.

Cacao was principally produced for export to the foreign markets, and the well-being of the colonists depended on the performance of cacao in these markets. The unit of production was the link between the international market, the metropolis and the colonists.[4] Although there were other economic activities going on, they were either complementary to the hacienda economies or were exclusively subsistence endeavors without links with the haciendas.

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[4] I am aware of the Mintz-Wolf debate surrounding the use of the concepts plantation or hacienda: to describe the cacao unit of production. But, given the scope of this monograph, I will refer to the unit of production as hacienda. That was the name given to the unit of production by the same cacao growers. Thus, to avoid confusion between the pri-

Beginning in the seventeenth century, cacao constituted one of the main staples of the province. During the seventeenth century, cacao jockeyed for a predominant position until the Caracas Company in 1728 made cacao the main staple of the region. The Company had monopolistic powers and was created for the purpose of shipping cacao to the Spanish market and to curb contraband. This economic relation between Spain and the province has been examined by Eduardo Arcilas Farias and Fedérico Brito Figueroa.[5] Their works study the cacao economy within the general scheme of the history of Venezuela. Roland D. Hussey analyzed the Compañia Guipuzcoana as a monopolistic enterprise.[6]

Historians concerned with this export-led economy adopt either an institutional or socioeconomic stance within the context of general trends. Miguel Izard and Carlos A. D'Ascoli, whom we can use as examples of the two perspectives, offer schematic analyses of contraband and the cacao economy's social hierarchy.[7] José Estornes Lasa has examined the Basque element's contribution to the creation of the Company and the consequent "benefit" Caracas derived from it.[8]

However, most Venezuelanists have been concerned with generalities when studying the economy of the Caracas Province in the eighteenth century. A systematic analysis of the region as a economic entity of production is lacking. This monograph studies the influence of the cacao economy in the region of San Felipe—a northwest city in Caracas. The relationship between the region, the province and the foreign and metropolitan market is studied through the "staple thesis" model. This model postulates that the growth of a newly settled region whose economy is based on a staple for export can better be explained through the analysis of

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mary sources nomenclature and that of the monograph, I will keep the concept "hacienda" instead of engaging the controversy surrounding the concepts of plantation and hacienda. The monograph makes an analysis of the cacao hacienda as a unit of production. Factors of production—land, labor and capital—will be closely studied.

[5] Eduardo Arcilas Farias, *Economía colonial de Venezuela* Segunda Edición, (Caracas: Italgràfica, 1973). Fedérico Brito Figueroa, *Historia económica y social de Venezuela, una estructura para su estudio,* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1966).

[6] Roland Dennis Hussey, *The Caracas Company, 1728–1784. A Study of the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934).

[7] Carlos A. D'Ascoli, *Esquema histórico económico de Venezuela* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1973). Miguel Izard, "Contrabandistas, comerciantes e ilustrados." *Boletin Americanista* 28 (1978): 23–86.

[8] Jose Estornes Lasa, *La real compañía Guipuzcoana de navegación de Caracas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1948).

the region's staple linkages between the foreign market and the domestic economy. Most economic historians that have used the model agree that the applicability of the staple thesis is best when used for analysis of the region during the colonial period or during the span of time on which the region was highly dependent on one staple or several staples bound for export.

The monograph is composed of two parts. Part one begins with an analysis of the cacao economy of Caracas in the eighteenth century using the staple thesis model which stresses the influence on the domestic economy of the region's major export, and is helpful precisely because Caracas depended on cacao exports for most of its income. The study discusses also the botanical properties of the cultigen in an effort to relate those features to the performance of the monoculture. An overview of the geography of cacao production during the colonial period in Latin America follows the examination of the staple thesis model.

Next, the Veracruz (Mexico) market and its regions of supply are examined: Southern Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Guayaquil, Maracaibo, and Caracas. This section analyzes the Caracas cacao market and its ties with the Veracruz market; Dutch contraband; and finally, the European market with emphasis on Spain. An important aspect of this last subdivision is to show how Spain's royal treasury forged fiscal linkages into the domestic economy.

Part two analyzes cacao haciendas and markets in the town of San Felipe and its jurisdiction. This section measures the amounts and worth of cacao transactions and the extent of cacao trade between San Felipe and foreign markets. San Felipe offers a fascinating case study since Amerindians were an important component within the labor force. Amerindians worked on the haciendas of the Spanish, were present on mission lands, and owned their own small farms which produced cacao. Last, I hope to show how this cacao production created linkages—mainly backward and final demand linkages—between San Felipe's economy and that of other regions.

Earlier in this century, economic historians interested in the colonial period of the Americas pointed to shortcomings in the historiography of that period. The contention was, and in some cases still is, that in the study of the New World's colonial economies, historians were prone to use models that applied only to the European economic scene and not to the special circumstances of colonial economic reality. In an effort to clarify the economic underpinnings of this early period in the Americas, historians have scrutinized the Euro-specific models which have been employed to analyze the American experience.

Although better known for his "Staple Model," Innis questioned the propriety of the Euro-specific model for analysis of the genesis of New World economies. He contended that economic growth in Canada did not evolve from a subsistence economy into a market economy that created surpluses for export as in Europe. He believed that contemporary analysis of the economic history of Canada did not account for local, New World, circumstances but followed dictates of the economic theories of the old countries.[9] Innis offered new explanations for economic growth in Canada.

Innis argued that, in Canada's early history, entrepreneurs shifted from one export staple to another in order to benefit from the comparative advantage of producing a single export commodity. Innis recognized that in order to understand the Canadian economy, it was necessary to use a model of regional economic development shaped to the Canadian experience, and not simply a model based upon European historical circumstances. Thus, the theoretical framework should be flexible enough to allow historical facts to "smooth" the rough edges of the economic model. In the case of western hemisphere countries, economic historians found that paradigm in the Staple Model of economic growth.[10]

Innis's model posited the existence of two important regions: the metropole and the colony. The colony markets natural resource-intensive staples—furs and fish—in the metropole. The production of these staples creates certain nodules, such as backward, forward, fiscal and final demand (or income-multiplier) linkages with the domestic and foreign economies. The botanical properties of the staple modify the production functions (land, labor, capital and entrepreneurship) and the number and intensity of the linkages. For example, furs were land-intensive but did not encourage income-multiplier effect into the domestic economy; sugar cane plantations were capital-intensive and forward linkage intensive.[11] The nature and intensity of these linkages is determined by the botanical properties of the staple.[12]

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[9] Harold Innis, *Essays in Canadian Economic History.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957): 10.

[10] Although Innis is regarded as the creator of the Staple Model, some consider Guy Stevens Callender as the first historian to use that model. See his *Selections from the Economic History of the United States 1765–1860,* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1909). Others consider W. A. MacKintosh as the co-creator, with Innis, of the model. W. A. MacKintosh "Innis on Canadian Economic Development," *Journal of Political Economy* 71 (1953):185–194.

Economic historians have argued in favor of the importance of cultigen properties in the analysis of a regional monocultural economy. Albert O. Hirschman, after a lengthy analysis of the Staple Model, stresses that a staple will not "determine the sociopolitical environment in any unique and exhaustive way, but that each time it will imprint certain patterns of its own on whatever environment happens to be around and that it is possible and worthwhile to study the imprinting process."[13]

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[11] Archibald R. M. Ritter, *The Economic Development of Revolutionary Cuba. Strategy and Performance,* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 28–29; Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 29 (1963): 145. Backward linkages are investments in the domestic economy of the colony to increase the efficiency of the export sector (roads, railroads, mule trains, canoes, etc.). Forward linkages are investments in processes which transform the staple into salable goods (e.g. cacao—chocolate industry; cotton—textile industry; tobacco—cigar industry). The formation of forward linkages can occur in either the metropolitan center, or in the colony. Both economic poles derive marked benefits from such investments. Final demand (or income-multiplier) linkages are investments in activities that produce goods to supply those persons working within the export-sector. Fiscal linkages are those duties and taxes imposed on the export staple. It should be noted that in modern Latin America the lack of final demand linkages and the perverse use—in the economic sense—of income accruing from the fiscal linkage has been identified by many scholars as an impediment to economic development. The income-multiplier effect is extremely important because it could result in the formation of secondary and tertiary industries. Readily visible examples in the cacao economy include the cattle industry of the llanos of Venezuela, where cowboys supplied the meat necessary to sustain laborers on the haciendas.

[12] Robert E. Baldwin, "Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions," *The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies* 24 (1956): 161–179. The author stresses "the role which technological differences among production functions can play in the process of economic development." He is aware of other factors that influence economic development, such as levels of technological knowledge, entrepreneurial spirit, personal tastes, and social, economic and political ideas. His goal is to show how technological differences among production functions affect the economy. In the study he describes two environments. One has a climate and soil conducive to the production of a plantation crop. Another more temperate region is better suited to wheat cultivation. Both areas have been recently settled. The plantation region is labor-intensive, and requires high capital investments and high levels of managerial and technical skill. The plantation puts a premium on unskilled labor. The non-plantation zone, on the other hand, is characterized by the predominance of family farms which grow wheat. In contrast to the plantation economy, wheat farms require highly skilled labor. Like the plantation economy, the wheat farms need high capital investment. Baldwin does not elaborate on how the botanical properties of the cultigen affect the production functions. But there is little doubt that the inherent characteristics of the staple affect the size of the production unit. Sugar cane, for example, requires large plantations, while wheat can be grown on small farms; plantations often require large numbers of laborers, while wheat can be grown by a small group. However, it is clear that he accepts that the size of the production unit is a function of crop properties.

[13] Hirschman, "A Generalized Linkage," 98. Melville H. Watkins is of the same opinion. Watkins, "A Staple," 146–147. See also Richard E. Caves, "Export-Led Growth and The New Economic History," in *Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger* edited by J. N. Bhagwati, et al., (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1971).

The relevance of the botanical properties of the staple are further highlighted through the study of linkages. Ritter and Hirschman both note that the likelihood of development of a region is affected by the extent of linkages created by the export sector within the domestic economy. Profits (or savings) from the export sector can be invested into secondary or tertiary industries that are responses to the consumer demand of those engaged in the production of the staple (final demand linkage). Those profits might be used to establish industries for further processing of the staple (forward linkage), or for creating transportation facilities (mule trains, railroads, etc.) that employ part of the population (backward linkages).

Another linkage seldom taken into account is the fiscal linkage, or government role in the absence of "physical" linkages. This is important in the instance of Latin America. Dependentistas claim that almost all export-led economies behave like enclaves, meaning that most of the surplus generated by these economies does not accrue to the domestic economies. In other words, entrepreneurs in the export sector expatriate most of the profits created in enclaves. Recent research has shown that the enclave conception needs some revision. For example, in his study of the nineteenth century Guano industry of Peru, S. J. Hunt states that Peruvian contractors as well as the Peruvian government derived high income from that export. The Peruvian government collected duties on Guano that represented 57–59 percent (381–432 million pesos) of the value in final sales of the staple. Peruvian contractors' share of the trade amounted to 60–80 million pesos (8–11 percent).[14] A monograph on the cotton industry in nineteenth century Peru argues that the capital needed to fund the expansion of cotton cultivation came from Guano-export merchants. Thus, this so called enclave economy—defined as a trade sector that has no physical linkages with the rest of the economy—did have strong fiscal linkage and high profits for the entrepreneurs.[15] Hirschman concluded, "If the state levies taxes on these incomes and channels the proceeds into productive investments, it is possible to speak of fiscal linkages of the staple to be contrasted with, again, more direct physical (or production) linkages."[16] This is obvious in the case of an enclave but fiscal linkages, too, can be found in export-led economies with properly developed linkages. The Staple Model underlines the conclusion that "the obstacles or benefit for development are to be found in the internal pattern of the economy and not in the external pattern of international trade."[17]

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[14] S. J. Hunt, *Growth and Guano in Nineteenth Century Peru,* Discussion Paper Number 34, Research Program in Economic Development, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1973.

[15] W. S. Bell, *An Essay on the Peruvian Cotton Industry, 1825–1920.* Working Paper 6, Centre for Latin American Studies, (Liverpool, University of Liverpool, 1985). Bell questions the propriety of using the concept "enclave" and offers some criticism and alternatives to that definition.

Some scholars employ the staple thesis for an explanation of development and underdevelopment. This study does not attempt to use the paradigm for similar goals; it is more an analysis of the genesis and growth of the cacao economy in Caracas in general and specifically the region of San Felipe and its jurisdiction. It concentrates on the peculiar characteristics of one staple, cacao, the work requirements associated with it, and the inputs necessary for its cultivation, transportation and storage.

The significance of export-led economies in explaining the economic history of Latin America is clear. It is obvious that staples for export became important to European settlers early in the colonial period. The pattern of staple development opens with the introduction of the cultigen into the metropolitan market, or, as in the case of cacao, an extra regional market. As demand increases and prices go up, cultivation spreads to climatically suitable regions. Sugar cane production represents one particular pattern of development. As a result of demand in Europe, in Brazil, cultivation of sugar for export began in the early sixteenth century. Sugar production in the Lesser Antilles during the mid-1600s brought those islands into the sugar cane plantation economy. The volume of sugar production for export increased with the arrival of the Dutch (1650s) in the Leeward Islands. Dutch sugar-making techniques and cane cultivation brought from Brazil spread. The French in Martinique and the British in Barbados (1640s) and Jamaica (1700s) competed against Brazilians for the sugar market. Prices decreased steadily with increased production on new lands. A planter was competitive within such a market only by reducing costs. Those who failed to adapt to changing conditions were driven out of the market. In this manner, fortunes were made and lost on sugar.

To a certain degree this pattern was followed by other staples, such as tobacco, cotton, wheat, rice, cacao, indigo, coffee and rubber. Even today the economies of many Latin American nations continue to rely on the export of a single staple. Prosperity is often determined by outside forces, especially the performance of the cultigen or raw material in the world market.

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[16] Hirschman, "A Generalized Linkage," 73–77.

[17] H. Myint, "The Gains from International Trade and the Backward Countries," *The Review of Economic Studies* 22 (1954–55): 141.

MacLeod describes graphically a transformation of colonial Central America that compares with changes caused by monoculture in the rest of the Latin American economies. He observes:

> Once sixteenth and seventeenth century Spaniards found a sure source of rapid wealth, there was a definite tendency to abandon or at least neglect other economic activities in favor of the new dynamic industry. This concentration on one product was not absolute, of course. Some industries and crops survived in various stages of health and decay throughout the colonial period. Others disappeared and then revived when the enthusiasm for another product had passed. Both comparatively and absolutely, however, there is a marked tendency in Central American colonial history towards monoculture—the logical result of a determined drive by the dominant class to obtain rapid wealth from unprocessed natural resources.[18]

Silver, gold and monocultures were predominant in these early export-led economies. As soon as Europe developed a taste for a New World cultigen, appropriate natural and human resources were allocated to encourage cultivation of the staple for export to the Old World. Production factors (land, labor and capital) were shifted from declining crops to more profitable ones. Even within an economy dominated by a single cultigen, one decaying region was supplanted by a new region in production for the market. Large areas, in some cases whole islands, depended on one crop for most of their livelihood. Although subsistence endeavors were present, export-led factors predominated as a source of national income.

One finds a similar pattern in the cacao regions. Cacao was cultivated in pre-Columbian times in Mexico and Central America. When production declined there in the sixteenth century, cultivation shifted to Guayaquil and Venezuela in the seventeenth century. Later, with greater demand for chocolate in Europe, Brazil entered the cacao market. During the eighteenth century, cacao was collected along the banks of the Amazon from trees that grew wild there.

The emphasis scholars of Latin America have placed on the predominance of an export-led economy in Latin America, has prompted a word of caution. William B. Taylor, for example, observes that there is an inclination to focus on the export-led model in the study of Latin American economies. He notes that although scholars point to the existence of a "market oriented enterprise" linked to North Atlantic economies, which in turn influenced labor, capital and land tenure in Latin America, this impact was not obvious in all aspects of Latin American life. Taylor believes that Latin America between Conquest and the 1870s was in a precapitalist state. Under such conditions,

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[18] Murdo J. MacLeod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History. 1520–1720*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): 47.

> many rural areas in this largely rural part of the world were subject mainly to tributary demands by the state and church and to the seasonal labor requirements of haciendas, mines, and other employers—by which elites enriched themselves without drastically changing the local economy—leaving room in most areas of highland Latin America for local decisions and social structures based on personal relations, local knowledge, and particular characteristics of local economies.[19]

Van Young's findings in his study of Guadalajara support this contention. Van Young concedes that although economic growth of the city and region of Guadalajara can be attributed to "exogenous factors," continued and sustained growth afterwards can be based only on internal factors.[20] The city progressively became the focus of the economic activity of the region.

Exogenous and internal factors have an impact on regional economies. While this was true in specific locales of Latin America, monocultural output of a particular crop was dominant in other areas. The Brazilian colonial economy illustrates this point. Caio Prado believes that the Brazilian colonial economy was organized and functioned "solely for the production and export" of several commodities. If there was any economic activity beyond the export region, it was definitely linked to these export-led economies. To explain, then, the colonial economy of Brazil, one must consider "the way in which the production of the commodities that provided the basis of the colony's wealth and activities was organized."[21] He concludes that the motive for Brazilian colonization was the desire for plantation colonies to produce highly priced staples such as sugar, cotton, and gold, for supply to the

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[19] William B. Taylor, "Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry Into Early American Social History, 1500–1900," in Olivier Zunz, *Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985): 167.

[20] Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth Century Mexico: The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region 1675–1820*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): 349–351.

[21] Caio Prado, *The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967): 133.

European market,[22] thus creating wealth from the comparative advantage of staple exports.

Cacao is an American cultigen known by the scientific name of *Theobroma cacao L.* of the genus Theobroma which means "food for the gods." The name derives from the Greek words *theos*-god and *broma*-food.[23] Although some confusion exists as to its varieties, most scholars are inclined to follow E. E. Cheesman's classification and nomenclature. Cheesman refuses to call them varieties, preferring the term "groups" or "forms." He accepts as the most plausible classification the following two broad groups:

1. Criollo
   a. Central American Criollos
   b. South American Criollos
2. Forastero
   a. Amazonian Forasteros
   b. Trinitarios (Trinidad)

Cheesman notes that the "Amazonian" type is a "pure non-Criollo population," while the *Trinitarios* are a "hybrid population of recent origin."[24] The term "criollo" was coined in Venezuela by a cacao hacendado early in the nineteenth century. With the introduction of hybrid cacao from Trinidad into Venezuela, the hacendados named the existing form as *criollo* (domestic) and the hybrid from Trinidad, *forastero* (foreigner). The differences between the two were obvious to the hacendados. It is important to note that the only criteria utilized to establish a division into types are the pod (*mazorca*) and the grains (*granos*) or bean. Except for these two elements, all cacao trees, regardless of forms or types, are the same. Experts have not satisfactorily established the common origin of the criollo and forastero types.[25] This study, however, accepts Central America as the region of possible common origin for all types of cacao.[26]

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[22] Ibid., 134.

[23] Réné Francis Millon, "When Money Grew on Trees: A Study of Cacao in Ancient America," Ph.D. diss., (Columbia University 1955): 11; Enrique Perez Arbelaez, *Manual del cacaotero Venezolano*, (Caracas: Cooperativa de Artes Gràficas, 1937): 67–68.

[24] E. E. Cheesman, "Notes on the Nomenclature, Classification and possible Relationships of Cacao Populations," *Tropical Agriculture* 21, 8 (1944): 145–146.

[25] Perez Arbelaez, *Manual*, 75.

[26] Cheesman advances the hypothesis that such a center must be in Central America because, following the Vavilov principle, "both (Criollo and Forastero) still occur there, whereas nothing is known of any indigenous Forastero type beyond the Panama Isthmus." According to Vazquez de Espinosa's [Antonio Vazquez Espinosa *Compendium and Description of the West Indies* Translated by Charles Upson Clark. Miscellaneous Collections 102, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1942)] description, there must have been

Cacao belongs to a primeval forest ecology, one that is delicately balanced between animals, plants and climate. In this eco-system, one finds several elements which contribute to each other's existence. The vast canopy of the rain forest provides shade, humidity and nutrients to the lower-level plants and animals. The deciduous trees of the eco-system contribute nutrients (Humus) from their fallen leaves. This humus contains decomposed organic matter in which bacterias have worked to create a natural soil fertilizer. On top of this subhorizon, as the botanist calls the decomposed organic matter, there is a horizon of slowly decomposing residual vegetation that serves to aerate the soil and helps it to keep a stable temperature.

In a man made eco-system, as on a hacienda, this upper horizon is formed from cacao leaves, leaves and flowers from the shade trees, and weeds scattered about the soil after weeding (deshierbo). The horizon acts to preserve humidity during the dry season and maintains a stable daily temperature in the soil. The cacao trees take their nitrates from this humus when it decomposes. These nitrates are formed by the action of microorganisms on this fallen vegetation. Thus, this topsoil is really a living organism that, in a man-made environment, needs careful attention to survive.[27]

The cacao tree needs not only a suitable humus[28] but proper rains as well. Cacao trees can resist droughts, as long as they are not prolonged. Long and heavy rains can wash away the nutrients and affect the cacao adversely. For these reasons, a man-

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more than one type cultivated in Central America in the early seventeenth century. In his description of the pods, he writes: "The outer skin is hard and almost a finger thick; some are red, others yellowish, others red and white, still others green . . . , this pulp is bittersweet and very soft." With Cheesman's botanical description of the Criollo and Forastero forms, one might surmise that either or both forms were cultivated in Central America at the time. One must remember that Cheesman described the Forastero pod as green, and yellowish when ripe. In addition, one must ask why cacao was domesticated first in Mesoamerica and not South America. Cheesman does not give much credence to the possibility of domestication in Central America. He does point out that no Forastero type has been found north of Panama. Cheesman may be incorrect in stating that both varieties are not found together north of the Isthmus of Panama. As it appears plausible that the Criollo and Forastero types may have coexisted in Central America as early as the seventeenth century, it may be equally consistent with the Vavilov principle to conjecture a possible Central American or Mesoamerican origin for cacao. Furthermore, one must contend with another challenge to the theory of cacao's South American origins: ethnographic evidence. While cacao was first domesticated among the Mesoamerican populations, and it was widely grown and consumed by them in pre-Columbian times, there are no references to its use among the Incas, the highest of South America's indigenous civilizations at the time of the Spanish conquest.

[27] Nava, *Cacao, café y té 218.*

[28] Michael T. Hamerly, "A social and economic history of the city and district of Guayaquil during the late colonial and independence periods," Ph.D. diss., (University of Florida, 1970): 16.

made ecology must provide for canals, not only for irrigation but for drainage as well.[29] Location is an important factor within the cacao eco-system. An excessive amount of rainfall in a given location may be insufficient for a different geographic setting. Loose sandy soil needs more precipitation than compact laterite soil. In the latter, too much rain will leach the soil of nutrients. In the former, abundant rain will result in better yields per acre, since loose soil will allow water to filter through and be wasted.

One necessary component of the cacao ecosystem is shade. Shade trees protect the cacao tree from winds, rays of the sun and heavy precipitation that could affect pollination. Strong winds not only alter the suitable atmospheric temperature for the cacao tree, but can damage the tree as well. Too much sun has a peculiar impact on cacao tree yields. In an open field where cacao trees receive more sun than usual, yields will increase; the tree will produce sooner, but its productive life will be shortened. Nava states, "When cacao is cultivated without shade protection, the yield in the early years is high, but decline begins at an earlier stage." This means a shorter life for the tree.[30]

This technique for increasing production was known to cacao cultivators in Mesoamerica, along with its unfortunate results. In a sixteenth century account, *Relación de Santa Maria de la Victoria,* Réné Francis Millon found that yield per acre cultivated "had increased since the arrival of the Spanish by allowing more sun to reach the trees." Millon contends that the Amerindians shifted to this technique under pressure from the Spanish to pay more tribute. That Amerindians knew of this self-defeating technique helps to explain the Soconusco, Suchitepequez and Izalcos cycles of cacao cultivation in Mesoamerica.[31]

Temperature and elevation also limit the area where cacao can be cultivated. Temperature is important because it influences the humidity needed for cacao cultivation. Cacao needs a high relative humidity.[32] For this reason, it is found mostly in the tropics between latitudes 22 North and 15 South. Cacao trees have been cultivated outside these extremes but the yields are considerably lower when compared to yields within the more propitious latitudes. Outside these, the tree vegetates—it continues living but does not yield—if left on its own.[33] An ecological habitat conducive to the growth of healthy cacao trees must include conditions similar to a rain forest. Rainfall, humidity, elevation, temperature, shade, soil conditions, irrigation and drainage limit profitable cacao cultivation to the humid tropics.

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[29] Perez Arbelaez, *Manual,* 24–25.

[30] Ibid., 48. My translation. When the author says "early years" he is referring to the phase when the tree is 12 years old.

[31] Millon, "When Money Grew," 120.

[32] The cacao tree prospers at an average temperature not higher than 30°C (86°F) nor lower than 20°C (68°F). It can be cultivated outside these limits with satisfactory levels of relative humidity. Nava limits the optimum average temperatures between 25°C and 27°C, and the extreme temperatures that allow successful cultivation between 23°C and 28°C. [Perez Arbelaez, *Manual,* 23–24.] He stresses that 15°C temperatures will irreparably damage the trees if they occur frequently. Temperatures higher than 35°C will cause the tree to vegetate and be unattractive for commercial purposes. Still, if properly shaded, the cacao tree thrives between 16°C and 35°C. [Nava, *Cacao,* 18.]

Certain places in Mesoamerica where cacao was first domesticated in pre-Columbian times possess suitable conditions for its cultivation. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, the principal cacao regions in Mesoamerica were Tabasco (Isthmus of Tehuantepec), Soconusco (South West Mexico and Southern Chiapas), Suchitepequez (Southern Guatemala), and the Sula Valley (Caribbean Honduras). Secondary regions of cacao production in pre-Columbian times included Quauhtochco, Cuatlaxtlan, Tochtpec (Gulf of Mexico), Cihuatlan (Pacific Mexico), Nito (Caribbean British Honduras), Cahabon River (Guatemala), Chiquimula (Guatemala - border with Honduras), Guazacapan (Pacific Guatemala) and Nicaragua (between Lake Managua and the Pacific Ocean). There were scattered plantings in Colima (Pacific Mexico), Tuxpan (Gulf of Mexico), Rio Agüan in Honduras, and in Costa Rica: at Nicoya (Pacific), Llanuras de los Güatusos (Caribbean), and the Rio Sijaola (Caribbean).[34]

Scholars argue that cacao reached these regions from Colombia. According to this theory, cacao was domesticated in Mayan areas, and then brought to Southern Mexico in the thirteenth century, where Spaniards encountered it.[35] Bergmann states that it was two millennia ago that cacao was domesticated "by some unknown Indian cultivators, probably in the area of Mayoid language in Middle America."[36] He contends that inhabitants of sixteenth-century Mesoamerica had perfected the cultivation and processing of cacao, and that it was found in the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific Ocean and coastal Yucatan.

From Central America and northern South America, the Spaniards carried Cacao to the Antilles in the sixteenth century. Based on Oviedo's observation, we can assume that it was not found in the West Indies at the time of the Conquest. Cacao trees arrived in Trinidad in the sixteenth century from the Orinoco delta. In Brazil, feral or wild cacao grew spontaneously in the lower and upper Amazon. Some scholars say that cacao reached Venezuela through Maracaibo from Colombia and then spread to central and eastern Venezuela. In 1614 cacao was carried to the Philippines from Acapulco, but it never became as important as it was in Central and South America. In the 1560s the Spaniards introduced it to the East Indies, from there it passed into Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Java in the nineteenth century.[37]

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[33] Pittier, *Apuntaciones*, 199.

[34] John F. Bergmann, "The Distribution of Cacao Cultivation in Pre-Columbian America," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 59, (March 1959): 86.

[35] Nava and Cheesman both endorse this contention.

[36] Bergmann, "The Distribution," 93.

In pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, cacao was cultivated for consumption by the noble classes, who prepared it in a beverage. It was used also as currency in trade transactions. Large amounts of cacao were consumed in the Mexican central plateau, where the lake city of Tenochtitlan was the center of political cultural and economic power in Mesoamerica at the time of the Spanish conquest. This use of cacao as a drink, called chocolatl, and as currency, can be traced back to the Mayas. They grew cacao on the Pacific lowlands from Soconusco (Chiapas) to Nicaragua. The Mayans found suitable conditions for cultivation of cacao at elevations of 600m (1968 ft.). In this area one finds a monsoon belt that includes the heavy shade and wind shelter so necessary for efficient cacao cultivation. Great amounts of cacao were traded and offered as tribute to the Aztecs.[38]

Cacao trade and tribute followed a two-pronged course. The trading center at the Mexican plateau bifurcated into a southwestern and southeastern direction. The southwestern direction followed the Pacific roads, passing near Huatulco, and continued on to Soconusco, Northern Guatemala, El Salvador, the Bay of Fonseca, and lacustrine Nicaragua. The southeastern route started in Tabasco and passed through the settlement centers of the Choloid-speaking Mayan Amerindians, across the Petèn, and ended on the south coast of the Gulf of Honduras. Merchants (*Pochteca*) as well as invading Aztec armies followed these routes.[39]

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[37] Nava, *Cacao.* 5, Bergmann, "The Distribution," 87. He wrote that "cacao was not found in the West Indian islands, for which we have Gonzalo Oviedo y Valdès's categorical statement, 'The tree called cacao cacaquat, is not of these islands but of the mainland.' "

[38] Felix Webster MacBryde, "Cultural and Historical Geography of Southwest Guatemala," Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication #4, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1945): 33.

[39] Murdo J. MacLeod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History 1520–1720,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): 31–32.

The Mesoamerican technique of cacao cultivation was quite sophisticated. In some places today they still use the same techniques mastered by the Mesoamericans. Accounts left by Amerindians and Spaniards show that cacao was domesticated and exchanged for tribute. In contrast to the calculated production of the Spaniards, cacao cultivation had religious overtones for the Mesoamericans. A complex ceremonial of chanting and dancing occurred at harvest time. Entire families, and communities, were involved in these harvest ceremonies. Cacao offerings were made at the beginning of the rainy season. Cups of cacao were served to the god of fire and the god of merchants. After the Conquest, cacao was used in the baptism ceremony. Outside of central Mesoamerica, for example in the Yucatan and Nicaragua, Amerindians also participated in ceremonials at the time of harvests.[40] David Browning, reflecting on the religious significance of cacao, believes that

> it is possible that the Indian was never persuaded to regard cacao-growing simply as a money-making exercise. The eclipse of this activity is to be explained in terms of the incompatibility between the grower's perception of the function of the land he used and the demands made upon him by an alien system, rather than simply in terms of demographic decline or external competition."[41]

Regardless of the religious uses cacao may have had among the pre-Columbian inhabitants of Mesoamerica, it is obvious that its cultivation and consumption dropped sharply after the Conquest. In pre-Columbian times, cacao cultivation was a family enterprise within the tribal organization. After conquest slaves were used near Lake Atitlan (Guatemala)—war prisoners from other tribes, not black Africans. They served a lord directly, not the community. Thus, even around Lake Atitlan, mostly families engaged in planting and harvesting cacao for personal consumption and for tribute. In Mesoamerica, cacao was never the basis of a single-crop economy. Those cultivating cacao had subsistence agricultural plots as well. This agrarian organization was found in Soconusco, Guatemala, Tabasco and northern Oaxaca.[42]

Réné Francis Millon lists several features of the pre-Columbian cacao economy that distinguish it from the post-Conquest period. Pre-Columbian cacao economy was based on a familial organization of labor, occasional use of slaves, cacao production within a subsistence economy and a production primarily geared toward consumption and not for a market. In this instance, the small amount traded was considered a luxury commodity. Most of this cacao was produced with techniques similar to those used under Spanish colonial rule. Echoing Vazquez de Espinosa, a sixteenth-century traveler to Nicaragua described how cacao was planted by Amerindians there:

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[40] Millon, "When Money Grew," 114, 118 and 172.

[41] David Browning, *El Salvador: Landscape and Society,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971): 64.

[42] Millon, "When Money Grew," 130 and 180.

> It (cacao) is therefore planted in the woods in moist places, and this not being sufficient, they plant a tree near it that grows larger, and where it has reached a sufficient height, they double down its head so as to shelter the other and shade it, preventing the sun from giving it any annoyance.[43]

Cacao produced in this manner found its way to the Aztecs in the form of tribute.[44] Cacao beans given in tribute were counted using the Indian vigesimal system, as shown in Table 1:

Table 1: The Mesoamerican Vigesimal System

1 zontle =	400 cacao beans
1 jiquipil =	8,000 cacao beans
1 carga =	24,000 cacao beans

Source: Woodrow W. Borah and Sherburne F. Cooke, "Price Trends Of Some Basic Commodities in Central Mexico, 1531–1570," *Iberoamericana* # 40, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 12. A load (carga) was the amount a human bearer was capable of handling. To the Spaniards, it meant about two arrobas (of 25 pounds), or 50 pounds.[45] 20 zontles = 1 jiquipil; 3 Jiquipiles = 1 carga.

If Torquemada is to be believed, Moctezuma's warehouses contained approximately 40,000 loads of cacao at the time of Cortes's arrival. Given the above equivalencies, this means that Moctezuma exacted from cacao-producing provinces nearly 1,000 tons (910 metric tons). Since one scholar has estimated that annual aboriginal production was 1,350 tons, it is possible that more than two-thirds of provincial production went into tribute to the Aztecs.[46] Based on the *Codex Mendoza* cacao production has been estimated as shown in Table 2. These figures suggest that Soconusco alone provided almost one-third of the cacao which entered Moctezuma's warehouse as tribute.

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[43] Ibid., 118.

[44] Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule. A History of the Amerindians of the Valley of Mèxico. 1519–1810.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964): 348.

[45] According to Dora Leon Borja (Szasdi) and Adam Szasdi Nagy—"El comercio del cacao de Guayaquil," *Revista De Historia De América* 57–58 (Jan.-Dec., 1964): 3, footnote 9—these weights were used in the following provinces: Caracas, 110 pounds per Fanega; Maracaibo, 96 pounds per Fanega; Magdalena in Colombia, 250 pounds per Carga; in Guatemala, 60 pounds per Carga; and in Guayaquil, 81 pounds per Carga.

Table 2: Cacao Tributes in Pre-Columbian Times

Province	*Location*	*Tribute in cacao*
Cihuatlan	Guerrero-North Coast	80 bales
Soconusco	Southern Chiapas	400 loads
Tochtepec	S. Veracruz and N. Oaxaca	200 loads
Cuetlaxtan	C. Veracruz and E. Puebla	200 loads
Quauhtochco	C. Veracruz	20 loads

Source: Frances Millon, "When Money Grew," 139.

Not surprisingly, the Spanish chose Soconusco to plant cacao. In 1570 Lopez de Velasco observed at Soconusco that Amerindians inhabited forested slopes because of cacao, "which yields best in country that is hilly, hot and humid."[47] Cacao orchards prospered under Spanish encomenderos, even when population declined.[48] Between 1524 and 1544, cacao prices remained stable in the principal market of Mexico City. Cacao production for 1562 was estimated at 3,000 loads, which increased to 4,000 loads in 1574. For the latter year, production in Suchitepequez in the Audiencia of Guatemala was calculated at 1,000 loads.[49] Faced with Indian population decline in the lowlands, Spaniards relied on the highland population to provide laborers for the cacao plantations. With decreased output of cacao groves in the Soconusco area during the 1550s, Spaniards moved to areas where cacao grew effectively, as in Suchitepequez and Izalco (Salvador). Their answer to the population decline encountered there was the same as it had been in Soconusco—they forced Indian laborers from the highlands on to the plantations. Although African slaves were found in Guatemala early in the sixteenth century, they were rarely used for cacao cultivation on the Pacific coastal lowlands (Soconusco, Suchitepequez and Izalco).[50]

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[46] Millon, "When Money Grew," 114 and 213.
[47] MacLeod, *Spanish Central America*, 76.
[48] Browning, *El Salvador*, 62.
[49] Millon, "When Money Grew," 115.
[50] MacBryde, "Cultural and Historical," 13.

The transformations witnessed in Soconusco were repeated in other cacao regions. One Spaniard's account dated in 1570 describes the town of Ystapan as "rich in cacao, there being many groves, with so much cacao that the Indians cannot process it. Though it used to be a large town, it has declined greatly because of numerous deaths. Many groves had to be abandoned without anyone to harvest and process them."[51]

When Spaniards reached the province of Izalcos (present-day El Salvador), they found that cacao consumption and production followed patterns similar to those in Soconusco. Cacao was used as a drink (chocolate), as money, in religious ceremonies and in general as an article of consumption for the privileged classes.[52]

The town of Izalco, and its cacao region, lies in present-day southern El Salvador. It faces the foothills of the western section of the central volcanic highlands. In the 1530s, Spaniards arrived at Indian villages in the region where there was substantial cacao production. In contrast to Soconusco, where most of the producers and traders of cacao were encomenderos, Spaniards involved in the cacao trade of Izalco were mostly merchants. This is one reason for the different settlement patterns and forms of cacao production in the two regions.

Izalcan merchants mostly interested in the cacao trade and not in its production left the Indian communities relatively untouched. They did not interfere in the daily life of the Amerindians, although they did supervise the cultivation, collection and shipment of cacao. Moreover, production surpassed that of Soconusco. By 1574, Izalco produced 50,000 loads of cacao. An early (1549) description of the Izalco cacao region described methods of cultivation in use and noted increased activity:

> Some of the cacao orchards are on flat land, others on rising ground and others on the hillsides, depending on the suitability of the land for irrigation; yes, it is true, they use irrigation, though in the rainy season it is not necessary . . . and there are orchards that have 15,000, 10,000, 8,000 and 5,000 trees . . . each day and each year they are planting new orchards, rooting out old trees and replacing them with new ones. Daily the production increases. The only work the Amerindians must do to tend these orchards is to clear the weeds from under the trees, irrigate them in summer and pick the fruit; and thus they spend much time rest-

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[51] Ibid., 11.

[52] Browning, *El Salvador,* 12–13.

ing in their houses, for there are many Amerindians visiting them with goods to exchange for what they produce. . . . [53]

This technique of tree transplantation has been documented for the Tabasco area as well. It was here that Spaniards sought an increase in production by forcing Amerindians to reduce shade on the trees. Although it cannot be determined where this technique originated—if from Tabasco to Izalcos or vice-versa—the transplanting technique was widespread. It was associated with the absence of shade which led to a shorter period of production. Decayed tress were replaced by young trees, thus maintaining or increasing output.

This fact is important in the history of the Soconusco-Suchitepequez-Izalco cacao economy, and perhaps for Mesoamerica as a whole. As noted, cacao production in Soconusco started a decline in the 1550s that reached bottom in the 1580s. By the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, a similar process was obvious in Izalcos. Production declined as it had in Soconusco. Some scholars offer the demographic variable to explain what occurred. Borah and Cook, and others after them, observe that the decline in cacao production in those areas was caused by the presence of fewer Amerindians. It is unquestionable that population decline had an adverse effect on cacao production in Mesoamerica at the end of the sixteenth century. However, demographic breakdown is not the only nor most important explanation for the marked decrease in yield of cacao in the region.

As noted, Browning argues that the cause or causes must be found in the deterioration of the Indian culture, which eroded by the increased presence of persons with another world view. Indians lost an interest in life. This was a profound and devastating transformation, as traditions and norms of individuals and communities were shattered. This abrupt transition is ably documented in works by Charles Gibson on the Valley of Mexico and Nathan Wachtel on the Peruvian highlands. Their contributions grappling with how different cultures confront and impact upon one another, are useful for an understanding of the Indian condition over the long term. These authors help to clarify Indian spiritual acculturation. Their models, however, do not help to explain the rapid decay of cacao output over the short term. Answers must be sought elsewhere.

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[53] Ibid., 56. This is Browning's translation.

The decline of cacao production in Central America can be found in the botanical properties of the cultigen, and in the cultivation techniques of the aboriginals. MacLeod advances the following explanation for the decline of cacao yields in Soconusco:

> As more and more groves were planted much of the original forest must have been cut, thus leaching the soil, increasing erosion, and lowering overall yields. The decision in 1568 to start four cattle ranches to provide local meat at lower prices for the hard-pressed inhabitants, and the increasing number of cattle ranches thereafter, suggests that some of the land was becoming grass-covered. By the late seventeenth century grazing became more important than cacao in Soconusco.[54]

Although MacLeod's argument is merely suggestive, other sources lend support to it. As previously seen, Millon uncovered a document (the *Relación*) which shows how Spaniards forced Tabasco Amerindians to permit more sun into cacao orchards. From Nava's encyclopedic book, we learn that yields per acre from a cacao plantation can be increased with more sunlight in the cacao eco-system,[55] but the productive life of the tree will diminish. Thus, in the short term, cacao trees will increase yield; in the long term, production will decrease.

In the Izalco region, intensive cultivation of cacao was achieved by means of the same technique of transplantation that Millon found in Tabasco: the constant replacement of trees upon decreased output. This technique, besides reducing the productive life of the tree, depletes the soil and creates clearings (calvas). These clearings are harmful to the cacao plantation because they affect the surrounding temperature, humidity, and consistency of the soil.

Another fact that supports MacLeod's suggestion is the demographic curve of Izalcos. In contrast to the Soconusco experience, the population disruption in Izalcos was not quite as marked. While the latter underwent significant population decline, it was not as severe as in Soconusco. A list of tribute payers gathered by Browning and shown in Table 3 helps to show this pattern.

This table points to a small population loss in Izalcos. There, the demographic variable is of lesser significance than the practice of intensive cultivation and the resultant depletion of the soil.

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[54] MacLeod, *Spanish Central America*, 77.

[55] Nava, *Cacao*.

Table 3: Tribute Payers in The Villages of Sonsonate

Years *Village*	*1550*	*1683*	*1770*
Izalco	900	640	1845
Caluco	140	94	100
Guaymoco	220	171	383
Nahuizalco	280	200	862
Juayua	60	46	117
Apaneca	100	154	241
Ataco	160	183	303
Tocuba	100	120	351
Sta. Catarina Nashuat	160	48	154

Source: Browning, *El Salvador,* 63.

If cacao trade was as important to the Spanish in Soconusco, why did they not acquire African slaves? Slaves had been present in Central America since early in the sixteenth century. Surely profits from cacao could have been used for their acquisition. While cacao regions did suffer a severe demographic decline, as in Soconusco, it was the depletion of the soil due to the use of aboriginal techniques of cultivation that best explains reductions in yields. Central American cacao production declined from a high of 150,000 loads annually at the turn of the century, to 25,000 loads by the end of the seventeenth century, to 15,000 loads at the middle of the eighteenth century and a mere 5,000 loads in the beginning of the nineteenth century.[56]

The progressive decline in cacao yields drew other cacao regions into the Mexican market. The Central American cacao regions continued to produce cacao, but not as much as before. The vacuum left by the decline in production out of Central America was filled by Caracas, Guayaquil and Maracaibo. As production in Central America began to decrease in the late 1500s and early 1600s, a new market for cacao began to open up in Europe. The new producing areas in South America were consequently in a favorable position to capture two markets: the traditional market of New Spain, and the new one in Europe.

When widespread demand for cacao started in Europe has not been established with certainty. One scholar, based on the absence of the word "cacao" in scientific works of the epoch, claims that cacao emerged as an important consumer product at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Erneholm argues that since Nicolas Monardes, in his *Historia medicinal de las cosas oue se traen de nuestras Indias Occidentales oue sirven en medicina.* mentions tobacco, coffee, and other cultigens, but not cacao, this would imply that cacao had not reached most markets in Europe, and certainly was not commonly known when this book was written in 1574.[57] Nava states that increased awareness of cacao resulted from the translation of the Spanish physician Colmenero de Ledesma's work. Published in 1631, this work claims cacao could cure several ailments and records a growing European taste for it. Phillippe Sylvestre Dufour's book *Traité Nouveax et Curieux du thé et du chocolat,* a treatise published in Lyon in 1671, substantiates Ledesma's claim with more documentation about European use of cacao.[58]

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[56] Borja (Szasdi), "El comercio del cacao," 11.

At the end of the sixteenth century cacao exports were mentioned in shipping documents. The first small quantities of cacao imported into Spain came from Central America in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These early imports of cacao were prepared in Europe before the nineteenth century in a manner similar to the methods of the Indians of Mesoamerica. Chocolate was made by pulverization of the bean into a powder and boiling it with water, to which honey, maize, chili or other ingredients were added.[59] In Europe the roasted bean was crushed, the cuticles separated from the kernels, and these were ground on a hand mill. Added ingredients might be vanilla, cinnamon or pimento.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the cacao processing industry continued its growth. In 1801, Salvador Sanchez Pareja invented a machine that ground cacao beans. In the early nineteenth century, a Dutch manufacturer, Van Houten, found a way to remove fat from the cacao bean and convert cacao into a powder. This permitted the fabrication of eating chocolate and cocoa. In 1875, the Swiss Daniel Peter introduced milk chocolate, and in 1879 Daniel's countryman, Lindt, made further advances in chocolate production. Before Van Houten's invention, it was impossible to make edible chocolate, because it contains more fat than the beans provide. Eating chocolate contains 42 percent cacao, 42 percent sugar and cacao butter.[60]

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[57] Ivar Erneholm, *Cacao Production in South America. Historical Development and Present Geographical Distribution,* (Goteberg, Sweden: Meddlelands fran Goteborge Hogskolas Geografiska Institution, 1948): 34–35.

[58] Nava, *Cacao,* 8.

[59] Gibson, *The Aztecs,* 349.

After the decline of Central American production, Guayaquil entered New Spain's cacao market. Quito's ties to the Mexican cacao market were enhanced by the presence of shipyards in Guayaquil that built the necessary ships for the trade. Shipbuilding started early in the sixteenth century in Central America. In the 1530s there were shipyards in Acajutla, El Salvador, and in Iztapa, Guatemala. Spaniards in Huatulco built vessels by the middle of the 1540s. Guayaquil excelled in shipbuilding at the end of the sixteenth century because of the abundance of untapped hardwood forests at its disposal.

Huatulco, in Mexico, was the principal port of entry for Guayaquil cacaos sent to the Mexican market. From Huatulco, cacao was taken to Mexico City in pack trains that took several months to reach the city.[61] A significant amount of cacao exports from Guayaquil were registered, beginning in 1593. By the early seventeenth century, cacao was exported from Guayaquil to Peru, Central America and New Spain.

Erneholm affirms that there is no mention of cacao cultivation "in historical documents and historical and geographical accounts from the latter part of the sixteenth century . . . as regards the cultivation of cacao on Guayaquil's coastland."[62] In the early seventeenth century, however, reference to cacao appears with increasing frequency in historical documents pertaining to Perù. Antonio Vazquez de Espinosa described in the seventeenth century the cacao Güaya lowlands as follows:

> Along the banks are many plantations or chacras owned by Guayaquil residents, with cacao trees loaded down with the pods of cacao beans, and other excellent fruit, like oranges in abundance, and limes. These cacao trees are not cultivated with the same devoted pains as in New Spain and Honduras; (but) planting of them has enriched many people and swollen their tithes and revenues.[63]

Vazquez de Espinosa described the eastern half of the Guaya lowlands. This section is tropical: hot, humid, fertile, well watered, and with green luxuriant vegetation—a place with all the features of a rain forest and thus the necessary ecology for cacao cultivation. The chacras he described near Guayaquil were similar to cacao haciendas in the province of Caracas, or maize milpas in Central America. As Vazquez de Espinosa asserts, the chacras were located along the river banks where there would be both efficient drainage and irrigation.

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[60] Hamerly, "A social," 165; Millon, "When Money Grew," 31.

[61] Woodrow W. Borah, "Early colonial trade and navigation between Mexico and Peru," *Iberoamericana* # 38, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 28.

[62] Erneholm, *Cacao Production*, 54.

[63] Vazquez de Espinosa, *Compendium*, 371. The term "chacra" in Peru means cultivated field, small farm, or land in a family subsistence farm. (See also MacBryde, "Cultural and Historical," 17).

In the seventeenth century Guayaquil produced enough of a cacao surplus to be able to send it to distant markets. Its population recognized the possibilities offered by the export of the product to New Spain,—especially prosperity as exports of cacao increased. This prosperity fluctuated with the cacao production curve. From an initial one million-pesos-a-year business in 1600–1615, Guayaquil cacao prices decreased in the 1620s from 36 pesos per arroba to 3 pesos per arroba.[64] This was a clear sign of a glutted market. With an initial upward trend in prices, new areas were cultivated, and an increased number of slaves were brought in for labor. Cacao yields increased, and prices went down again.

Production continued to climb in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From 1700 to 1718, average annual production of cacao was 34,000 cargas, reaching 56,000 cargas in the period 1780 to 1790. Shipments of 130,000 loads were registered as cacao exports for 1820 and 107,048 loads (81 pounds per load) for 1824. This increased production encouraged consolidation of great landed estates in the Güayas lowlands and the southern littoral.[65] The preferred market of the Güayaquileños was New Spain. It has been estimated that Guayaquil cacao was between 50 and 90 percent of the imports of that viceroyalty at the close of the eighteenth century.[66] Europe also was a market for the cacao from Guayaquil, but it reached those markets on foreign Portuguese vessels.

As a result of royal prohibitions against cacao trade with New Spain, issued and re-issued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, large quantities of cacao became contraband. A precise measure of cacao smuggling cannot be determined, but it is certain that most contraband that reached Europe was carried by Dutch vessels. Güayaquileños carried their cacao to the markets of New Spain or Europe by land through Acajutla in El Salvador, or by sea. Vessels would often claim to be in distress to force entry into the ports of Huatulco or Acapulco. While there, they sold their cacao. The other route followed was Rio Atrato in the Darien, from where traders went to Cartagena and sold the cacao to the Dutch. Throughout the colonial period New Spain was the principal market for Ecuadorian cacao.

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[64] John L. Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century.* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 17.

[65] Hamerly, "A Social and Economic History," 141 and 145.

[66] Ibid., 149.

Cacao production in Brazil was different from other regions. There, cacao estates were the exception, as feral (wild) cacao collection was the dominant method. There were attempts at cacao domestication in the Amazon in the 1670s, but these were never on a grand scale. Cultivated cacao gave two harvests per year, while wild cacao yielded only one and it was smaller. Dauril Alden gives four reasons why Brazilians relied on feral cacao gathering instead of cultivation of the staple up to the early nineteenth century. The first is custom. The Portuguese were used to gathering what they wanted from the Amazon rain forest. Second, cacao *bravo* (as opposed to *manso* or cultivated) was found in abundance. Third, for several reasons until after the 1730s, the profitability of a cacao hacienda was very low. Finally, Indian demographics did not allow the fazendeiro an adequate labor pool. The only profitable choice was to collect the cacao from the trees.[67]

Organization of cacao collection had peculiar characteristics. There were collecting parties (*Tropas*), a pilot (*cabo*), canoes and a warehouse. The collecting parties were composed of between 12 to 24 Amerindians in a canoe under a pilot. The canoes were constructed at an approximate cost of 300,000 reis. This expense absorbed 33 percent of the canoe cacao load value in Belem. There was usually more than one canoe in a tropa, with a capacity of 300 to 500 arrobas (of 32 pounds each). The collecting expedition started in December or January, and ended in June or July at the city of Belem, where the cacao was sold. Tropas left their bases of operation (a mission station, a river port, or the city of Belem) in a particular season. The party constructed a warehouse midway between their home base and location of the cacao trees. Upon arrival at the site, the tropa spent six to eight days harvesting cacao, and then storing it in a warehouse. Upon attainment of their load capacity, they returned to Belem, where the party was paid and dismissed after sale of the load.

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[67] Dauril Alden, "The Significance of Cacao Production in The Amazon Region During The Late Colonial Period: An Essay in Comparative Economic History," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 120 (April 1976): 115–116. The section on Brazil is based on this article.

Most of this cacao went to Lisbon, and was later re-exported to Great Britain, France, Holland, the Germanies, Russia, Spain and Italy. Italy received 52 percent of the total cacao exported during the late colonial period (1776–1822). In 1805 Portugal re-exported 82 percent of the cacao it imported from Brazil. The lowest year of re-exportation was 1813, in which 18 percent of the cacao imported from Brazil was re-exported. As Alden aptly points out, this is one phase of the cacao economy that has not been properly researched and might help clarify the international cacao market at the time.

We have seen how the botanical properties of cacao and Indian cultivation techniques explain the Soconusco-Izalco cacao cycle. Increased cacao demand on the Mexican plateau prompted Spanish merchants and encomenderos to exact higher cacao tribute from the Amerindians. The aboriginal response was to open the cacao orchards to more sun, which increased yield per acre but lessened the productive life of the cacao trees. Depletion of the soil and a decrease in production was the result. In this manner, Soconusco's cacao production declined, and Izalco filled Soconusco's share of the market.

The demise of Soconusco and Izalco brought Guayaquil and the Caracas into the Mexican market. Later in the seventeenth century, cacao reached the expanding European market through Spain and Amsterdam. Brazil entered as a greater force within the international market later in the eighteenth century, after production in Venezuela failed to satisfy European demand. The intracolonial and international cacao market grew and prospered, and it is to these markets that we turn in the next sections.

CHAPTER II: CARACAS CACAO MARKET IN VERACRUZ

Caracas cacao came into New Spain through Veracruz. Compared to other important colonial mercantile centers, Veracruz was rather small with a population in the middle of the seventeenth century of about 6,000 inhabitants. By the end of the eighteenth century, its population was more than 20,000 people, to which a floating population of 15,000 muleteers, traders and travelers must be added. Several dirt roads entered Veracruz. From Mexico City and other quarters, no less than 50,000 mules a year, along with wagons, arrived at the port which harbored 200 vessels per year. After cacao was unloaded at the port, it followed a difficult and narrow mule trail into Mexico City.[68]

Veracruz was an important Atlantic port from the early sixteenth century both within the intracolonial economic system and in the larger, expanding international economy. Its importance to the intracolonial trading network increased dramatically as cacao production in southern Mexico and Central America decreased due to soil depletion in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The cultivation techniques employed, such as allowing too much sun to enter the groves, quickly depleted the soil. This opened a cycle that took the Spaniards from Soconusco to Suchitepequez and then to Izalco. Cacao consumption was restricted to the Aztec nobility. Indian commoners used cacao beans mostly as money and few of them dared to convert this valuable specie into a beverage. The Spaniards viewed cacao quite differently. The religious aspects of the cultigen were irrelevant to them. They saw cacao as a means of exchange with the Indian producers and encouraged increased production so that they might acquire a surplus and barter with the Amerindians for the goods which the Spanish desired.

With the steady decrease of output in the Central America region, producers in Quito and Caracas responded.[69] Cristobal de

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[68] Ortiz De La Tabla, *Comercio exterior,* 69 and 89.

[69] Lois Crawford de Roberts, *El Ecuador en la epoca cacaotera. Respuestas locales al aüge y colapso en el ciclo monoexportador,* (Quito, Ecuador: Editorial Universitaria, 1980): 32.

Acuña, a Spanish Jesuit priest, noted in his work, published in Madrid in 1641, that he saw wild cacao trees in the Amazon basin "which if cultivated, would undoubtedly be sufficient to enrich not only one, but many kingdoms." He believed that there was no difference between the cacao tree "which yields this much valued fruit in New Spain" and the one he saw in the Amazon basin.[70] "It is clear," he added, "that with little labor these trees may be cultivated on this river, when, without any help from art, nature alone covers them with abundance of fruit." Thirty years later the first evidence of cacao cultivation appeared in the Amazon. De Acuña's remarks that the cacao bean was "sufficient to enrich" and his description of it as being "much valued" represent an example of awareness by entrepreneurs of the benefits to be derived from the cacao trade.

In the Güayas lowlands of Ecuador cacao trees were introduced to haciendas, or chacras, in response to the demand of the Mexico City market. This process started in the early seventeenth century. The sudden presence of cacao trees there almost a hundred years after the Europeans arrived in the Güayas lowlands suggests that they brought from other places to the lowlands. It seems that the trees were transplanted from places where they grew spontaneously to a location where they could be rationally exploited.

More evidence attesting to an evolutionary pattern, from gathering the cacao bean to its rational cultivation, is found in Maracaibo, Venezuela. The presence of wild cacao trees in the Maracaibo region was revealed in the litigation papers of two Andean towns that disputed the jurisdiction over the Maruma cacao forest[71] which was found in the vicinity of the Rio Pocó. The river was considered the political boundary of the towns of Merida and Trujillo. In 1611, the royal treasurer of the New Kingdom of Granada, Juan Bejuna Escalante, estimated that this cacao forest had over 100,000 trees. The cacao mountain, or forest, was said to be located half a league from Lake Maracaibo at a distance of 20 leagues[72] (60 miles) from the town of Trujillo and 40 leagues (120 miles) from Merida.

The harvest was estimated at 300,000 beans per 200 trees with a value of 6 reales per thousand. The forest yielded two harvests per year: one around Saint John The Baptist Day (June 24) and the other around Christmas. About 200 men were needed to gather the cacao beans and an additional 30 men were needed to protect the workers from rebellious Amerindians. An eyewitness calculated that between 100,000,000 to 150,000,000 beans could be collected in a year with a value of 2,000 reales of eight.[73] There were 24,000 cacao beans in a carga[74] which was considered the standard human load in New Spain. The yearly harvest (150,000,000 beans) represented 6,250 cargas of cacao a year, for an approximate yield of 3,300 fanegas of 96 pounds (the accepted weight for a fanega in that region) per one thousand trees. Considering harvests in other sites, such yields were substantial.[75] At six reales per thousand cacao beans the fanega would cost 34 pesos of eight reales.

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[70] Dauril Alden, "The Significance of Cacao," 103–135.

[71] Hussey, *The Caracas Company*, 253.

[72] (1 league = 3 miles)

The evidence confirming that these were wild cacao trees comes from the verdict given by a royal official. The officer determined that the land should be divided among the vecinos of Maracaibo. He testified that nobody had legal title to the cacao trees under litigation. This legal entanglement shows that vecinos from Merida, Trujillo and Maracaibo were collecting cacao beans from the trees and not cultivating it. Another fact which suggests that the montaña was a wild cacao forest is the condition in which it was maintained. The soil in the cacao forest was so flooded that it made reaching the inner trees impossible. The cacao had to be transported on the backs of human carriers to the lake shore. From the shore it was carried to Cartagena and was later shipped to New Spain.

In the end the Maracaibo's vecinos were granted the rent and administration of the cacao forest. In 1613 Pedro Cronelles and Manuel de Velasco, both royal officials in Maracaibo, delivered 7,904 reales (988 pesos) to the Royal treasurer Bernabe Oñate Mendizabal the product of the rent and administration of the cacao forest for that year. The vecinos of Maracaibo were still exploiting the Montaña in the late seventeenth century. In 1683 the royal treasurer was still collecting money from the auctions on the cacao from Maruma.

Guayaquil (Ecuador) and Caracas (Venezuela) were two important exporters of cacao from South America. The entrance of these two regions into the international cacao market is closely related, and perhaps even entirely attributed to the Mexican market. While Brazil entered the international cacao trade in the late seventeenth century, Ecuador and Venezuela were already exporting cacao by the beginning of that century.

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[73] Ileana Parra Grazzina, "Proceso de formación de la Provincia de Merida, La Grita y ciudad de Maracaibo, 1574–1676," Ph.D. diss., (Universidad de Sevilla, 1984): 214–16. This and the following data on Maruma are based on this dissertation. The silver peso was worth eight reales. Each real had value of 34 maravedis.

[74] (50.7 U.S. pounds)

[75] Woodrow Borah and Sherburne F. Cooke, "Price Trends," 36–37 and 77.

Guayaquil's cacao, as Ecuadorian cacao was known in those times, had its principal market in Mexico. As important as the Mexican cacao market was for Guayaquil, it was considered illegal to trade with New Spain. Several edicts issued by the Spanish crown in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries forbade Guayaquil from exporting cacao into New Spain. The Quiteños (Quito was the capital of Ecuador, then) had to rely on contraband to get their cacao into Mexico, while limiting their legal cacao exports to South America and Spain. Because of the high freight costs of shipping to Spain and the low consumption of Guayaquil cacao in South America, Mexican consumers remained the most important clients of Guayaquil.

Guayaquil's competitors were Caracas and Merida de Maracaibo in the Captaincy General of Venezuela. These two, however, were not capable of satisfying the demand thus leaving room for Guayaquil.[76] While Caracas and Maracaibo sold their cacao in the Atlantic port of Veracruz, Guayaquil smuggled its cacao through the Pacific shores of New Spain and Central America. In 1693, the competition from Guayaquil so much alarmed the Caraqueño growers that in a municipal council meeting they expressed their concern over the low prices obtaining from their cacao due to the presence in the Mexican market of cacao from Guayaquil.[77] They did not see the competition from Guayaquil as fair. Güayaquileño cacao traders did not pay duties and, thus, their cacao prices were lower than the Caraqueños'. Confronted with this, the province of Caracas cacao traders had two choices. Either they would lower their prices, and this would have meant lower, or perhaps no, returns, or they would have to withdraw from the Veracruz market. This last choice was out of the question. They chose to lower their prices. As we will see, they brought in their cacao through contraband channels and avoided government duties in Mexico that would have increased their

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[76] Stephen J. Homick, "Reform and Rebellion in Western Venezuela: A History of the Province of Merida de Maracaibo 1739–1784" Ph. D. Diss. (University of Connecticut, 1985)

[77] Enrique Bernardo Nuñez, *Cacao,* Ensayo y prologo de Orlando Araujo, Colección Cuatricentenario de Caracas, (Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 1972): 107. This book is a transcription and compilation of the minutes of the city of Caracas municipal council -Actas del Cabildo de Caracas. The following quote is from Tomo XXXV, Año de 1693, Folio 44 y vto. Cabildo del 9 de marzo de 1693 ". . . :que havia en esta ciudad noticia siertta del poco valor que tenian los fruttos de cacao de estta provincia en la de Mexico por la abundancia del de Guayaquil. . . ."

Table 4: Ecuador Annual Cacao Harvest: 1700–1825

Years	*In Cargas*	*In Fanegas*
1700–1718	34,000	25,036
1719	18,000	13,255
1729–1736	35,000	25,772
1737–1741	40,000	29,455
1765	34,060	25,080
1772–1779	40,000	29,455
1780–1790	56,000	41,236
1802	100,000	73,636
1809	150,000	110,455
1821–1825	180,000	132,545
Total	687,060	505,925

Source: Borja Szasdi, "El comercio del cacao," 141. Cargas = 81 pounds; Fanegas = 110 pounds

product prices. This, however, was not a long term solution and they continued their fight with royal government authorities concerning this matter. Eight years later, in 6 June 1701, the Caraqueños sent a representative to the Spanish courts to raise the grievance directly to the king.[78] To the end of the eighteenth century, the minutes of the cabildo are interspersed with clamors bearing on the unfair competition from Guayaquil.

It is difficult to determine the amount of cacao from Ecuador that went into contraband because the trade was illegal for both Mexico and Ecuador. But it has been estimated that two-thirds of the annual cacao harvest from Guayaquil was legally exported.[79] Dora Leon Borja and Adam Szasdi[80] have estimated the following average annual Cacao harvest shown in Table 4 for the years 1700 to 1825.

It is not surprising that these totals are low since they were based on total legal exports of cacao. Nevertheless, the figures are reliable for determining the drift of production. The estimates show the annual yield drifted up from 34,000 cargas in 1700–1718 to a high of 180,000 cargas or 132,545 fanegas, in 1821–1825, with an annual average of 21,160 cargas. The 1772–1825 totals include the cacao exported to Mexico that was declared legal in 1774.[81]

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[78] Ibid., 120. (Tomo LXIV Folios 152 vto. 153 y vto. Cabildo del 6 de junio de 1701.)

[79] Hamerly, "A Social and Economic History," 145.

[80] Dora Leon Borja Szasdi and Adam Szasdi Nagy, "El comercio del cacao de Guayaquil," *Revista de Historia de Amèrica*, 57–58 (Jan.–Dec. 1964): 141.

[81] Javier Ortiz De La Tabla Ducasse, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1778–1821. Crisis de dependencia*, (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1978): 142.

From 1775 to 1785 Guayaquil exported legally to Mexico a grand total of 74,075 fanegas. Each fanega consisted of 110 pounds. For this period cacao exports to Mexico averaged 6,734 fanegas per year. Guayaquil was responsible for approximately 55 percent of the total amount of cacao imported by Mexico from 1774 to 1785. The Mexican market was vital to the Ecuadoran economy to that extent before and after the legalization of the trade with Mexico. In the quinquennium of 1784–88 Guayaquil introduced into New Spain a total of 45,096 fanegas of cacao.[82]

There is no possible comparison between the pre-1775 period (illegal commerce) and the legal period because no documentation is available. Evidence for the latter attests to a peak in exports to Mexico in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the twenty-five year period starting in 1784 and ending in 1808 Guayaquil legally introduced in New Spain 335,230 fanegas or 46.2 percent of the total amount of cacao imported by Mexico in those years. In the five years after 1804 Ecuador sold 157,477 fanegas in the Mexican market. This translates into a 66.5 percent of all the cacao that entered New Spain in this quinquennium.[83]

The importance of the Mexican market for Ecuador cannot be overstated. However Guayaquil's cacao had other markets as well. The Portuguese and the Dutch acquired the precious cargo through illegal channels and carried it to the European market. Cacao from Guayaquil reached Spain even though freight rates in this route were very high. From 13 September 1761 to 17 January 1762, a little over four months, several ships offered for sale in Spain no less than 23,941 quintals[84] or approximately 21,765 fanegas of Ecuador's cacao.[85] In 1767, the municipal council of the city of Caracas sent the king a report complaining of the illegal intrusion of the Güayaquileños in Spain's cacao market.[86] In the report, the Caraqueños asked the king for his arbitration on their favor. It has not been possible to establish the yearly Guayaquil cacao exports to Spain, but as we will see Caracas dominated that market for most of the eighteenth century.

Another strong exporter of cacao to Mexico was Maracaibo. This city located on the shores of the lake of the same name in southwestern Venezuela earned the early recognition of the

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[82] Ibid., 141.

[83] Ibid., 142.

[84] (one quintal = 100 pounds)

[85] Hussey, *Caracas Company,* 189.

[86] Nuñez, *Cacao,* 215.

Table 5: Cacao Equivalence to Spanish Specie

125,000 cacao beans (not pods)	125 Pesos
1,000 cacao beans	1 Pesos
500 cacao beans	4 Pesos
250 cacao beans	2 Pesos
125 cacao beans	1 Pesos
62 cacao beans	4 Reals

Ileana Parra Grazzina, "Proceso de formación de la Provincia de Merida, La Grita y ciudad de Maracaibo, 1574–1676," Ph.D. diss., (Universidad de Sevilla, 1984): 214–16.

crown when the province was named after Maracaibo in 1676.[87] In that year Maracaibo was incorporated into the Gobernación de Merida y La Grita. From that moment on Maracaibo was named the capital of the province. After 1678 Maracaibo became the center of this Andean Province.[88] Maracaibo was the second most important cacao exporter of the captaincy general of Caracas during the seventeenth century and for the most part of the eighteenth. However it never reached the importance of Caracas.

Late in the sixteenth century Maracaibo reportedly exported cacao.[89] By 1605, Maracaibo sent 180,000 cargas of cacao to Cartagena. In 1613 merchants exported cacao to New Spain where "it was more valuable."[90] So advanced was the cacao trade by 1610 that traders used a rate of exchange which meticulously listed the equivalencies between the cacao beans and Spanish specie. Table 5 lists the rate of exchange.

This custom must have spread from Mesoamerica where, as we saw, the equivalencies between cacao and Spanish money originated. It is also evidence of the circulation of knowledge concerning the cacao market in Mexico and, of course, its cultivation.

Further evidence of the importance of cacao for the region comes from cacao tithes and cultivation. In 1627 the jurisdiction of San Antonio de Gibraltar in Maracaibo reportedly raised 2,000 pesos in cacao tithes, an amount that increased to 3,000 pesos in 1628. A Jesuit priest writing between 1643 and 1652 described one of the trade fairs of the region. He pointed out that the priests exchanged cacao for merchandise and money from Spain and

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[87] Parra, "Proceso de formación," 162.

[88] Guillermo Moron, *La estructura provincial*, Vol. 3 of *Historia de Venezuela*, (Caracas: Italgráfica, 1971): 413.

[89] Eduardo Arcila Farias, *Comercio entre México y Venezuela*, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1945): 72–79.

[90] Parra, "Proceso de formación," 211–212.

Mèxico. A hacienda in Gibraltar owned by the same religious order produced 41 million beans from 1657 to 1664.[91] Following cacao's par value to the Spanish real these harvests were worth the considerable sum of 41,829 pesos of eight reales. If we take into account that the rate of exchange used in this computation is based upon equivalencies of 1610, the value of these harvests should have been higher.

Cacao exported through Maracaibo was not solely from the lacustrine region surrounding that town; it also came from the Venezuelan Andes where it was cultivated and found wild in the jurisdiction of the Andean town of Trujillo. This cacao was transported to Gibraltar and from here to Veracruz. Cacao was abundant in the Andean highlands and was collected and cultivated by Jesuit priests. In Trujillo they were granted 30 fanegas of land in the Pocó valleys in 1629 and later in 1630[92].

Maracaibo exported little cacao to Veracruz during the first half of the eighteenth century.[93] For the later period 1774–1785, Maracaibo was a distant third in cacao sales in Mèxico. During these years Maracaibo sold a total of 15,832 fanegas of cacao in Mèxico. This represented 11.8 percent of all the cacao imported to that region with an annual average of 1,319 fanegas. For 1784–1808, however, Maracaibo increased its exports to New Spain enough to become the second major supplier of cacao. In this span of time Maracaibo was responsible for 189,071 fanegas or 26 percent of the total amount of cacao sold in New Spain.[94] Thus it is in the later part of the eighteenth century that Maracaibo obtained a strong second position in the Mexican market. Nevertheless, Guayaquil remained the number one exporter of cacao to Mèxico with 55 percent of all cacao imported by Mexico for the period 1774–1785 and 46 percent for the period 1784–1808.

The importance of the Mexican cacao market for Guayaquil and Maracaibo was based on the silver coins they obtained for the sale of their cacao there. For this reason, as well as the decline in production of the Mesoamerican producing regions, Caracas sought to carry its cacao to New Spain early in the seventeenth century. Minted silver was of primary importance to the Caraqueño merchants. Merchandise occupied but a small part of the returning cargo. In a ten year period (1701–1710), the value of Mexican merchandise that was imported by Caracas reached 365,671 reales or approximately 45,709 pesos of eight reales. This amount was only 24 percent of the total import from Veracruz. Minted silver accounted for the remaining 76 percent. In the next ten year period (1711–1719) the merchandise imported from Veracruz amounted to 67,681 pesos of eight reales.[95] Based on the previous computation, the estimated amount of silver imported during that decennium amounted to approximately 214,323 pesos.

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[91] A. Matheus Gonzalez, *El comercio en la colonia,* (Maracaibo, Venezuela: Imprenta Maracaibo, 1933): 25. This is a senior thesis presented for the degree of B.A. at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. I consider it the first comprehensive approach to the study of the cacao economy of colonial Venezuela. It is a pity this seminal work is not more widely known.

[92] Ibid., 26.

[93] Arcila Farias, *Economía colonial,* 79.

[94] Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior:* 141–142.

As commerce between the two regions prospered, the value and volume of the trade moved upward. Two nobles of Caracas, Marquis Del Toro and Count San Xavier, commented in 1738 that the Veracruz trade was the sole source of specie for the province and they added that the trade generated approximately 600,000 pesos per year.[96] Without doubt commerce with Veracruz thrived because the Caraqueños wanted the silver needed to keep their enterprises financially healthy and for their own personal needs.

Mexican silver coins were not the only ones circulating in the province. In October 1755 the viceroy of New Spain received instructions to send the governor of Caracas 150,000 pesos, thereby enabling him to withdraw from the province "foreign money and what remains of that coined in Spain." Later, on 17 October 1757, 84,424 pesos of redeemed Spanish money arrived from Venezuela.[97] More than thirty years later foreign currency was still circulating in Caracas. In 1786 the viceroy of New Spain received royal orders to issue 400,000 to 500,000 pesos of silver to circulate as "provincial money" in the Caribbean, specifically in Caracas, Havana and its jurisdictions. The royal order added that the reales were to be 40 percent lighter than those in use in the rest of the American colonies because the foreign colonies' "provincial money" that contains "40 per cent less specie than ours, circulates, and all possible means are used to convert their money into our good coins and smuggle them out."[98]

Although Caracas received silver coins throughout the period 1700–1770, many hacendados, merchants and royal officials complained about the scarcity of circulating money. Even in subsequent years the absence of specie was considered a major problem. In the 1780s the monetary policy of the intendancy was geared toward the retention in Venezuela of the money present in the captaincy general.[99]

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[95] Arcila Farias, *Economía colonial*, 90–91.

[96] Hussey, *Caracas Company*, 96.

[97] Earl J. Hamilton, *War and Prices in Spain: 1651–1800*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969): 61.

[98] Ibid., 73–74.

If Caracas was receiving silver from Veracruz yearly, then where was the silver going? Confronted with the same puzzle Roland D. Hussey offered the following hypothesis:

> It is difficult to comprehend the shortage of silver in Venezuela. The Company presented figures in 1760, presumably accurate in view of the ease with which they could be checked, which prove that from January 1, 1750, to the end of 1758, more than 2,425,000 silver pesos entered the Province from Veracruz. Evidently the royal duties, private or Company remittances to Spain, and foreign traders absorbed the average of nearly 300,000 pesos for each year. Other documents show a scarcity of hard coin in the Company's area.[100]

The contention that there was low circulation of specie in Caracas should be further researched. Evidence uncovered thus far suggests that there was not a critical shortage of specie. It should be noted that if the governor of Caracas was able to collect 84,000 pesos in less than two years (the order was issued on October, 1755 and the money reached the crown on 17 October 1757) there must have been a significant amount of money circulating in the province. It would appear that the hacendados, merchants and royal officers understated their circumstances to keep the royal government from further incursions into their finances.

Most of the cacao from Caracas carried to Veracruz arrived in vessels owned by Caraqueños. By the middle of the seventeenth century there was already a Venezuelan merchant fleet. In 1763, a contemporary set at 14 the number of Caraqueños' freighters engaged in cacao trade with Veracruz.[101] Another source estimates that the Venezuelan merchant fleet in 1778 had a capacity of 118,000 fanegas.[102] In 1733, Caracas merchants claimed a loss of 200,000 pesos worth of merchandise in six ships confiscated by enemies of the crown in less than five years. This confiscation is illustrative of the high amounts of cacao traded on the ships and the crucial importance of the Veracruz market to the economic development of Caracas.

If compared with European crafts, the size of the ships in the *carrera de Veracruz* were modest. The largest Caraqueño vessel was the frigate (*fragata*). This *navio* was capable of carrying approximately 9,170 fanegas in its hold. Then followed the packet boat (*paquebot*) and the sloop (*balandra*). The former was capable of transporting 3,800 fanegas of cacao, while the latter carried 2,800 fanegas of the precious cultigen.[103] These vessels carried cacao to Veracruz on consignment. Consignees were mostly merchants, but there were also other interests in this trade. Church, cacao growers and laymen tithers were sending their cacao to Veracruz too.[104] Presumably, the captain reserved one third of the capacity of the ship for the growers. The captain and merchants used the rest of the ship's hold for their own cargo. The cacao owner or agent, whether grower or merchant, would deposit the cacao in the hands of a captain who would sell it in Veracruz. Upon closing the sale the captain would pay the duties and deduct the freight. On the return trip he would get his commission, pay the crew, and give the consignee his cargo, whether silver, or merchandise, or both. Yet, things did not always run that smoothly.

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[99] Angel Lopez Cantos, *Don Francisco de Saavedra segundo intendente de Caracas,* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1973): 25.

[100] Hussey, *Caracas Company,* 186.

[101] Cisneros, *Descripción,* 122.

[102] Arcila Farias, *Economia colonial.* 70.

Sometimes costs, freight and duties did not allow for a good return. In 1708, these three items ranged from 10 to 11 pesos per fanega on cargo landed in Veracruz. A year later, prices for cacao in Veracruz reached 18 pesos per fanega, some people even offered 8 pesos.[105] Given the level of transportation costs, it was no less than impossible to sell the cargo at 18 pesos per fanega and still make a profit. However, this was no deterrent for the cacao dealers to continue trade. Precisely because commerce continued, the question comes to mind: if Caraqueño cacao commerce with Veracruz was so onerous, why did it last for more than two centuries? I surmise that, in order to make a profit, they diverted, when possible, some of their cacao into the underground economy.

In the late 1770s the intendant Abalos of Caracas complained that out of half a million pesos of provincial cacao sales in Veracruz, duties were paid to the royal exchequer on only 50,000 pesos. The rest of the sales, he argued, (450,00 pesos) was contraband. He backed his findings with documentation from the royal treasury covering the years 1766 up to 1775.[106]

After comparing the totals of cacao fanegas that legally left the port of La Güayra bound for Veracruz and those registered as arriving at the Port of Veracruz, I reached the same conclusion. Although totals for only four years are analyzed for lack of more data, the practice can be checked through the Caracas-Spain trade—as we will see later.

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[103] Nuñez, *Cacao*, 347–348, 424.

[104] Laymen tithers were entrepreneurs who auctioned church tithes from ecclesiastical authorities.

[105] Nuñez, *Cacao*, 124 and 127.

[106] Arcilas Farias, *Economía colonial*, 324.

In the year 1774, 39,424 fanegas of registered cacao departed for Veracruz, yet only 4,334 fanegas arrived. This means that 89 percent of the cargoes that left La Güayra for Veracruz were sold illegally to smugglers. For 1775 the figures are not comparable because there were more fanegas arriving than leaving the port of La Güayra. This suggests that vessels stopped along the way and bought more cacao. However, this is only a conjecture. In 1776 cacao shippers in Caracas reported the export of 6,743 fanegas from the port of La Güayra and only 878 registered fanegas arrived in Veracruz. Thus 87 percent of the total official shipment became contraband. Registered fanegas in 1777 reached 6,804. However, only 2,594 were officially accounted for on arrival. A total of 62 percent ended up in the hands of smugglers. For the three years (1774, 1776 and 1777) considered, 85 percent (45,165 fanegas) of all legal cacao registered for Veracruz entered the underground economy.[107] Abalos claims they were sold to foreign colonies. Unless more documentation is unearthed, however, one could also conclude that the fanegas entered the underground Veracruz market. The practice of bribing royal officers to evade duties was common. If the Caraqueños could sell the loads illegally to foreign colonies, why would they go through the trouble of shipping them legally and paying all the duties instead of selling them on the Caracas coast to the foreign smugglers? The cacao traders were after silver and it could be obtained in Mexico.

The point which needs to be emphasized here is that these goods evaded the duties of the royal treasury, thus lessening any fiscal linkages between the royal government and the domestic economy. Even if those duties had been collected, it is questionable that the royal government would have diverted those funds into the infrastructure of the colonies. One hypothesis worthy of further investigation is that the majority of the cacao contraband reached Mexico City.

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[107] Totals for Veracruz were taken from Ortiz de La Tabla *Comercio exterior,* 141 and the totals for Caracas from Arcila Farias, *Economía colonial,* 272.

CHAPTER III: CARACAS: STRUCTURE OF THE EXPORT SECTOR

Cacao contraband was not based on the malevolence of those involved in it, but on the fact that the government levied heavy duties on the traffic, making it risky to obtain profits on the legal trade. Thus, duties were a direct consequence of poor returns in the legal market. A description of the duties levied, and the manner of their charge, will make the point clearer.

All cacao exported to Veracruz, or any other legal port, paid several duties. The most important and onerous of them were the *alcabala de salida*, known as *alcabala de mar* or *ultramarina*, set at 2 percent of the appraised value per fanega; the *almojarifazgo de salida*, set at 2.5 percent, which followed the same guidelines; the *Antigua Armadilla*, which was a tariff of 4 reales per fanega exported; and the *Armada de Barlovento*, a duty of 2 reales per fanega exported.[108]

On arrival in Veracruz, duties on each fanega of cacao were paid according to the appraised value. The cacao traders had to pay the *almojarifazgo de entrada*, or import duty, of 5 percent because the goods were traded between two colonies. Otherwise merchants (*mercaderes*) paid 10 percent of the import duty. Additional levies included the ones just mentioned: alcabala de entrada at 2 percent, Antigua Armadilla at 4 reales per fanega and Armada de Barlovento at 2 reales per fanega.[109] The only one of these duties that changed was the alcabala de mar, the sea sales tax. In 1770 this duty was raised to 4 percent.[110]

The alcabala de mar was not paid equally by those involved. Some people or institutions did not pay it at all. Those who enjoyed the privilege of exemption were selected on the basis of several criteria. Royal cedulas were issued, for example, to exempt growers from paying the customary sales tax (alcabala de salida) thus promoting the cultivation of cacao for the benefit of the province.

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[108] Archivo General de la Nación (Hereinafter AGN), Real Hacienda, Tomo 34, fols. 16, 44 and 53; Tomo 35, fols. 3; Tomo 36, fols. 3 and 16; and Tomo 54, fol. 6.

[109] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 61; Tomo 35, fol. 15vo.

[110] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 79.

The books of Real Hacienda examined for this analysis reveal that from 1693 to 1699 the growers, the Church and the tithers (*diezmeros*) were exempted from paying the alcabala de salida. On 8 October 1699, the alcabala de mar was auctioned to Don Lucas Pereira for a period of five years, ending in October 1703. From 1704 to 1712 the growers and the tithers paid the alcabala, but the Church's exemption continued. On 14 March 1716, the alcabala de salida was auctioned to Domingo Rodrigues Tinoco for five years. Thus from that date to 14 March 1721, the entries as to who paid or did not pay the alcabala are not registered in the royal exchequer accounting books.[111] From 1712 on, excluding the absence of data during Tinoco's alcabala auctioning from 1716 to 1721, the growers and tithers did not pay the alcabala.

The period for which the growers, the Church and the tithers did not pay the alcabala de mar appeared in the entries. The royal accountant declared the number of fanegas for which duties had not been paid, and to whom they belonged.[112] The entry read, "The duties on these number of fanegas were not paid because they belong to growers who are shipping them on their own account and risk, as the register shows." The entry showed the price at which the fanegas were appraised for royal fisc purposes. This entire section was an appendix to the main entry consisting of those institutions that had not paid the duty. The only sector of the economic strata paying this duty were the merchants. One must keep in mind that many of these "merchants" were involved in a variety of pursuits. The Caracas Company paid the duty but on different terms, as I will explain in the following section.[113] Those who bought cacao directly from the Church, clerical growers or pious works (*obras pias*) were exempted also from paying the duty when shipping that cacao.[114]

Another instance where the alcabala for fanegas of cacao shipped went unpaid was when they belonged to the tithers. If a person won the right to collect the tithes (diezmos), he was exempted from paying the customary sales tax on those fanegas which were part of the tithe, even if he was a merchant. This is interesting because if the person who won the right to the tithe had fanegas of cacao on his boat which were not part of the tithe, he would have to pay the duties. The tithers did pay almojarifazgo de salida. The tithes consisted mainly of mule trail tithes—*diezmos de veredas*. These road tithes were auctioned and the highest bidder was granted the right of collection. He was given a specified time to pay the amount he bid for the right to the tithe. Most growers using those roads paid their tithes with cacao. Thus the tithers were granted royal permission to sell that cacao abroad for cash.[115]

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[111] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 33, 38 and Tomo 41, fols. 40vo to 41vo.
[112] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 33, fol. 69.
[113] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 62, fol. 40.
[114] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 33, fol. 67vo.

The Church was another institution which had the privilege of not paying the alcabala de salida when they were shipping the cacao cultivated on lands which they administered. When the cacao belonged to the Church the Royal accountant registered them in the following manner:

> Las treinta y dos fanegas treinta y ocho libras restantes pertenecen a eclesiasticos de esta provincia a quienes su magestad (Dios le guarde) por cedula de 22 de Dic. del año pasado de 1716 es servido de mandar embarquen libremente y sin pagar derechos los cacaos que prozedieren de sus rentas y haciendas como parece de una certificación, y tres partidas de este dicho registro y en una de mercaderes.[116]

Such an appendix describes the Church's exemption. The main entry to which it was attached listed those liable for payment of the duty. This included the merchants, and after its arrival in 1731, the Company. The royal accountant stated clearly that the cacao shipments were exempted only if they came from the Church rents and haciendas. The implicit meaning is that cacao bought from sources outside the Church had to pay the duty.

The royal treasurer sometimes granted a considerable length of time to pay the alcabala. On 12 January 1717, Don Diego de Matos Montañez, a merchant, signed a note for 200 pesos for an alcabala on clothes he was taking to the hinterland to sell. Approximately four years later, on 6 December 1721, Don Diego paid the 200 pesos to the royal fisc. On 26 June 1720, Don Alonso Terrones left a down payment of 14 pesos 6 reales on a sales tax from goods which he planned to carry out to the countryside and sell in the future. Don Francisco Crespo, representing the merchant Don Juan Espinosa, paid a 25 percent tax on merchandise priced at 2,000 pesos. The royal customs officer defended the imposition of this tax because of the length of time needed for the sale of the goods, and because of the "high profits on the sale of the merchandise." The surcharge of 25 percent was over and above the 2 percent of alcabala he already owed to the royal fisc. In some instances an individual had to be bonded in order to sell the merchandise in the hinterland. At other times the debtor was not granted much time to pay the duty. For example, a duty on 1,020 fanegas of cacao registered on 14 March 1721 was not paid until 5 May 1721. The next day 1,946 fanegas were registered and its duty paid a month and 24 days later. Credit offered by the royal exchequer was prudent indeed. More rigid measures would have prevented the royal fisc from receiving more revenues because the merchants could have smuggled the cacao, as they sometimes did.[117]

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[115] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 33, fol. 73; Tomo 44, fol. 282vo.

[116] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 39, fol. 2.

As is apparent, the Libros Comunes y Generales unveil the structure of the legal market. With the information provided by these books, I have constructed Appendix A which shows who exported cacao from Caracas to all foreign ports. The analysis of the legal market in Caracas suggests that the bulk of the trade in the eighteenth century was in the hands of merchants. Also, it would seem that this pattern was not something new, but rather originated in the seventeenth century.

The data to sustain this conclusion were collected from the alcabalas de mar. Since growers were exempted from the duty, the law forced the royal officer to detail how many fanegas were being sent by growers, and thus exempted, and how many were required to pay the duty because they belonged to merchants. The data on Appendix A rearranged into Table 6 shows those involved in the export of cacao from Caracas to Veracruz.

Not included in the analysis are the years before 1693. However, these last years of the seventeenth century can give an idea of the earlier conditions. The quantity of cacao listed for the years 1698 and 1699 include the fanegas of the tithers and the Church. I have considered these fanegas as a proxy for the growers' exports because in all previous and later years the growers shipped more than the Church and the tithers.

In 1693 the merchants sent to Veracruz almost 63 percent of the cacao exported from Caracas. The growers, notwithstanding the privileges they enjoyed, exported a mere 16 percent of the total shipped to Veracruz. By 1696 the merchants gradually increased their cargo to reach 9,019 fanegas. This meant that they trans-

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[117] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 39, fol. 15vo; Tomo 475, fols. 8vo; Tomo 477, fols. 4 and 10.

Table 6: Cacao Exported to Veracruz: Growers and Merchants

Year	*Total*	*Merchant*	*%*	*Growers*	*%*
1693	12,630	7,926	62.8	2,056	16.3
1694	13,202	8,923	67.6	3,203	24.3
1695	5,688	4,063	71.4	1,539	27.1
1696	9,019	9,019	100.0	0	
1697	11,769	7,597	64.6	638	5.4
1698	12,675	7,889	62.2	4,773	37.7
1699	14,052	10,570	75.1	2,947	21.8
Tot.	79,035	55,987	70.8	15,156	19.2

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 33. Loads are expressed in fanegas.

ported all of the cacao from Caracas to Veracruz in that year. The next highest year for the merchants was 1699, when they shipped 10,570 fanegas. This amounted to 75 percent of the cacao transported to New Spain. In these years (1693–1699), the growers never dominated the trade. Their highest year of cacao exports was 1698 with almost 38 percent of the total cacao shipped belonging to them. It should not be forgotten that the number of fanegas exported in 1698 is an aggregate of Church, growers and tithers' fanegas. For the entire period under consideration, the growers sent 19.2 percent of the cacao, while the merchants sent an extraordinary 55,975 fanegas, or 70.8 percent of the total.

For the decade 1700–1709, the growers paid their alcabalas. It is not possible to ascertain the fanegas they shipped because these were clustered in the royal documents with those of the merchants. Comparisons can be made, however. In 1697, the lowest year, merchants and growers combined carried 70 percent of the cacao transported to Veracruz. The lowest year for the 1700–1709 decade was 1701, with almost 88 percent shipped. If one compares the rest of the years, an upward trend can be detected. If 1701 is omitted from the computations, merchants and growers always shipped more than 94 percent of the load to Veracruz. That was not the case for the years 1693–1699. This can be verified in Table 7.

In terms of actual fanegas shipped, the merchants started the decade with 4,659 fanegas, which increased to 17,053 fanegas in 1703, and decreased the next year to 5,127 fanegas. From this low point, the graph shows an increase to 7,721 fanegas in 1705 and a continuous climb to 20,450 fanegas in 1708. Thus, for this decade the graph depicts a four year cycle cacao trade.

Table 7: Caracas Cacao Legally Exported to Veracruz: 1700–1709"

Year	*Total*	*Merchants*	*% of Total*
1700	4,723	4,659	98.6
1701	12,698	11,165	87.9
1702	14,203	14,203	100.0
1703	17,065	17,053	99.9
1704	5,127	5,127	100.0
1705	7,971	7,721	96.9
1706	11,580	11,340	97.9
1707	20,382	19,583	96.1
1708	20,961	20,450	97.6
1709	7,573	7,181	94.8

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 33,34 and 35. Cargo is in terms of fanegas.

The next decade sampling for the Caracas cacao trade with Veracruz is from 1730 to 1739. As Table 8 shows, it is possible to distinguish the fanegas belonging to the merchants and those owned by the growers.

In this period the Guipuzcoana Company made its entrance into the cacao trade. Although armed with de jure rights that some scholars consider monopolistic, the Caracas Company, as it was also known, had little impact on the Veracruz trade. The Company's by-laws did not permit trade with Veracruz. This trade was reserved for the growers and merchants of Caracas. On two occasions, however, the Company transported cacao to Vera-

Table 8: Caracas Cacao Legally Exported to Veracruz: 1730–1739

Year	*Total*	*Merchants*	*% of Tot.*	*Grower*	*% of Tot.*
1730	13,230	10,754	81.3	2,360	17.8
1731	16,972	12,230	72.1	3,574	21.1
1732	26,687	20,266	75.8	6,203	23.4
1733	20,282	11,333	55.8	6,499	32.0
1734	19,736	14,679	74.4	4,901	24.8
1735	20,439	14,107	69.0	5,869	28.7
1736	17,331	11,617	67.0	5,311	30.6
1737	24,689	12,555	50.9	4,240	17.1
1738	16,712	5,848	34.8	1,889	11.3
1739	26,191	19,813	75.6	6,234	23.8
	Tot.	133,202		47,080	

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 48–49, 51–52, and 54. Amounts in fanegas.

cruz. The first fanegas of the Guipuzcoana which entered into Veracruz were transported in 1737. In that year, 7,730 fanegas of cacao were shipped in the Company's vessels from Caracas to Veracruz (See Appendix A). The next year, 8,855 fanegas of cacao were unloaded from Company ships in Veracruz. The 1737 cacao load (7,730 fanegas) represented 51 percent of the cacao transported to Veracruz from Caracas for that year. The 1738 cacao shipment (8,855 fanegas) amounted to 53 percent of all the cacao arriving to Veracruz from Caracas.

After these two years the Company was never a major challenge to the merchants involved in the Veracruz trade. As the table shows, in 1737 the merchants were responsible for 50.9 percent of the cacao reaching Veracruz in that year. That percentage went down to 34.8 the next year, but increased in 1739 to almost 76 percent. Disregarding the deep trough (5,848 fanegas) of 1738, the rest of the years for this decennium show merchants sending an average 14,150 fanegas per year if one excludes the outlier of 5,848 fanegas. Even if one includes this amount, the average does not decrease significantly (13,320 yearly fanegas).

The growers were never contenders in this decade either, although some high totals can be seen. In 1733 they sent 32 percent of the total cacao exported to Veracruz. For the ten year period they traded 47,080 fanegas in Veracruz. Their lowest year came in 1738, when they exported 1,889 fanegas. Their highest export year was in 1733, with 6,499 fanegas sent out.

In the 1700s, the merchants exported an average of 11,848 fanegas, with a minimum of 4,659 fanegas and a maximum of 20,450 fanegas. For the next ten year period sampling (1730–1739), the picture changes. The average goes up to 13,320 fanegas per year, with a minimum of 5,848 and a maximum of 20,266. In the 1760s, the merchants transported 129,993 fanegas to Veracruz, while the growers sent 15,603 fanegas for the same period. The merchants' mean for the 1760s is 12,999. The growers mean for the same period is 1,560. As Table 9 highlights, the means for both sectors went down, but that of the growers had a steeper decrease (from 4,708 fanegas in 1730–39 to 1,560 fanegas in 1760–69).

To what might one attribute this decline? One factor might be that prices for Caracas cacao decreased in Veracruz due to the increased availability of Guayaquil cacao there. Based upon a perception of lower profit margins, merchants and growers slowly withdrew from that market, shifting most of their production to the Spanish market, and thus securing higher returns. One other influence that should be considered is the entrance of the Caracas

Table 9: Caracas Cacao to Veracruz: Merchants and Growers

Years	*Port Total*	*Merchants*	*%*	*Grower*	*%*
1760	12,944	11,048	85	939	7
1761	28,303	22,750	80	3,131	11
1762	13,982	11,709	84	1,624	12
1763	17,261	14,259	83	2,135	12
1764	12,348	9,943	81	1,126	9
1765	16,623	13,267	80	1,890	11
1766	10,065	7,877	78	1,468	15
1767	12,928	10,926	85	1,286	10
1768	21,586	18,548	86	2,004	9
1769	9,666	9,666	100	0	
Tot.	129,993	15,603			

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 66–69, 71–72, and 75–76. Cacao cargo is in fanegas.

Company into the trade. The immediate result of the presence of the Company in the trade could have been a shift of cacao fanegas away from other markets to the Spanish market. I consider the slow and steady increase of Guayaquil cacao in the Mexico City market, dating from the early 1760s, coupled with the arrival of the Company, as the most probable explanation for the decline of Caracas cacao exports to Veracruz. In Europe, and particularly in Spain, Caracas cacao found increasing demand in the late eighteenth century due to a higher standard of living and population increase.

Another sector of the Caracas economy exporting cacao to Veracruz was the Church. To the extent possible, I have separated the fanegas of the Church and tithers from those of the growers. It is important to keep in mind when studying the figures in Table 10 that they represent both Church and tithers.

In 1693, the Church sent 2,648 fanegas. This surpassed the growers by 592 fanegas. In the years 1760 and 1764, the Church again sent slightly more fanegas than the growers. For the decade 1730–1739, the growers consigned 47,080 cacao fanegas to Veracruz. The Church total amounted to 3,062 fanegas. From 1760 to 1769 the growers shipped 15,603 cacao fanegas to the New Spain market and the Church exported 10,110.

The figures show that the Veracruz cacao market was controlled by the merchants, not the growers or the Church. The merchants always exported more cacao in comparison to the

Table 10: Cacao Exported to Veracruz by Church and Tithers

Year	*Fgs.*	*Year*	*Fgs.**
1730	116	1760	957
1731	1,168	1761	2,422
1732	218	1762	649
1733	110	1763	867
1734	156	1764	1,279
1735	463	1765	1,466
1736	403	1766	720
1737	164	1767	716
1738	120	1768	1,034
1739	144	1769	0
1740	19		

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 48–49, 51–52, and 54. *Fanegas

growers and Church. The entrance of the Company did not adversely affect the presence of the merchants in the New Spain cacao market. A statistical analysis of the exports of the merchants and the Company sustains this contention.

I use the simple linear regression method to test the contention that the entrance of the Company into the Caracas cacao trade did not adversely affect the volume that merchants exported to Veracruz. In order for this to hold true, the correlation coefficient resulting from the regression of the merchants' exports and those of the Company must approximate zero. The implication is that when the Company established itself in the Caracas cacao economy, it did not take away from the share of the merchants' exports. Fluctuations in the merchants' exports are not explained in terms of increases or decreases of the Company exports; the increase in the Company's exports is not related to decreases in merchant exports.

The data used to test this hypothesis are listed in Appendix A. The years 1731 to 1770 were selected because they represent the presence of the Company in Caracas. The merchants' exports were the independent variable because they had been in the market the longest. Company exports constituted the dependent variable for the opposite reason. There were a total of forty observations.[118]

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[118] Richard Jensen, "Crunching Numbers By Hand: Statistical Programs For the Texas Instruments 55 Pocket Calculator," *The Newberry Papers in Family and Community History,* (Chicago: The Newberry Library and the University of Illinois, 1981), Sec.3.4. Two vari-

The regression for the merchants' fanegas and time gave a correlation coefficient of .012 and a mean of 21,722 fanegas for the period 1731–1770. The correlation coefficient for the Company's exports was .48 for the same time span and the mean of 23,401 -not too dissimilar from the merchants' mean. The independent variable (merchants) had a standard deviation of 10,679. The correlation coefficient of the merchants' and the Company's fanegas was .31. The correlation coefficient (r) controlling for trend was .35 with a r^2 of .12.

These results signify that after controlling for trend the merchants' exports had a positive correlation with the Company's exports. When the merchants' total went up, the Company's exported fanegas went up. In terms of economic variables a correlation coefficient of .35 is not that significant, especially when the coefficient of determination (r^2) is so low (.12)[119]. The positive correlation suggests that every time the Company's fanegas exported went up, 12 percent of the merchants' exports went up, and viceversa. Thus considering the low percentage of the variance explained by the correlation, I concluded that the regression sustains the hypothesis. The entrance of the Company into the cacao trade did not adversely affect the merchants' exports.

I used the same procedure to determine whether or not the Company purchased for export growers' cacao intended for Veracruz. In this instance, the Company was considered the independent variable for the obvious reason that they had the political power to influence growers' exports. The regression gave a correlation coefficient of .03 for the growers' fanegas correlation with time. The mean for the growers was 3,865 fanegas. The correlation coefficient (r) controlling for the trends was a highly insignificant .11 and the coefficient of determination (r^2) a mere .01. This analysis suggests that the Company did not receive their supplies of cacao for trade from the growers' sources. Rather,

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ables measured for the same years are usually highly correlated because of the trends in each series. A proper correlation between the two series should remove the trend from each series, and correlate the residuals—the difference between y' (predicted value) and y (observed value). A simple way of doing this is through partial correlation. Three correlation coefficients must be computed: r_{xt}, r_{yt}, and r_{xy}, where r_{xt} is the correlation of x (merchants' fanegas) with the date (1731–1770), ryt is the correlation of y (Company's cacao) with the date (1731–1770), and rxy is the original correlation of x (merchants' fanegas) and y (Company's fanegas). The correlation of the residuals, i.e. the correlation of x and y controlling for trends is

$$\frac{r_{xy} \cdot t = r_{xy} - r_{xt} \cdot r_{yt}^{*}}{\sqrt{(1 - r_{xt}^2)(1 - r_{yt}^2)}}$$

[119] The coefficient of determination (r^2) tells us that the increases or decreases of the merchants' exports explain 18 percent of the variance in the Company's exports.

their fanegas must have been coming from the illegal cacao trade between the Dutch and the growers.

In the case of the merchants and the growers, the correlation coefficient (r) controlling for trends was .32 with a coefficient of determination (r^2) of .10. The correlation was positive, signifying that as the merchants' exports went up so did the growers' exports. But only 10 percent of the variance between these two is explained by the equation. This further means that in terms of exports, the merchants were not acquiring fanegas from the growers' export lot.

The statistical analysis of the Caracas cacao exports to Veracruz show that the merchants were in control of that trade; it was a merchants' market. What is highly significant is that the merchants were not displacing the growers from their traditional lot. In terms of socioeconomic relations, this meant that both had the political clout to protect their economic gains.

Trade occurred in Caracas during the eighteenth century in a variety of ways. Agents of all sorts were involved in this trade. Nobles, merchants, growers, royal officers, muleteers, soldiers, slaves and brokers were readily visible in that urban setting. All of these persons were buying and selling cacao. I have studied this Caracas market by analyzing alcabalas or sales taxes. This duty was levied only on merchandise sold internally within the city.

As noted, there were two different alcabalas: the alcabala de mar, which was known also as alcabala de salida (export) or de entrada (import) (sometimes referred to as custom sales tax), and the alcabala de tierra, or land sales tax. The alcabala de mar was levied at the port. While the land sales tax was payable in the cities or towns and in some provisional customs in the hinterland or the coast.

Most of the data on land sales tax were found at the Real Hacienda section of the Archivo General de la Nación in Caracas. These books were kept by the royal representative in the town or city. As with the customs official, the alcabalas de tierra were collected by the royal accountant and the royal notary. The entry in the books is signed by the notary and the accountant. The land sales tax was kept in this manner:

> Me hago cargo de setenta y un pesos y tres reales que me ha pagado Don Juan Bautista Equino por la alcabala de mil cuatrocientos veinte y ocho pesos en que bendió a la Real Compañia y ciento dies y nueve fanegas de cacao a doce pesos fanega y de su importe no me hago cargo

> por ser esta segunda venta y tenerlo satisfecho los cosecheros que hicieron la primera venta, como consta en el folio 133 vuelto de este libro bendidas por Matheo Hernandez, dos fanegas de cacao y las ciento diez y siete, constan por los ? de Soto Lazo tenerlo satisfecho y para que conste lo firmó conmigo.[120]

This entry cannot be considered typical, but it does show the main points I want to emphasize. It indicates who is selling or buying; the amount of the sale and its price; and, although it is not stated in this sample entry, the date the transaction took place. The entry included comments concerning the peculiarities of the sale. In this entry, the royal officers are unable to charge the sales tax (2 percent) because it was already paid when the growers sold them for the first time. The royal officer also notes that the alcabala was paid by the grower not the merchant. The alcabala, then, was paid only once.

There was some sort of record keeping and receipts which showed when the transaction took place, so that the person did not have to pay twice. This receipt was known as the *guia*. The guia was a document authorizing the person to carry a certain cargo outside his jurisdiction. It was usually issued by the *teniente cabo a guerra* of the region. In the guia the teniente stated who owned the cargo, if the person paid the alcabala or the peso de guia (a tariff imposed by the Crown on all products moved from one jurisdiction to the other), and the intended place of unloading.

The comments on the alcabala entry also revealed whether the cargo simply passed through the city for export, or if it was sold on the spot. For example, in January 1755, Doña Maria Pereyra sold 20 fanegas to Domingo Alfonso. Domingo in turn sent them to the warehouse of Captain Don Bartolome Benitez. He shipped them later on his "account and risk" to New Spain.[121] In other instances there is no sale, but the grower sends the cargo directly to a distant port for sale on consignment, as this 18 July 1754 entry shows:

> En dicho dia me hago cargo de cuatro pesos que me ha pagado Doña Geronima de Ponte por la alcabala de ochenta pesos en que se le regularon ocho fanegas de cacao que navega de su cuenta en la fragata de el cargo de Don Esteban de Otamendi por cuyo nuevo impuesto tambien me ha pagado un peso del que me hago cargo. Y para que conste lo

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[120] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 481, fol. 289vo.

[121] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 478.

firmo conmigo de orden de dicha Sra. Don Joseph Fortigue y Lopez.[122]

The data used for this study cover from 1 November 1753, to 13 December 1755. There is a gap of six months for the year 1755. Since the data comprise a total of 20 months, I decided to analyze them to get an idea of the city market structure. The data are from the city of Caracas, by far the most important center of the province.

The analysis concentrated upon cacao. The Caracas market, however, included the exchange of many other commodities. In the Caracas market, one could buy and sell *papelones* (a sort of sugar paste), cheese, soap, beans, beef, cows, houses, maize, plantains, wood and hides. Some people sold or bought one or more of any of those, along with cacao. The Marquesa Del Valle sold papelones, molasses, cassava bread and maize.[123] The heirs of the Conde de San Javier sent 40 fanegas of cacao on consignment in Company ships in December 1754. The Marquesa de Mijares sold 185 cargas of papelones and 12 fanegas of cacao to Don Joseph de Orcoso.[124] From July 1753 to October 1754, the Marquesa traded 603 fanegas of cacao. Of these, 241 were sold to individuals; 62 were shipped on her account; and 300 she sold to the Company. Her administrator, Marcos Hernandez Marrero, sent cacao to Santo Domingo, New Spain and Spain. The Marquesa's buyers included merchants, the Company and distant ports. Certainly she chose to sell her cacao wherever she could obtain the highest returns. The Marquesa's estate also produced papelones, molasses, sugar and maize.[125]

Royal officers were also active in the city of Caracas cacao market. Don Manuel Blanco De Villegas Teniente Cavo a Guerra, of the valles of Ocumare and Cata, sold fifteen fanegas of cacao at fifteen pesos each; four of them he sold for silver and seven he bartered for clothes. A most interesting case is that of Sergeant Thomas Alvarez. For a fee this officer acted as a sort of broker for almost anyone willing to pay. Sgt. Alvarez was involved in a total of 37 transactions in which 624 fanegas of cacao were exchanged. In some transactions he sold cacao, while in others he bought it on behalf of a third party. At times, he purchased some for himself. In 19 November 1753, he bought twenty fanegas from seven different sellers for Don Esteban De Otamendi. On 1 January

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[122] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 477, fol. 40. The information is found in the section of Real Hacienda of the Archivo General de la Nación in Caracas in Tomos 474 and 476 to 479. All entries were of daily transactions.

[123] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 477, fol. 366.

[124] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 479, fols. 201.

[125] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 474, 476 and 477, fols. 179 and 380.

1754, he bought sixty-six fanegas from nine sellers and three buyers. In September 1754, he bought twelve fanegas for the royal Treasurer, Don Martin de Eyzaguirre. Sergeant Alvarez can be compared to a present day broker. Like him, there were others in the Caracas market acting as brokers or agents for third persons.

Don Esteban Antonio de Otamendi was one of the most active cacao traders in the city of Caracas market. He was also present in the San Felipe market. Although born in the villa of Bilbao in the province of Vizcaya in northern Spain, he was a resident (*vecino*) of the city of Caracas. He was the legitimate son of Don Juan José de Otamendí y de Doña Isabel de Bertia, residents of Ichasondo in the province of Güipuzcoa. He married Doña Maria Isabel de Medina on 8 April 1753. He was captain and administrator of the frigate "Nuestra Señora del Socorro." In November 1771, he was administrator of the estate of Doña Maria Vicenta de Ugarte.[126] In 1754 Don Esteban owned a cloth store (*tienda de ropas*) and a port warehouse (*bodega*).[127]

Don Esteban bought cacao in Caracas personally and through brokers. One of his buyers was Sergeant Alvarez. From 1 November 1753, to 15 February 1754, Don Esteban bought 197 fanegas of cacao. Of these, six were sent directly to his port warehouse, and the others were sold in the city of Caracas.[128] Otamendi carried cacao mostly to New Spain. This was the preferred port for captains purchasing cacao in Caracas. There were eight frigate captains doing business in the city of Caracas cacao market in the period studied (1753–1755). All of them, like Otamendi, bought cacao with the intention of selling it in Veracruz. Of the eight captains, six had warehouses in the port for storage. Those not owning a warehouse sent their cacao directly aboard the ship, sold it immediately, or kept it in *trojas*. Trojas were like small tables on which cacao was kept covered with plantain leaves or red clay. The purpose of covering cacao, contemporaries claimed, was to protect the cacao from insects and to preserve the beans.[129]

A most intriguing fact is that those entrepreneurs identified by the royal accountant as *mercaderes* (merchants) seldom traded in the cacao market. The royal fisc volumes listed 13 mercaderes for the year 1754. Only three were registered as cacao traders in the legal market. Don Theodoro Castro, a merchant, sold cacao through brokers, on his own, and sent cacao on consignment in Company ships. He made six transactions for a total of 151 cacao fanegas. Don Joseph Antonio Sarastume made 10 transactions, nine of which were purchases totaling 96 fanegas of cacao. A third merchant was Don Juan Martin De Aniz, who sold 18 fanegas of cacao.

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[126] Vicente de Amezaga Aresti, *El elemento vasco en el siglo XVIII venezolano*, (Caracas: Ediciones del cuatricentenario de Caracas, 1966).

[127] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 474.

[128] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 474 and 476.

[129] In a personal interview with agronomist Cesar Molina, of the Agricultural Experimental Station in Caucagua (northeast Venezuela), he asserted that although using red clay did not help preserve the beans, it certainly helped to increase the weight of the cacao loads.

If one compares the total these merchants bought or sold (265 fanegas) with those transacted by people not identified as merchants, one is impressed by the low volume of cacao they bought. Strangely, the other 10 merchants did not appear at all. Since the data cover only 20 months, I am not sure if this was the case for the rest of the years. An explanation for these 20 months is possible, however.

In 1754, Caracas legally exported 68,278 fanegas of cacao to the world market. Cacao transactions in the city of Caracas for that year reached 10,747 fanegas. This figure represents 15.7 percent of all cacao exported by the province that year. It may be that these shipments were sent to the port for legal export. This, of course, was not always the case. If the Caracas cacao market accounted for those few fanegas that were being exported, then the bulk of the legal cacao trade must have been somewhere else. The most plausible explanation for 1754 is that the merchants bought directly from the hacendados' estates.

Other possible explanations are not sustained by the sources. For example, it could be argued that the merchants were using agents, and their names did not appear in the entries. This was not the case, however, because the entries always stated if the fanegas were bought or sold through brokers. The presence of administrators' names and their bosses' names in the entries challenges this supposition. For this year, I contend, the merchants obtained their cacao from sources outside the city and transported it to the port.

The Guipuzcoana Company had a preponderant presence in the city of Caracas' cacao market. For the 20 months studied, the Company's factors handled 6,354 fanegas of cacao. The grand total transacted in this period reached 18,051 fanegas. The cacao fanegas handled by the Company (6,354) was 35 percent of the cacao traded in the city.

The records show three types of transactions between the growers and the merchants on the one hand and the Caracas

Company on the other. The first was the outright sale of cacao to the Company. In this transaction, the records show that the growers or merchants sold the cacao to the Company (". . . . . bendio (sic) a la Real Compañia"). In the second kind of transaction, the grower or merchant is using Company ships to carry the cacao to Spain at his own risk (". . . . .y de su quenta (sic) las navega a los Reynos de España en uno de los navios de la Real compañia. . .").[130] A third transaction is a bit more difficult to understand, as the following extract illustrates. The royal notary wrote in 1753:

> Me hago cargo de nueve reales entregados en el dia de oy por Don Andres Peña como apoderado de Don Juan Nieto de Arroyo de quien con su orden puso nueve fanegas de cacao remitidos en este dia veinte y uno de septiembre en la Real Compañia, cuya partida de entrega al impuesto de dicho cacao firmó el expresado Don Andres junto conmigo.[131]

Since we have computed already that Company factors handled 6,354 cacao fanegas in the city of Caracas for the 20 months studied, it is possible to conclude that in the legal market of the city of Caracas, most of the cacao handled by the Caracas Company belonged to the growers. This likelihood appears greater when noting that the majority of Company entries state "puso en compañía" and by the fact that 5,899 fanegas shipped in Company vessels went under the label of the growers.

The analysis of the land sales tax suggest that the structure of Caracas's legal market was composed of three elements: the growers, the cacao traders and the cacao brokers. Cacao traders were those individuals like Don Esteban de Otamendi who entered the market solely to buy cacao for export, even though they might have other business commitments, such as a general store. Cacao brokers were those who, like Sgt. Alvarez, entered the market on behalf of a third person as well as for themselves. Among the growers I include commoners as well as nobles.

Growers traded about one third of the cacao handled in the city directly with Spain. The Company did not buy that much cacao in the city, but only transported growers' cacao on consignment to Spain. The merchants, as defined by the royal fisc, were buying outside the city, perhaps directly from the hacendados. Cacao traders handled far more cacao than the other elements. Since these traders were not allowed to export to Spain legally, most of this cacao must have gone to Veracruz and the Antilles.

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[130] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 481, fols. 289 and 292.

[131] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 474, fol. 28vo.

Cacao reached the port for shipment in two forms: loose or in *zurrones*. Zurrones were sacks made out of hides. Each zurrón contained a fanega (110 pounds). In some cases, the zurrón was marked with the owners' seal or initials. On 24 September 1736,[132] one shipload included 525 zurrones and "262 hides of which the zurrones were made." It might be that not all the cacao bought or on consignment could be shipped. In this case, the ship captain left the cacao in a warehouse for later shipment. In 1732, Captain Don Pedro Ignacio de Olivera paid duties on 254 fanegas and 15 pounds of cacao,[133] but was forced to leave them on land due to lack of space. The sources depict many cases like the above. On 28 July 1732, Don Geronimo Lopez Barroso loaded some fanegas previously left behind for lack of space. Three months later, on 27 October 1732, another vessel loaded "the rest of the 510 fanegas that Don Geronimo Lopez Barroso left on land because he could not take them."[134]

These examples point to the importance of warehouses in the cacao trade. Cacao could be stored for a considerable length of time after it was processed. After drying under the sun for four days, cacao was transported to the market. In an epoch of dirt roads and slow moving mules, it often took nine days to carry the beans from the hacienda to the market destination. It was often another month before the cacao was loaded on to the ship. On 21 June 1738, the Company's frigate Santa Anna arrived in the port of La Güayra. The vessel embarked loaded with cacao 24 days later, on 15 July 1738.[135] With two to four months the expected sailing time to Cadiz, Spain, it is obvious that the beans could be stored for an extended period.

The importance of this reality, that the beans did not perish quickly like certain other commodities traded at that time in Latin America, cannot be overstressed. With storage facilities, any hacendado could bargain with cacao traders over the price of the fanegas. This benefited both hacendados and the traders, as the commodity could be withheld from the market until prices were attractive. The effective use of these warehouses, then, suggests that seasonality might not have been a factor in the pricing mechanism in the provincial cacao market.

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[132] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 51, fol. 26.

[133] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 51, fol. 16.

[134] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 48, fol. 86vo.

[135] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 54 (1738–39), Fols. 36 vo. y 37.

There is irrefutable evidence that seasonality was controlled also by the Company, and not only by growers and merchants. One scholar concludes that Caracas was able to export almost 80,000 fanegas in 1763 because the Company released cacao it had "in storage from the previous year."[136]

To test the presence of seasonality in the short and long term, I have arranged the cacao export data in intervals of months, and then by selected years, by quinquennium and finally by decades. The results are shown in Appendix B. Two years were selected within the decade; those with the lowest and highest exports. Representative years with good and bad harvests have been used. The months in which the Real Hacienda's books showed no cacao exported were taken as zero for statistical purposes.

The two largest cacao harvest periods, according to contemporary accounts, began on 24 June (St. John's Day) and on 25 December. There were some haciendas which produced crops all year, but these were not common. By taking these two months and the two following them—July, August, January, February—as representing seasonality, and then translating their crops into percentages of total harvest for the year, we can obtain a picture of how seasonality affected exports.[137]

On the basis of harvest, the year 1700 (in the 1700–1709 decade) shows the month of April as having the highest crop, with 85 percent of the yearly crop harvested in that month.[138] In 1708, the crop reached 22,602 fanegas. The month of May represented 32 percent of the yearly crop. In the following decade, the years 1715 and 1718 represented bad and good crops respectively. The highest output for the first year is seen in the month of September, with 37 percent of all monthly export. March (40 percent) was the highest for the second year. The years 1726, 1730 and 1742 were the low crop years for their decades. The highest crop months for all of them was November -35 percent, 43 percent and 32 percent. For the same decades, 1721, 1739 and 1746 were the years with high crops. Their respective months with high yields were December (29 percent), August (21 percent) and April (47 percent). In the last two decades studied, 1750–1759 and 1760–1769, the years with higher yields were 1758 and 1763, while 1755 and 1762 show low harvests. The most interesting year of these last two decades was 1762. In this year, 94 percent of the yearly crop (34,033 fanegas) reached the port of La Güayra in July. In the 1760s decade, on December, 1763, the exports represented 16 percent of the yearly harvest. For the previous decade, October 1755 was the month with the highest yields (39 percent). In December 1758, the crop was 22 percent of the yearly total.

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[136] Arcila Farias, *Economía Colonial*, 328.

[137] Seasonality in these terms means those months (June and December) in which the grower expected the groves to produce the highest yields. The months following these two—July and August for June and January and February for December—are considered within the season for the obvious reason that it took sometime for the cacao to reach the market.

[138] This year does not conform to my definition of seasonality based on contemporary accounts. However, as we will later see, this was an exceptional year.

Of the fourteen years examined, six followed seasonality in the sense here defined. Those years were 1718, 1721, 1739, 1758, 1762, and 1763. Five of these years had high crops, while one (1762) had a low output—94 percent of the crop was exported in the month of July alone. In all these years, the highest crops were registered in the months of March, July, August and December, the months I chose as representing seasonality for the growers.

The rest of the years—eight in total—do not display seasonality. The months of highest yields for these years were April, May, September, October and November. None of these months followed the notion of seasonality as contemporaries saw it. The percentages obtained for some of these months suggest the need for further analysis. For example, the month of April 1700 reflects 85 percent of the total yearly crop. The same month in 1746 shows 47 percent and November 1730 figures 43 percent. The results are not as conclusive as I expected but do show that there was a marked tendency toward unseasonality, which in turn suggests the capability of the growers and merchants to store cacao.

I re-arranged Appendix B, so that monthly figures from five year increments can be seen in percentages. As Table 11 shows, I added the monthly percentages to form trimesters. The first trimester was composed of December, January, and February; the second trimester included March, April, and May; the third trimester's months were June, July and August; and the last trimester included September, October and November. The data were arranged around the two key months of December and June. Thus we have two trimesters showing seasonality—the first and the third—and two reflecting the lack of it—the second and fourth.

The addition of the first trimester and the third formed the seasonal semester of December, January, February, June, July and August. The sum of the second and fourth trimesters integrated the unseasonable semester of the months of March, April, May, September, October and November.

Table 11: Cacao Output in Percentages by Trimester

	Trimesters			
Year	*lst*	*2nd*	*3rd*	*4th*
1693–1697	5	22	38	34
1698–1702	6	45	30	19
1703–1707	25	17	38	20
1708–1712	11	16	30	44
1713–1717	10	33	39	18
1718–1722	22	20	29	30
1723–1727	17	24	33	26
1728–1732	8	23	33	36
1733–1737	21	19	39	21
1738–1742	21	19	18	42
1743–1747	34	34	13	18
1748–1752	27	24	19	30
1753–1757	20	20	41	21
1758–1762	8	25	44	21
1763–1767	31	22	27	21
1768–1771*	25	19	30	26

Source: These percentages were computed using the totals in Appendix B.
*Four years

Data arranged in this manner show seven quinquenniums with marked unseasonality and three quinquenniums (1713 to 1727) split almost evenly between seasonality and unseasonality. The rest of the five year periods (six in all) were seasonal. All of the seasonal five year periods had more than 50 percent of the crops in the second and fourth trimesters. Two of the unseasonal quinquenniums, 1698–1702 and 1738–1742, had yields of over 60 percent in the unseasonal trimesters (second and fourth). Three seasonal quinquennium (1703–1707; 1733–1737 and 1753–1757) yielded crops in the seasonal trimesters of over 60 percent.

This analysis suggests that the merchants and the growers were able to store the product for a long period of time. There is little doubt that warehousing was a factor of considerable influence in the Caracas cacao economy.

The connection between the existence of warehousing and cacao traders influence on market pricing is suspected but cannot be proven. The price quotations available belonged to the royal exchequer and these were appraisals for the purpose of taxation. These prices seldom reflect the conditions of the market. A look at the complaints the Caracas municipal council raised to the king pertaining to the Royal Caracas Company collection of sales taxes (alcabala de tierra) will illustrate the point. In the minutes of a meeting, members of the cabildo—mostly cacao growers and merchants—argued they paid sales taxes to the Caracas Company based on 16 pesos per cacao fanega, the official customs price. They did not consider this to be proper. They founded their argument on the fact that in the open market they sold and bought cacao at six pesos per fanega, not 16 pesos. Thus, customs levied more taxes than they should. In addition, they stressed the unfairness of relying on royal customs prices that did not reflect open market activities.[139]

Statistical analysis of royal customs prices and production shows that customs prices variance is not explained by output. A regression of prices of the royal exchequer and production for the period 1693–1711 shows a correlation coefficient of .19, which explains only 3 percent of the variance of prices in terms of production. The same method was used for the 1712–1730 period and it resulted in a correlation coefficient of .21 with a r^2 of .04. The price mean for the first period (1693–1711) was 110 reales. For the second (1712–1730), the mean decreased to 82 reales. In these circumstances, it is difficult to assess the correlation between production and prices. Since this is the pre-Caracas Company period, the decision to withhold or release cacao into the market must have been influenced by the Veracruz or Dutch market, the preferred cacao outlets for Caraqueños. Unfortunately, the prices in Veracruz are not available. Scholars agree that prices there were high enough to attract the Caracas merchants to that market.

Specific cases examined show that the general conditions of the market did not always prevail. The Marquis de Torres Casa filed a claim against the cacao carriers in the *Carrera de Veracruz*. He questioned the propriety of some shipmasters who refused cacao saying that their ships were full, when in reality they were seeking a better price.[140] The claim of this son of a Caracas cacao merchant could have some validity, but as we saw, the merchants were in charge of the Caracas - Veracruz market. It is unlikely that the carriers could apply much pressure on the cacao traders. The merchants were able in 1753 to close the access to the Veracruz market to anybody who was not a member of their own provincial circle.[141]

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[139] Nuñez, *Cacao*, 426.
[140] Hussey, *Caracas Company*, 91–92.
[141] Arcila Farias, *Comercio*, 65–67.

There was always some pressure exerted to procure better deals. In 1738, Caraqueños protested that the Veracruz merchants, notwithstanding that the official cacao price in Veracruz was 14 pesos, wanted to pay only 10 pesos per cacao fanega. Caraqueños contended that the Veracruz merchants knew the Caracas Company cacao warehouses were full, thus, the growers did not have other outlets for their cacao. For this reason, the Veracruz merchants hoped the growers would sell at 10 pesos per fanega. This is the classic attempt at taking advantage of a glutted market. The reader should not forget that, given proper care, cacao endured storage for prolonged periods of time. The logic of the times was to wait for better prices and then release the products into the market. Moreover, Caraqueño cacao dealers asserted that their Mexican counterparts only accepted cacao directly consigned and assigned to them before departure for Veracruz. The Veracruz dealers wished to bypass the market and increase security of return. In other words, they expected to lower risk by converting Caraqueños cacao marketers into their agents.[142]

When one considers the costs of transporting cacao from the port of Veracruz to its destination in Mexico City, it becomes clearer why Veracruz merchants maneuvered so wholeheartedly to secure lower prices. Freight costs to Mexico City were 16 pesos per carga (2 fanegas) in 1792. This decreased to 13 pesos per carga in 1799. The cost of transportation was really very high and added a lot to the high prices Caracas cacao demanded in the Mexican market.[143] Taking a price of 40 pesos per fanega in 1768[144] and supposing a freight of 16 pesos per fanega, when the fanega reached Mexico City it cost 56 pesos, that price not including the several duties. The customs appraisal price for each cacao fanega sold in La Güayra was 14 pesos per fanega. Assuming that the market price could not have been far from that quotation, the price per fanega in Mexico City (56 pesos) was 400 percent higher than in Caracas (14 pesos).

Although attempts at bypassing the market were traditional among European and New World merchants, they seldom made much influence on the market, because of the sheer volume of the trade and competition among the different sectors involved. The evidence suggests the presence of a competitive cacao market in the province which existed outside of the official structure. In 1774, the Company factor, José de Amenabar, stated that the rate of 16 pesos per fanega did not reflect the true condition of the market, since in daily trading the fanega was sold at one peso over the royal government price and traders competed to buy the beans. He further contended that cacao traders were buying cacao at lower prices from the growers who preferred silver to merchandise, and merchants had enough silver to satisfy them. When the Caracas Company started paying in silver, merchants offered prices above the established rate. The circumstances he described seem to apply to the market years after the Company arrived in the province because Amenabar also stated:

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[142] Nuñez, *Cacao*, 152–154. Reales Cedulas 1737–1738 Folios 278 vto. y sgtes. Cabildo del 30 de septiembre de 1738.

[143] Ortiz De La Tabla, *Comercio exterior*, 212.

[144] Arcila Farias, *Economía colonial*, 327.

> Cuando se instituyó esta junta (1751) no había caudales tan crecidos que compitiesen con la compañía, ni se previo-que había de llegar el caso de que los mercaderes particulares igualasen y aún alterasen por temporadas el precio de feria, como está sucediendo años hace y es casi imposible que deje de suceder.[145]

The *junta* he described is the board established in 1751 to regulate the cacao prices at which the Company could buy cacao. The board was composed of the provincial governor, the Company factor and a cabildo deputy representing the growers. From Amenabar's observation, it is proper to infer that at least until 1751, and even perhaps for some years after that, the merchants were not overly influential in the internal cacao market. One explanation for merchants' lack of influence could have been the presence of illegal Dutch traders. The Dutch constituted the hacendados' main market, as I will discuss later. Here it suffices to note that their activities carried weight in the Caracas cacao market. The presence of local merchants, the Dutch and the Company (after 1731) implies the presence of a competitive market; it suggests that the grower had alternative outlets for his cacao.

Most of the cacao legally bought by merchants was sent to Veracruz. In Veracruz Caracas cacao demanded a higher price. However, as noted, illegal exports of Guayaquil cacao to New Spain sometimes depressed Caracas cacao prices, not counting Mexican merchants endeavors at rigging prices. In 1708–1716 prices dropped in Mèxico, a drop attributed to illegal introduction of cacao from Guayaquil and Martinique.[146] In most years,

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[145] Ibid., 332–333.

[146] Ibid., 217.

Table 12: The Four Major Cacao Traders in New Spain: 1774–1785

Years	*Caracas*	*Maracaibo*	*Tabasco*	*Guayaquil*
1774	4,334	2,768	1,504	———
1775	9,360	842	1,450	4,078
1776	878	2,093	2,352	752
1777	2,594	1,360	233	8,862
1778	1,272	1,412	1,098	5,715
1779	2,945	3,025	745	4,922
1780	4,239	1,094	2,053	4,908
1781	461	387	842	14,969
1782	564	470	1,446	17,764
1783	603	354	1,611	10,802
1784	2,228	1,954	1,156	124
1785	106	73	1,179	
Tot.	29,674	15,832	14,890	74,075
	22.1%	11.8%	11.1%	55.0%

Source: Ortiz De La Tabla, *Comercio Exterior,* 141. Loads are in fanegas.

however, Caracas cacao demanded a higher price. Angel Lopez Cantos has estimated that the price differential between cacao prices in La Güayra and Veracruz in some years reached 100 percent.[147]

In the period 1774–1785 there were four major suppliers of cacao to Mèxico: Caracas, Maracaibo, Tabasco and Guayaquil. From Table 12 we can see the amount of cacao traded by these regions in New Spain. The figures for previous years are not available.

The preponderance of Guayaquil is obvious. Fifty five percent of the cacao consumed in New Spain was from Guayaquil. Caracas exported 22 percent. Maracaibo and Tabasco came in third and fourth.

The supremacy of Guayaquil in the New Spain market continued into the beginning of the nineteenth century. For the years 1784 to 1808, Guayaquil was responsible for 46 percent of the cacao imported by Mèxico. Caracas slipped into fourth place (9 percent) and Maracaibo and Tabasco cacao traders in New Spain started the nineteenth century second (26 percent) and third (17 percent).[148] At this time, it was obvious that Caracas was no longer the principal exporter of cacao to Veracruz, if it ever was.

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[147] Lopez Cantos, *Don Francisco.*

[148] Ortiz De La Tabla, *Comercio exterior,* 142.

Some generalizations can be made concerning the Caracas and Veracruz markets, however. The elites, growers, cacao brokers and some merchants composed the legal cacao market of Caracas. Cacao was brought to the city market to be sold there, or on its way to the port. The growers sent most (35 percent) of the cacao traded in the city to Spain on consignment in Company ships. Cacao traders and brokers handled most of the remaining cacao transactions. Merchants, as defined by the royal officials, seldom traded in the city's legal market. This suggests that they were dealing directly with hacendados, but not necessarily illegally.

It is not possible to establish a definite price mechanism, although it seems that one existed. The royal officers price quotations might have been made for the purpose of taxation and perhaps did not reflect market prices. There were three potential outlets for the hacendado: the cacao trader or merchant, the Dutch and after 1730 the Company. The presence of these three buyers points to the existence of a competitive market. That the Company at times paid higher than the regulated price further strengthens the contention of an internal, competitive cacao market. Official sources used do not show the existence of forward investment linkages in the Veracruz market. Backward investment linkage in the province is obvious in the form of muleteers, canoes and small vessels. In the case of the legal market in Caracas, only muleteers appear as a form of backward investment linkage within the domestic economy.

The sources show a mature market with brokers, carriers, growers, traders and warehousing in the port of La Güayra and the city of Caracas. The ability to store cacao may have affected trading transactions at the hacendado-merchant level and the export sector-foreign market level.

PART II: SAN FELIPE: A CACAO TOWN

CHAPTER IV: FOUNDATION OF THE TOWN

The conquistadors chose the site of the future city of San Felipe in the 1540s. The Cerritos de Cocorote, as San Felipe was known for part of the sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth, was located south southwest of present day Caracas, in the hot and humid region irrigated by the Yaracuy River. Here Europeans found no gold, only a rain forest with no promise of precious metals. Later in the seventeenth century, they began the exploitation of a copper mine located in the vicinity of Cerritos. This served the settlers well because the absence of precious metals shifted their energies toward subsistence endeavors.[149] The copper mine seemed to be the only enticement to stay in such inhospitable circumstances. Most of the copper mined went to Spain. Although documentary evidence states that Spaniards excavated the mines for the first time in 1620, the accounting books left by the European miners cover from 1632 to 1664. This mining activity brought Amerindians, Europeans and black African slaves to the area.[150] This extractive enterprise did not found the town of San Felipe, later [1728] to become the city of San Felipe, but it might have certainly created the savings needed to capitalize on the incipient cacao economy. The genesis of the cacao economy and the exploitation of the copper mine ran a parallel development.

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[149] "Expedientes sobre derribo del pueblo de los Cerritos de Cocorote de Barquisimeto y fundación de ciudad." Archivo de la Academia Nacional de la Historia (Hereinafter AANH), Escaparate II. Libro 62. This is a typescript of a primary source found at the Indies Archive in Seville. The transcription was done by Brother Nectario Maria. Archivo General de Indias (Hereinafter AGI), Sevilla, Seccion V= Audiencia de Santo Domingo, "Sobre fundación de ciudad en los Cerritos de Cocorote Años 1726–1731," Signatura Antigua 57-6-6, Signatura Moderna Santo Domingo, legajo 778-A. This document is found within the legajo labeled "legajo 778-A" but has a new pagination ["foliaje"]. "Relación de los progresos de las misiones de Capuchinos de la provincia de Caracas." It states that the Capuchin missionaries arrived in the province in 1658. It also shows that the inhabitants of the province were engaged in commercial agriculture, but were not interested in discovering precious metals; ". . . y los moradores de la provincia mas se aplican a sembrar cacao y tabaco que a descubrir minas."

[150] Miguel Acosta Saignes, *Vida de los esclavos negros en Venezuela*, Prologo de Roger Bastide, (Caracas: Hesperides, 1967): 151–170.

As a result of the Central American cacao economy bust, entrepreneurs in Caracas and Guayaquil saw their opportunity to invest in a highly remunerative enterprise. Central American cacao growers serviced the market in the basin of Mexico. Merchants and others involved in the cacao trade knew how profitable cacao production and commerce was. In some instances entrepreneurs would derive profits that would double their investments. Some in northern South America heard in the early seventeenth century of the demise of Central American cacao economy. The Central Americans' methods of cultivation exhausted the soil nutrients, thus decreasing output and making it difficult to cover cacao demand in the valley. Consequently economic stimulus turned to northern South America. No doubt, those related with copper extraction provided the capital needed to found a cacao hacienda, or perhaps they established a cacao hacienda themselves. Beyond capitalization of the enterprises, the mines furnished the metal required to make the tools. Entire Amerindian tribes, royal officers, captains-general, priests, slaves, convents, the Church, and women and men of all walks of life began cultivating cacao.

Cerritos lured many of these people. The location was ideal for the cultivation of the cultigen. Cerritos' climate was that of a tropical rain forest—humid and hot, but this did not deter some from moving to the region. In the early part of the seventeenth century, Cerritos teemed with people from the Canaries, other parts of the province, black Africans and Amerindians. These people became the muleteers, the growers, the merchants, the peons, the slaves, the priests, the doctors, the barbers, the shoemakers, the pulperos [retailers], the cowboys and the royal officers commanded by the embryonic cacao economy. In this frontier society, some of them would serve several socioeconomic roles. A priest, for example, would be a trader, merchant and even administrator of an hacienda. Makeshift houses were built to serve as quarters for brokers, merchants and growers. Growers constructed warehouses close to the center of town to store their precious fruit and also to have it available for buyers. Most of these structures were seasonal, abandoned when the harvest was over.

By the early eighteenth century [1725], Cerritos had approximately 3,000 inhabitants ["souls," almas].[151] There were hundreds more spread throughout the hinterland, living in cacao haciendas. Cerritos also had several retail stores [*pulperias*], a church, a cabildo [municipal council] building, a Capuchin mission and enough pride to solicit from the king the title of "Primate City." Their wish was granted in 1728, but not before the Cerriteños showed their largesse and affection for their monarch in a more tangible manner.

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[151] "Expedientes . . ." AANH, Escaparate II, Libro 62. This document is found within the legajo labeled "legajo 778-A" but has a new pagination ["foliaje"]. "Relación de los progresos de las misiones de Capuchinos de la provincia de Caracas." Fol. 3 ". . . en los alrededores del Cerrito de Cocorote. . . pasan de 3,000 almas. . . ."

Many peninsulares heard of this prosperity and sought governmental posts in the province of Caracas. Members of the royal government who found themselves far from the centers of the colonial world paid large sums to the Spanish Crown to receive rights to the captaincy general of Caracas. Don Nicolas Eugenio de Ponte Hoyo offered 16,000 pesos in 1692 to Charles II to receive the highest government post of the province. In 1706 Don José Francisco de Cañas y Merino paid 10,000 pesos for the post; Don Marcos de Betancourt y Castro made a *Donativo Gracioso* (a "voluntary donation") in 1709 to the royal fisc of 10,000 pesos and the crown responded by offering him the captainship of Caracas. On 26 June 1718, Philip V accepted a "voluntary donation" of 6,000 pesos from Don Diego Portales y Meneses. The king appointed him captain general of Caracas. On 4 February 1719, Don Lope Carrillo de Andrade Sotomayor y Pimentel paid 8,000 pesos for the privilege of governing the province of Caracas. What is interesting about these cases is not the payments for governmental posts, but the length of the wait, in some cases, a period of eight to ten years before official occupation of the post. Why pay so much and wait for so long? Potential riches from cacao encouraged patience. Although crown laws forbade royal officials from engaging in commercial activities, most of those seeking the Caracas post contemplated future income accruing from their investment into the cacao economy. Captains general became involved in the lucrative cacao trade as traders and not merely as responsible, neutral crown officials.[152] As we will see, members of the higher echelons of the royal officialdom invested considerable amounts of money in the cacao economy and they also accrued high profits from their investments. For example, Father Rodriguez Camejo was accused of mishandling 12,000 pesos the captain general gave him for investment on a cacao venture, economic activity that was illegal for that royal official and both knew it. Still, some other captains general were charged with

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[152] Hector Garcia Chuecos, *Siglo Dieciocho Venezolano* (Caracas: Ediciones Edime, 1956): 9; 19; 24; 39; 46.

Table 13: Frequency Distribution of Cacao Haciendas-1720

Trees	*Haciendas*	%
20– 2,000	323	48
2,001– 4,000	30	4
4,001– 6,000	85	13
6,001– 8,000	78	12
8,001–10,000	52	8
10,001–12,000	23	3
12,001–14,000	22	3
14,001–16,000	21	3
16,001– over	43	6
Total	677	

Source: Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general* Chapters 2 and 3.

misuse of funds, and were forced to pay money back to the royal treasury.

Cacao was cultivated along the north central coast, in the northeast and northwest.[153] The Llanos was mostly reserved for cattle raising. According to a report of 1720–21, there were over 677 haciendas of cacao in the regions mentioned. As Table 13 shows, the majority of the haciendas (48 percent) had plantings of less than 2,000 trees. Among the larger cacao haciendas, there were 43 (6 percent) with over 16,000 trees. Among what I label the middle range haciendas (6,000 to 10,000 trees), there were 130 units, close to 19 percent of all the cacao farms of the province.[154]

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[153] John V. Lombardi, *People and Places in Colonial Venezuela*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976): 162–165. Cacao in these locations was cultivated on haciendas.

[154] Pedro José De Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de Venezuela en los años de 1720 y 1721*, Fuentes papa la historia colonial de Venezuela, (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia. No. 76, 1965). Chapters 2 and 3. Some haciendas were not included in this analysis because the author listed the proprietors of the cacao groves together under one group. The examples which follow are my translation. There were cacao groves owned by several persons (5,000 trees), new foundations (14,000 trees), several Amerindians (4,000), the slaves of the valley (4,000), blacks of those haciendas (10,000), Güige and new foundations (20,000), Valencia's hinterland (1,000), El Cojo to Cuyagüa (284,000), Indian Conucos (5,000 trees), several Amerindians (2,000 trees), several poor people (6,000 trees), several free Amerindians (1,000), and from Chuspa to Macuto (454,100). These total 810,100 trees not included in the computations. This total comprises 18 percent of the total number of cacao trees estimated by Olavarriaga in the province. He computed a total of 4,546,564 trees. His totals are based on approximations. I cannot claim that my calculations are based on complete data. However, approximations do offer an insight into the size of haciendas in the province. I should add that Hussey mentioned a Company report in which Company factors counted 769 haciendas upon their arrival in the Province of Caracas (1730).

The owners of these haciendas ranged from nobles to slaves with *arboledillas* (small cacao groves). Commoners, Amerindians and poor people also owned groves. The *pobres* (poor) owned 6,000 trees. The report does not tell us how many of these poor people owned the groves. If it had been two or three, 6,000 would be an impressive statistic. However, there are contemporary accounts which state that it was not a burden for a poor person to maintain a 1,000-tree grove.[155] Slaves did not own land, but they did have de facto usufruct rights over cacao groves. Ownership later allowed some of them to obtain liberty for themselves and, in some instances, for their wives and children. New foundations were identified and listed for several jurisdictions. However, only 34,000 cacao trees were counted. The rest were mentioned as new foundations, without specifying the number of trees. This fact is significant. The presence of new cacao groves implies expansion of production before the arrival of the Company. This process was progressive, not sudden. The definitive transition to extensive cultivation—more land brought into production—, as opposed to intensive cultivation—reliance on technical know–how, e.g., no shade trees fostered increased production—occurred with the arrival of the Company in 1730. This coincided with the official recognition of the town of Cerritos de Cocorote as the city of "San Felipe El Fuerte."

A royal officer, commissioned to appraise the economic potential of the region that was later to become the city and jurisdiction of San Felipe, described the territory in 1720 in these terms:

The Yaracuy River originates on a hill called Samuraco. This hill is about 30 leagues (90 miles) from the mouth of the river, which passes through the jurisdictions of Nirgua and Barquisimeto. The river is navigable from Los Cerritos, which is composed of three settlements: the first one of Fray Marcelino, distant from the river shore close to 500 geometric paces and said population is of recently conquered Amerindians; the other one, called el Cerrito (later the city of San Felipe proper), is located 20 leagues from the mouth of the river and 3 leagues from the beach of the river, and, if one navigates the river, there are 60 leagues (180 miles) from this settlement to the sea. In it, there live several white families; the second is an Indian settlement, known as Cocorote, it has a considerable number of families, distant one league from Cerrito and 4 from the river beach. The third village, located one and half leagues from Cocorote and five and half from the riviera, is also of Amerindians and is named Guama.[156]

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[155] Archivio Arquidiocesano de Caracas (Hereinafter AA), Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 15, fol. 37vo.

All three localities mentioned in the report, plus the *sitios*[157] of Cocorote, Guama and San Nicolas, become part of the city and jurisdiction of San Felipe. The three sitios, Guama, Cocorote and San Nicolas, were Indian towns with some free and enslaved blacks and Spaniards. These towns were interconnected by mule trails and *caminos vecinales* (dirt roads leading to haciendas). Contemporaries tell of preferring mule trails to carry their loads because they could then trade illegally with the Dutch. River passage made it easier for royal officers to spot smugglers. The Yaracuy River was navigable in canoes but not on barges with large loads.[158]

The report goes on to list the names of the owners and the number of haciendas in the villages of the region. Because they needed irrigation and transportation for their staple, cacao growers located their haciendas close to the river. The chronicler continues in greater depth to describe the river and its advantages for transporting cacao and other commodities. Fray Marcelino settlement, important enough for the narrator to mention it, was an Indian mission. Another important point included in this record is the presence of free Indian pueblos in the region with cacao haciendas owned by the Amerindians.

Before its inception as a royal city in 1730, San Felipe was part of the jurisdiction of Barquisimeto, a city located in the Segovia highlands about sixty miles south of San Felipe. The sixteenth century location of what later became San Felipe was known as

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[156] Pedro José de Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, P.320. "El rìo Yaracuy empieza de un cerro llamado Samuraco, el cual està cerca de 30 leguas distante de su boca pasando por entre las jurisdicciones de Nirgua y Barquisimeto. Es navegable para canoas desde los cerritos que son tres poblaciones, la primera de Fray Marcelino, que distarà de la orrilla del rio 500 pasos geomètricos, y dicha población es de indios reciènconquistados; la otra llamada el Cerrito, es distante de la boca de dicho rio 20 leguas, y de la orilla de dicho rìo 3 leguas, y en esta parte comprehendiendo las vueltas del rìo hay 60 leguas de èl a la mar; viven en èl muchas familias blancas. *La segunda población* llamada *cocorote* es de indios, y tiene bastantes familias, dista una legua de cerrito y 4 del Rìo. *La tercera población* llamada *Guama*, es de indios tambièn, y dista 1.5 legua de cocorote, y 5.5 del rìo."

[157] The best definition of "sitio" is ward. Royal authorities called some places sitios, while in other instances they were called pueblos. In this context, pueblo will always mean Indian town or village, unlike a mission which was under the supervision of regular clergy.

[158] Cisneros, *Descripción*, 152–153.

Cerritos de Cocorote. It is likely that the inhabitants of the small village of Cerritos de Cocorote had remained in that locale after the gold and copper mines were depleted. Telasco McPherson says that, Cerritos de Cocorote was the first pueblo founded in the Valley of the Yaracuy River by Juan de Villegas in 1551.[159] Soon after the gold mines of Buria were discovered. Other scholars believe that Cerritos de Cocorote emerged as a town for the first time in the seventeenth century when a nearby copper mine closed. Still others argue that the establishment of the town of Cerritos was the natural outcome of an initial gathering of Spaniards, Creoles, mission and indoctrinated Amerindians (in the religious sense), and free blacks from the city of Barquisimeto.[160] In the seventeenth century Cerritos de Cocorote became part of the cacao economy.[161]

There are no accounts telling how San Felipe and its environs emerged as a cacao region in the seventeenth century. But there is testimony that San Felipe and its jurisdiction began cultivation of cacao in the 1600s, perhaps 1610. In a royal inquiry of 1700, a citizen states that there have been cultivation of cacao in the San Felipe area for "eighty years now."[162] He also asserts that cacao cultivation grew because relatives of the original cacao growers became cacao hacendados themselves. Cacao was cultivated along the length of the Yaracuy River and there were makeshift huts in which traveling merchants found shelter while they waited for the crop to harvest. These merchants (*mercaderes*) brought their own slaves who served as pages and agents for them. After closing deals with the hacendados, cacao traders would contract with local muleteers, possibly Amerindians, to carry the cargo to the coast. The testimony of this man was corroborated by others. This fact surmises that local entrepreneurs answered early to Mexican cacao demand.

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[159] Telasco MacPherson, *Diccionario histórico, geogràfico, estadìstico y biogràfico del estado Lara*, segunda edición, (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1941): 135.

[160] "Expediente . . ." AANH, Escaparate II, Libro 62. "Auto ante el eclesiastico," 26 de junio de 1725. "Vino con carta de fray Marcelino de San Vicente misionero capuchino y procurador de las provincias de Venezuela de 20 de abril de 1725." Fol. 10 Vo. ". . . los montes y contornos del pueblo (Cerrito) en donde hay muchismos negros libres y esclavos fugitivos y otras muchas gentes vagabundos." Fo. 13 Vo. The settlement of San Javier started in 1710. Fray Marcelino argues that there were a considerable number of Black slaves in the area introduced as contraband by the inhabitants of Barquisimeto. They had to pay 11,000 pesos in duties to the authorities for the slaves.

[161] Nicolas Perrazo, *Historia del estado Yaracuy*, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Repùblica, 1982): 18.

[162] "Expediente . . ." AANH, Escaparate II. Libro 63. The document is titled "Pieza 8. Sobre la fabricación y adorno de una iglesia que costearon los vecinos de aquellos valles, por estar la iglesia que habia muy distante de su jurisdicción, y no poder recibir el pasto espiritual" and is found on Libro 63 pages 186–266 of the said expediente. The data on which the generalization is based are found in libro 63 page 236 of the typewritten copy at the Academia Nacional de Historia, Caracas and Fo. 62vo.-63 of the original in the AGI. The information is found in the third question of an extensive inquiry concerning the destruction of the town of Cerritos de Cocorote: TERCERA= Si saben que los vecinos de esta dicha ciudad (Barquisimeto) desde que se descubrió el fruto del cacao de 80 años a esta parte/ y hasta la hora presente poblaron y fundaron y estan fundando haciendas de cacao en la rivera del rio Yaracuy, y otros parajes de los valles de esta jurisdicción dónde han sido asi los primitivos como sus hijos y nietos, y otras personas aumentandose en dichas haciendas de cacao digan. This document is dated 1700, suggesting that the inhabitants of the valley had been cultivating cacao since at least 1610.

What happened in the San Felipe region while and after it was turned into an export-led economy is not certain, but there are "relaciones" (reports) of the entrance of another area into the cacao economy in the late eighteenth century that could give a clue as to what occurred in San Felipe in the seventeenth. Increasing demand from Europe, specifically Spain, and Mexico shifted entire regions in the Caracas from subsistence agriculture to cacao cultivation. Vast expanses of rain forest land were brought into the export-led economy. In 1626, Governor Gutierrez de Lugo complained to the Caracas *cabildo*—municipal council—of maize scarcity in the city of Caracas. He stated that growers in regions providing Caracas with the grain shifted vast tracts of land from maize cultivation to cacao, to obtain higher profits.[163] This evidence and that already discussed surmise that the regional economy sensed initial disturbances from the Mexican cacao market very early in the seventeenth century perhaps even late in the fifteenth. The following account of a royal government officer illustrates how the conversion from subsistence agriculture to cacao haciendas might have evolved.

In 1768, Don Joseph Solano y Bote, governor and captain general of the Province of Caracas, ordered a survey there. The purpose of the inquiry was to ascertain current conditions as well as the economic potential of the region. This inquiry was not something unique in the history of bureaucratic Spain. The annals of Spanish administration are crowded with these "relaciones," an invaluable source of information on the economy, demography and geography of eighteenth century Latin America. In the case of Venezuela, there are several "relaciones," some of them from the sixteenth century, but the majority from the eighteenth century.

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[163] Lucas Guillermo Castillo Lara, *San Sebastian de los Reyes: la ciudad trashumante,* Tomo I, Fuentes para la Historia Colonial de Venezuela, (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1984: 182).

The governor received a report from each of the jurisdictions of the province and then summarized the findings into one provincial relación. The report made by the officer had more details about the region than that presented by the governor to the Council of the Indies, which emphasized only broad aspects of provincial conditions. Most of the regional descriptions, on which the governor based his report, are not available. However, a report on the Aroa valley, made by the royal officer of the jurisdiction, contains details seldom found in other documents. A royal officer stationed in the Aroa River valley made the survey. (Reports were seldom made by people not familiar with the surroundings.) In this instance, the officer was a corporal *-cavo a guerra*. In most cases, the officer was a lieutenant *-teniente cavo a guerra.*[164]

It is not clear what the officer's functions were. In some cases, he appears to have the authority of a paramilitary functionary, enforcing the laws of the crown. In others, he performs as clerk of the royal accountant. He collected and kept records of taxes. He also sent, or carried, the money collected to the nearest bureaucratic center. For this last function, he collected 6 percent of the total amount of tax money. In the San Felipe jurisdiction, he also enforced payment of the one *peso de guia* on every carga (load) of produce that left the jurisdiction for other parts of the province. He knew the vecinos by their proper names, the names and number of their children, and the worth and location of their estates. All these data were listed in the report. Some aggregate data—number of people and their race—he gathered from church records and government reports. All data were summarized into one report submitted to the governor.

As stated, this report is from the Aroa River valley located in northwest Venezuela. The Aroa River runs parallel and west of the Yaracuy River, the one that irrigates the San Felipe valley. Both empty into the Caribbean Sea. The valley was first settled by people looking for gold. They found only copper. For some time, the valley remained almost deserted, except for some blacksmiths who mined copper for specific jobs, but there was no major mining. Although there was one cacao *arboleda* in 1720, it seems it did not thrive into a profitable enterprise.[165] Conditions continued in this manner until 1740, when for the first time people from Barquisimeto arrived and established haciendas. Two citizens from the city of Barquisimeto were the first to reach the region for purposes other than finding gold or silver. Don Martin de Cicardia and Don Pedro Galindez secured permissions from the city council (cabildo) to establish cacao haciendas in the valley.

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[164] "Descripción geográphica y relación individual del valle de nuestra señora del Carmen de Aroa que forma el cavo a guerra principal y juez de comisos en el distribuida en 6., en que da satisfacción a la comisiva instrucción del señor Don Joseph Solano y Bote cavallero del orden de Santiago Capitan del navio de la real armada teniente de la real compania de guardias marinas governador y capitan general de esta provincia. Año de 1768," in Angel Altolaguirre y Duvale comp., *Relaciones geográficas de la gobernación de Venezuela, 1767–1768.* (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1954): 118–139. Unless otherwise stated, all the sentences on the Aroa River valley economic, demographic and geographical conditions are based on this tract.

Twenty eight years later (1748), Aroa was a loose conglomerate of houses made of *bahareque* (mud) walls and thatched roofs, isolated from each other by cacao groves but interconnected by dirt roads *-caminos vecinales*. There was no church or town council. For worship, the inhabitants went to the church in Duaca, an Indian town. Its administrative center lay in Barquisimeto. The Aroa was so humid that humans, not mules, had to carry cacao from the groves to the hacienda border and then load the cargo onto mules. Similar conditions prevailed in the mountains of Maruma in Maracaibo and in the Yaracuy River valley in San Felipe.[166] Because of these climatological conditions—high humidity and high temperature—, dwellers dressed lightly, prompting the shocked royal officer to comment about their "lax morals."

Suitable climatic conditions for the cultivation of cacao made life for the inhabitants unbearable. In 1723, church authorities in the Valley of Ocumare asked the archdiocese permission to move the church to another site. Among the reasons cited: flooding of the church premises by the irrigation canal (*acequia*) leading to the hacienda of Don Luis Blanco de Villegas; cacao groves growing on the area set aside for the plaza and cemetery; and cacao grove canopies retaining underground humidity, causing the church structure to deteriorate.[167]

Our chronicler stated that Aroa was two journeys (days)[168] from Barquisimeto, the head *-Cabecera-* of the jurisdiction. Barquisimeto stood 20 leagues (60 miles) from Aroa, which in turn, was one day from San Felipe to the east and ten days from Caracas, the capital of the province. For the standards of the day, Aroa was pretty close to other major centers of economic activities: five days from Puerto Cabello, the most important legal port of the region; two and a half days from the Tocuyo River, site of heavy Dutch contraband; and three days from Mapubares, a town in the jurisdiction of one of the most hectic commercial centers of the province, Coro. Day/distance should not be construed to mean inflexible time, for weather influenced the actual time muleteers spent on dirt roads. Roads in winter (summer for the temperate zones) were mostly impassable, thus the journey could have taken longer. On the other hand, because they reached their customers through several tributaries, smugglers made distances shorter. In some instances, it was a matter of unloading the cargo into a barge waiting on the river nearby. Still, few cacao regions could have claimed such proximity to major commercial centers as San Felipe and Aroa. Obviously, geography and ecology favored Aroa for cacao cultivation.

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[165] Olavarriaga, Instrucción general, 272.

[166] My description of the area is based on maps of the epoch I examined at the AANH and at the Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Nacional in Caracas. One pictographic map at the AANH depicts slaves carrying cacao loads from the groves to the border of the hacienda, where they were loaded on to mules. The mules take the cargo farther down to canoes that are seen going down river. The map, is dated in the eighteenth century of the San Felipe region, hangs on one of the walls of the Palacio de la Academia Nacional de la Historia.

[167] AA, Documentos Episcopales, Carpeta 16, Documento 39, 1723, Visita episcopal al valle de Ocumare de la costa.

[168] In the report, the distances are expressed in *jornadas de carga*,—meaning the time it takes a loaded mule to travel the distance.

According to the reporter, Aroa's cacao exports reached mainly Puerto Cabello, not San Felipe. From San Felipe, when they could clear the trails to get there, they obtained some wares and foods. To reach the port they relied on a combination of canoes and mules. The road to the port was so obstructed with impassable jungles, marshes and lakes that traders had to carry their loads on mules for some distance and, after arriving at a lake, or marshes, they unloaded the cargo into a canoe. The depth at the mouth of the Yaracuy River prevented some from crossing with their mules. At this point they again unloaded into a canoe, or barge, to take the cargo to Puerto Cabello. There, they exchanged cacao for money, cloths and other European goods.

The most important variable in choosing the site for the cacao haciendas was not their proximity to the centers of commercial activities, although this was a factor, but the suitability of growing cacao in that locality. The reporter, in explaining why people came to the valley, states that ". . . . news of its (valley's) fertility, and superior quality of the precious cacao it produces, attracted a universe of peoples from various parts." After ecology, the presence of a close waterway was the most important element, since this facilitated transportation of the staple to the legal and illegal markets and irrigation of the cultivated fields. Invariably, most hacendados founded their haciendas close to, or on, the shores of the rivers. Aroa River was deep and wide enough to sustain canoes capable of carrying from 30 to 40 quintals (one hundred pounds) of loads. The royal officer tells of haciendas of eighteen thousand trees irrigated by tributaries of the Aroa River. Cacao growers made canals (*acequias*) to irrigate their haciendas. The chronicler recounts cacao growers constructing two ditches from one of Aroa's tributaries to irrigate eight haciendas. As a result of the stream diversion, some tributaries lost their water.

The chronicler tells of haciendas of between 10,000 to 40,000 cacao trees. He also makes the important observation that the valley was not exploited to its full potential. There was space for growth, but somehow entrepreneurs were not taking advantage of it. The reporter offers some of the reasons for the presence of vacant land in the valley. Cacao growers cultivated only a portion of their land because, growers thought, vacant land would result in low output and higher prices. They hoped demand would increase, or stabilize, resulting in higher income. This contention was not exclusive of the cacao hacendados of the Aroa and Yaracuy River valleys. The minutes of the Caracas' cabildo abounds with comments that follow the same logic: low output will cover for overhead and will increase profits.[169] In other words, all this was an attempt at defeating the market.

Theory, however, was not born out by the facts. Notwithstanding the narrator's contention that first settlers kept land fallow to discourage others from coming, more entrepreneurs came and founded cacao haciendas. These first growers kept some land vacant to discourage overproduction, but increased demand prompted higher prices and profits. These, in turn, paid for new exploration and acquisition of land. The explanation is simple: the market was defeating first settlers' intentions. High profit margins attracted others to the cacao production. People with low or no liquidity at all became part of the strata. Entrance into the cacao economy of people with low or no capital was due in part to the market, but, as we saw, the botanical features of the staple also offers an explanation. Cacao called for low capital investment but turned in high profits. In a trial deposition, growers testified that a poor person, one with no funds at all, could plant and reap profits from a 1,000 trees cacao grove, provided the cacao groves were properly located and judiciously managed.[170]

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[169] Nuñez, *Caracas*.

[170] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 14, 1690–1699. Hacienda Choronì of Maria Revolledo de Villavicencio. Ignacio Vazquez de la Cruz administrator and trustee of the estate.

By 1768, the year of the report, Aroa counted 328,300 cacao trees and an output of approximately 3,200 fanegas—ten fanegas per 1,000 trees. By 1782 the region was producing approximately 4,000 fanegas a year. Legal exports at the time were expanding but contraband also persisted. The narrator states that it is precisely because of contraband that hacendados sent their loads to Puerto Cabello on mules and not in canoes; smuggling activities were more easily detectable on a waterway than on mule trails. Waterways forced traders to navigate in one direction, making it easier for royal officials to control traffic. This indicates that cacao hacendados never abandoned their Dutch market and it also infers that there was a competitive cacao market on the Venezuelan coasts this late in the century.

At the time of the report, the population of Aroa consisted of Amerindians (130), whites (62), slaves (167), pardos (219),[171] blacks (39) and sambos (32). The distribution of the population closely resembles that of the province and specifically that of San Felipe. There were more pardos than any other race. Whites were a minority, compared to pardos, slaves and Amerindians. Amerindians had haciendas, not as large as those of the Spanish, and were also salaried workers, most of them making a living on the haciendas. Some of these Amerindians came from the Indian town of Duaca. It is interesting to note that the ratio of Amerindians to slaves is not that skewed. As a matter of fact, it is almost a one to one. During the period under scrutiny, Amerindians did not live a marginal existence to the cacao economy. They were fully integrated as free salaried workers, mission Amerindians and cacao hacienda owners. This was true in 1720, when Olavarriaga made his appraisal of the province's economy and society, and in the 1780s (1782), when Bishop Mariano Martì visited the Archdiocese of the Province of Caracas.

While the chronicler makes the observation that some Amerindians were workers and owners, he does not state anything concerning pardos. This leaves us to guess that most of them were cacao growers. If that is the case, they outnumbered white proprietors. Although the officer admits that some whites were absentee owners and that his census undercounted some of the Amerindians and other races, that the provincial distribution of the population followed similar patterns encourages one to believe that the figures are not far from the real distribution of the population. The presence of women in this frontier environment throws some light on the stability of this society. By 1768, these settlers were in Aroa permanently. They no longer came to get rich and leave; even if they wanted, cacao cultivation did not put a premium on absenteeism. There was absenteeism, however, among large proprietors, most of them went to Barquisimeto and, when possible to the capital city, Caracas. But these growers had trusted administrators who oversaw the haciendas and some absentee cacao growers regularly visited their haciendas.

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[171] The term "pardo" should not be construed as meaning race in the biological sense. It is a racial category manufactured for social or fiscal purposes. The term means anyone with a trace of African genetic stock but not a full-blooded African.

Aroa's total population numbered 649, a figure less than the population the valley could sustain. In 1762, an outbreak of fevers (*calenturas*) almost decimated the dwellers. Of these inhabitants, 209 (32 percent) were women and 440 (68 percent) were men. In 1768, Aroa was settled and growing, and the community provided for most of its needs. Few ventured outside the valley to seek goods or to sell their vegetables. Growers and their laborers consumed most of what they produced in their orchards. They imported only salt and some clothing from outside the valley and these only in small quantities. The reporter complained about the inhabitants' garments, stating that even some of them passed the day with bare essentials. These austere outfits were evident on the Hacienda of Cumanibare in San Felipe, but only on the slaves. The inventories of hacienda Cumanibare show that the same cloths used to make curtains and to wrap the dead were used to dress the slaves.[172]

Aroa's inhabitants main diet consisted of cassava (Yuca), other roots, beans, vegetables, maize and salted meat. They cultivated most of these products in their orchards. The food they did not produce was bought in from Barquisimeto and San Felipe. Growers mainly traded cacao for these commodities. Their preferred trading center was Puerto Cabello, however, where they could obtain better prices and silver pesos. By 1787 Aroa had three grocery stores (*pulperias*). In 1786, crown officials auctioned the alcabala of Aroa on D. Felix Caraballo for 550 pesos for the fiscal year (November 1786 to October 1787). These taxes represented 10.5 percent of the sales taxes San Felipe collected thirty years before, giving us an approximate size of the Aroa economy. Crown officials expected to raise that amount on 11,000 pesos in sales. Although Aroa did not compare to San Felipe, it did experience similar growing pains as the primate city of the region.[173]

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[172] AA, Tomo 19, Expediente 5 (1751), Hacienda Cumanibare fols. 418. The cloth was named *ruan* and its price was 5 reales per vara -a measure equal to U.S. 33 inches.

Like Aroa, San Felipe entered the cacao economy with difficulty and progressively. People came from Barquisimeto and populated the valley of the Yaracuy River, site of the future San Felipe. Initially, entrepreneurs cleared the jungles and planted cacao trees. Following market demand, more hacendados came into the cacao economy. Labor was obtained from Amerindians and slaves. When the eighteenth century began, the city of San Felipe and its environs were already on their way to becoming the second most prosperous cacao region in the province.

By 1700 the people of Cerrito de Cocorote petitioned the king to allow them to name Cerritos a city, villa or *lugar* (literally, "place").[174] In the appeal to the king, inhabitants of Cerritos described its geography and themselves. The authors claimed that the place had everything "human nature" needed to live healthily and to achieve prosperity. They depicted the territory as vast and fertile, with abundant fruits "of all kinds," great rivers and tributaries (*arroyos*), and savannas for cattle. In another document dated 1700, the region is described as having 250,000 trees.[175] In 1710, a missionary wrote that "in the hills of Barquisimeto in a place called Cerritos de Cocorote and in its environs lived so many people of various castes that you could make a very populous city."[176] By 1725, in a *Relación* submitted by Fray Marcelino de San Vicente, Cerritos de Cocorote and its surroundings had over 3,000 souls, not including those in Indian pueblos.[177]

Settlers labored "principally on their cacao groves full of great quantities of trees." These cacao growers came from different regions of the empire including Castile, the Canary Islands, other colonies and surrounding provinces in Tierra Firme. They were "so great in numbers that you could count them only with great difficulty; they had residences and found themselves at a distance of more than twenty leagues (over 60 miles) from the city of Barquisimeto." The petitioners assured the king that they had enough wealth ("caudales muy bastantes") to pay for their houses, buildings, parish church and other public works. They noted to the king that they wrote on their own behalf and for the "foreigners from the city of Barquisimeto living in this place of Cerrito." Thus by the time of the appeal, there were enough wealth in the region to claim not only the title of villa but that of city.[178] The king did not respond to the appeal.

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[173] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1753, Fol. 58vo.

[174] The best treatment of how to define and distinguish a city, villa, town, or sitio during Venezuela's colonial past is John V. Lombardi's *Peoples and Places in Colonial Venezuela,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976). I highly recommend this book for those interested in the subject for Latin America as a whole.

[175] "Expediente . . ." AANH, Escaparate II. Libro 63 pages 186–266. Pieza 8, pages 236–237.

[176] *Documentos para la historia de la ciudad de San Felipe El Fuerte,* Compilación y estudio por Manuel Pinto. Prologo por NICOLAS Perrazo, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Repùblica, 1969): 113.

[177] Dr. Ambrosio Perera, *Historia de la organización de pueblos antiguos venezolanos: pueblos coloniales de Barquisimeto, El Tocuyo, Carora, San Felipe, y Nirgua,* Tomo II sección Documentos, (Madrid: Imp. Bravo, 1964): 185.

In a description seventeen years later, one has a better idea of change in the region. A census ordered in 1717 by Governor Don Marcos de Betancourt y Castro listed the owners of the cacao groves and their slaves established in the region of what would later be called San Felipe. The census included over 69 haciendas, and 171,700 trees. It also counted 101 houses or "residences."[179] The cerritos proper had 27 haciendas with 84,400 cacao trees. The region included the sitios of Cerritos, Macagua, Tamanavare, Mampostal and Quebrada de Cocorote. All these will later form part of San Felipe and its jurisdiction. Among the owners, the census listed widows, pious workers (*obras pias*), soldiers and officers of the royal army, Portuguese, Amerindians, blacks and pardos.

A 1720/1721 description by Pedro José de Olavarriaga of Barquisimeto and its jurisdiction (at that time San Felipe was a political subdivision of Barquisimeto) the region that was later the jurisdiction of San Felipe counted 322 haciendas and 759,108 cacao trees. This number of cacao trees represented 94 percent of all those in the Barquisimeto jurisdiction.[180] Thus, cacao production in Barquisimeto is documented in the environs of the future San Felipe. There were thirteen jurisdictions within what was later known as San Felipe. The increase in the number of cacao trees cultivated from 1717 to 1720 cannot be measured accurately, because in the 1717 description many cacao trees were left out. Based on the depiction of Cerritos de Cocorote and Macagua,

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[178] *Documentos*, 43–44.

[179] Perazzo, *Historia*, 36–42. Excluded were the number of cacao trees owned by those outside of Los Cerritos and Macagua.

[180] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 267–278.

Table 14: Comparison of Cacao Groves Growth

Cerritos			
Hacendado	*1717*	*1720*	*Growth*
Domingo Ibañez	1,500	1,500	0
Pedro Martin de la Cruz	4,000	3,000	1,000
Juan Lorenzo Rodriguez	2,500	3,000	+500
Obra Pia de Cumanibare	9,000	8,000	−1,000
Don Nicolas de Tovar	8,000	9,000	+1,000
Andres Martin de la Fuente	8,000	5,000	−3,000
Don Alonso de Torres	5,000	3,000	−2,000
Total	38,000	32,500	−5,500
Macagua			
Hacendado			
Don Lope Galindes	20,000	18,500	−1,500
Francisco Romero	6,000	8,000	+2,000
Francisco de la Peña	2,000	2,000	0
Pedro Gil Fanego	2,000	2,500	+500
Doña Ana Romero	3,000	2,000	−1,000
Tomas Mazedo	4,000	5,000	+1,000
Maria Morena, libre	1,000	1,800	+800
Juan Esteban, Pardo libre	2,000	1,300	−1700
Juan Salvador, Indio	2,000	1,500	−500
Agustin Romero	4,000	2,600	−1,400
Esperanza, morena libre	2,000	1,200	−800
Total	48,000	46,400	−1,600

Source: Perazzo, 36–39 for 1717 and Olavarriaga, *Instrucción General,* 271–272 for 1720.

which formed part of the San Felipe jurisdiction, estimates can be made. There were 27 haciendas and 84,400 trees in 1717 in Cerritos de Cocorote. In the 1720 *Informe,* Cerritos appears with 24 haciendas and 107,800 cacao trees,—an increase of 23,400 cacao trees, or 28 percent, since 1717. Macagua went from 17 to 21 haciendas, and from 87,300 cacao trees to 99,200 trees, or a 14 percent increase. I compared the growth of individual haciendas for Cerritos and Macagua, but not for the other three sitios, because the cacao groves for these other locations were not listed in the 1717 report. The comparison is shown in Table 14.

In Table 14 we see the decline in the number of trees for some cacao groves, while others increased in the number cultivated. This might be interpreted as a consolidation of cacao groves in the hands of a few owners. Yet, the number of owners, in the case of the Cerritos, declined only by three, from 27 in 1717 to 24 in 1720. The number of owners for the two locations in the two reports is almost even: forty-four growers in 1717 and forty-five growers in 1720. Thus, consolidation does not explain the phenomenon. One tentative explanation could be that there was some underreporting in both censuses.

Still, the number of cacao trees in the jurisdiction did increase. Perhaps, there was some consolidation, as the case of the heirs of Captain Juan Florencio Barbosa attests. This might explain why the number of haciendas decreased while the number of trees increased. In many cases, faulty management reduced the number of cacao trees and prompted the acquisition of a property by others. Proper administration was needed to augment the groves, and this was not always the case. The Barbosa estate demonstrates that efficient administration of an hacienda was not always the norm. In 1720, the estate of Captain Barbosa in the environs of San Nicolas, San Felipe jurisdiction, counted 6,000 cacao trees.[181] Sixteen years later (1736), the same estate appears in a document with only 6,470 trees. In that time span, the hacienda grew by only 8 percent, this negligible growth comes into sharp relief when one remembers that this is the time when the Company is already putting pressure on the growers to increase cultivated acreage. This case also throws light on consolidation as an element of importance to the development of the region.

Along the years the estate of Captain Barbosa increased its liabilities. By 1736, the estate could no longer meet its obligations. To liquidate the debts, the creditor, Don Bernardo Rodriguez, Marquis del Toro, sold the hacienda to Captain Joseph del Castillo Salgado. In the same transaction, the marquis sold him 21,470 cacao trees from three different haciendas with 33 slaves and, in addition to the cultivated land, 6 fanegadas of fallow land. Thus, in one single transaction 20,000 pesos worth of land, slaves and cacao trees went to one owner. Some consolidation did take place and it was due to improper administration, operating an hacienda below cost efficiency. The marquis was in a better position to keep the properties and its benefits, but he chose to sell it. This case also shows something else. The manner in which the parties finalized the agreement is further evidence to the contention that many well-to-do Caraqueños preferred to handle the commercial stage of the cacao economy rather than its production phase.

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[181] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 272.

Captain Salgado did not have liquidity. Nevertheless, the marquis sold him the haciendas on the following terms. The buyer signed a *censo y tributo,* a mortgage, on the properties. He paid an annual interest of 5 percent on the property value, 1,000 pesos, to the seller.[182] In the meantime, Captain Salgado managed the properties and earned an income with which to pay his obligations. The Marquis del Toro preferred to finance the properties rather than acquire them. Meanwhile, Marquis del Toro increased his estate income. It would not be an exaggeration to say that both gentlemen closed the agreement over a cup of hot chocolate.

Some interesting details of the 1717 and 1720 reports are worth mentioning for their socioeconomic importance. The reports underline the importance of cultigen properties for a full understanding of processes of change and development in a region highly dependent on a specific export commodity. These properties—cacao did not put a premium on high capital investment or labor—allowed Amerindians, slaves and freemen to grow cacao on small or large plots of land for their own profit. In the 1717 account, three black women are described as caring for 6,000 trees on their own property: Esperanza had 2,000 trees, Maria had 1,000 and Nicolasa, 3,000. All three were widows. There were three muleteers in Cerritos. One of them owned 4,000 cacao trees, fallow land, 20 mules and two slaves.

In the valley of Macagua, slaves owned 4,000 cacao trees, producing approximately 60 fanegas of cacao per year. In the valley of San Nicolas de Tolentino black slaves from haciendas grew cacao on land allotted to them by the hacendado. These slaves received the profits from the sale of this cacao which they cultivated on their own time. Surprisingly in this instance the slaves had usufruct rights—to grow cacao on someone else's property and keep the profits—to have more cacao trees (10,000) than the heirs of Juan Florencio Barbosa, a white Spaniard (6,000). The Indian Pueblo of San Jose de Chivacoa, where Don Pedro Carrillo was the cacique, had 74 cacao groves, totaling 93,540 trees. Each Indian family tended an average of 1,264 cacao trees. Eight families tended cacao groves with a total of 4,000 trees. One Indian had a grove of 5,000 trees; another had 100. The Indian pueblo of Santa Catalina de Quara had 4,646 cacao trees, distributed in 23 groves. The pueblo families cared for an average of 202 trees. San José de Guama, an Indian pueblo to the Southwest of San Felipe, included 32 cacao growers who tended 9,182 trees. These Amerindians, free blacks and slaves profited from the cultivation of cacao. Cacao production and profits were not only within the reach of Spaniards or white creoles; it included the other castes. The author of the report, Olavarriaga, closes with the statement, "This jurisdiction is considered as the best in the Province."[183]

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[182] Archivo del Registro Principal de Caracas (Hereinafter ARPC), Sección Civiles, 1736 C No. 9. "Testimonio de venta hecha en favor de Don José Castillo por Don Bernardo del Toro de una parte de hacienda en valle de San Nicolas costa del mar abajo." No folios in the original document. This and previous comments on Captain Barbosa and the Marquis Del Toro are based on this document.

Before San Felipe became an independent royal city in 1730, wealth generated by cacao brought its inhabitants into a confrontation with the upper classes of Barquisimeto. Cacao growers from San Felipe wanted the town to have its own charter. But the people of Barquisimeto were opposed to the petition because that meant less income for their city. San Felipe, as we saw, had 94 percent of the cacao trees in the Barquisimeto jurisdiction. If Barquisimeto granted San Felipe its own charter, they would lose a substantial amount of income. Because of the wealth of the region and possible benefits from duties imposed upon cacao exports, the powerful family De La Parra from Barquisimeto did their best to maintain Cerritos de Cocorote within the jurisdiction of Barquisimeto. For obvious reasons, the inhabitants of Cerritos wanted their own government. They needed crown recognition to have their own cabildo thus enabling them to control their own political and economic destiny. This did not happen easily.

The 1700 petition to establish Cerritos as a city went unnoticed by the crown. The De La Parra family did not fail to notice the petition, however. In 1710, the lieutenant governor of Barquisimeto, Don Martin de Gainza, and the *Alcalde Ordinario,* Don Luis de la Parra, ordered the destruction of houses in Cerritos. Martin De Gainza had close ties with the De La Parra family. He was married to Doña Maria Josefa de la Parra. Later he was named administrator of the royal exchequer in Barquisimeto a position he carried out from 23 January 1723 to 15 May, 1731.[184] This connection between royal government employees and members of the upper families was a phenomenom common in the province. San Felipe later exhibited the same connection.

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[183] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general,* 279.

[184] AGN., Real Hacienda, Tomo 377 fol. 10 vo.

The De La Parra family had already been in the Barquisimeto jurisdiction by 1649. In that year Sargento Mayor Juan Ruiz De La Parra was encomendero to the Amerindians of San Jeronimo de Cocorote.[185] In 1695 Don Gaspar Santiago de la Parra appeared as alcalde ordinario of the city of Barquisimeto.[186] Twenty-six years later (9 July), he won the auction to the tithes of the Barquisimeto road for 800 pesos. There is little doubt of this family's influence. Eleven years later, another De La Parra, Sargento Mayor Don Luis Francisco Ruis de la Parra, was the alcalde ordinario and administrator of the royal exchequer.[187] This same family destroyed San Felipe in the early eighteenth century. Such was the destruction that people of high social and political esteem expressed their outrage to the captain general. That action forced the royal government to start an inquiry that resulted in the reprimand of the Barquisimeto upper classes and, finally, in the charter of San Felipe as a royal city. As we will see, that did not deter Barquisimeto from a second attempt at destroying San Felipe. The reprehensible behavior of the Barquisimeto town council was met with opposition not only from the royal government but also from the San Felipe upper classes.

Among the capable and honorable persons of Cerritos that challenged the intrusion from Barquisimeto was Don Bernardo de Matos y Machado. In 1732 he was listed by royal authorities as one of the leaders of the revolt against the Guipuzcoana Company monopolistic practices. Don Bernardo is noted in the 1717 relación as owner of an hacienda and a house in the sitio of La Quebrada. His entry does not state how many trees were on the hacienda. In the 1720 Informe, Don Bernardo is listed as owner of a cacao grove of 15,000 cacao trees. Only Don Manuel de Montoya had more—21,000.[188] Señor Matos's importance is underscored by his being a member of the royal government and highly respected in the region. In 1729, royal treasury books describe him as the administrator of the royal treasury in the "new Spaniards" town of Cerritos de Cocorote in the valley of Barquisimeto.[189] Two years later he continued to serve the king in that capacity.[190]

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[185] Perera, *Historia de la organización*, Tomo II, 148.

[186] AGN., Causas de Residencias, Tomo I, Fols. 538–544.

[187] AGN., Real Hacienda, Alcabala de Tierra, Tomo 235, Fols. 22–22 vo.

[188] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 270.

[189] AGN., Real Hacienda, Tomo 471, fol. 111vo.

[190] AGN., Real Hacienda, Tomo 48, Fol. 52.

Even with leadership of this quality, the town of Los Cerritos met strong opposition from the king to attain the designation of city and thereby have its own political jurisdiction. In September 1724, the De La Parra family and the Barquisimeto cabildo attacked for a second time. This assault was directed by the Alcalde Mayor Don Luis Lopez Varona and the Maestre de Campo (Field Marshall) and Captain Francisco Adan Granados. More than sixty houses were burned and scores of others damaged. The town did not back down. Through Fray Marcelino de San Vicente, leader of the San Francisco Javier mission, they asked the provincial governor, Field Marshall Don Ruy Fernandez Fuenmayor, to allow them to rebuild the town. On 7 March 1725, their petition was granted. Five years later, on 6 November 1729, the king granted autonomous jurisdiction to the town of Cerritos de Cocorote, naming it "Ciudad De San Felipe El Fuerte." It was not until 1 May 1731 that the first city council met. From then on, the town of Cerritos de Cocorote appears as the city of San Felipe in all official documentation.[191]

San Felipe was founded three leagues (9 miles) from the Rio Yaracuy in the northwest region of the province, a region known as the Segovia Highlands.[192] The city's elevation is 252 meters, with average annual temperatures of 260c. Eighteenth-century San Felipe was described as mountainous, with dense vegetation. The mountains and the jungle were "criss-crossed by roads and mule trails used for their commerce with the Dutch and the port of Puerto Cabello."[193] The proud citizens of the new city requested in 1731 a permit from the ecclesiastical authorities of the province to construct a new church. This petition is a historical document of the greatest importance for the study of the socio-economic structure of San Felipe at that time. It lists the leaders and the common citizens of the community and their wealth. The appeal includes names of city residents able to afford monthly contributions for construction of the church. The document states that the monthly sums were to be assigned and appraised on the basis of the citizen's wealth (*caudales*). Two important facts must be noted. First, the amounts were prorated on a monthly basis according to wealth. Second, the wealth of the contributors was appraised by a respected member of the Cabildo and not the citizen himself. These two facts attest to the objectivity of the in-

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[191] Perazzo, *Historia*, 44–46.

[192] Lombardi, *People and Places*, 162, map B-2.

[193] Cisneros, *Descripción*, 152. My translation.

Table 15: Monthly Contribution For San Felipe Church

Monthly Pay In Reales	2	4	6	8	12	16	24
Number of Citizens	5	199	8	65	17	15	4
Total in reales	10	796	48	520	204	240	96

Source: *Documentos,* 86–95.

quiry. The document shows the social rank the community ascribed to the city residents. The effort to collect the money for construction of the church was the initiative of members of the cabildo, not the Church. The monthly sums assigned and the number of payees are listed in Table 15.

I have divided the monthly payments to reflect lower-, middle- and upper-income citizens.[194] Lower income citizens were in the 2 reales to 6 reales bracket, middle income people fit in the 8 reales to 16 reales donation, and upper income citizens were contributing 24 reales a month. It is notable that low income citizens were to contribute almost half (107 pesos: 45 percent) of the money, while high income hacendados pledge only 5 percent. Middle income people were assigned 120 pesos or 50 percent of the offerings. Data show a total of 212 citizens considered as having low income, 97 people were in the middle income bracket and only four could contribute 24 reales (3 pesos) a month. Among those in the upper bracket was Don Bernardo Matos, hacendado and representative of the royal exchequer. The list was composed of 273 men and 49 women. Of the men 44 (16 percent) carried the title of Don and 7 women (14 percent) were addressed as Doña. The rest of the women were widows. The document details the race of the contributors: 299 persons were depicted as Spaniards or white creoles; 23 were ascribed to other racial or ethnic groups. It should be underscored, then, that the initiative to construct the church was taken by the Europeans, not the castes. This list also shows a frontier society mainly in the hands of the Europeans. The 23 "others" were composed of 8 free blacks, 7 Indians, 3 pardos, 2 French, 1 free woman, 1 Creole, and 1 mestizo. Of those listed as free blacks, two were assigned monthly payments of 8 reales—putting them in the middle-income bracket; and six paid 4 reales,—placing them among low-income citizens. That two blacks were within the middle income bracket and six were in the lower income range reenforces the contention that contributions were appraised based on wealth. But it also suggests something else. In San Felipe, if you were a member of the lower classes but you had the wealth, you were accepted into the upper social levels. It also shows that lower classes had access to the wealth generated by the cacao economy and this contributed to some social mobility. To put this in the proper perspective, blacks contributing eight reales were wealthier than a poor Spaniard who employed himself for three reales per day in some menial tasks that others refused to perform and there were many such Spaniards in San Felipe. Nevertheless, this was by far a Eurocentered society. Among the pardos one contributed 8 reales and two 4 reales; both Frenchmen paid 4 reales; the free woman 4 reales; the Creole woman 4 reales; and the mestiza paid 4 reales. Thus of the 23 people twenty were in the lower brackets while three were in the middle income. Although not stated in the document most of these people must have been cacao growers. It is difficult to conceive a person paying half a peso (4 reales) a month unless he had a cacao grove to sustain him. By comparison a jornalero (unskilled daily worker) earned three reales for a day of work. Only a cacao grower with a grove of considerable output, like Don Bernardo de Matos —whom, we saw, owned a 15,000 cacao trees hacienda in 1720—could have paid 24 reales (3 pesos) a month.

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[194] *Documentos,* Expediente no.3, 81–103. The census includes people who could not contribute and seven citizens who were missing from the original document. Thus there are at least 322 people in the jurisdiction who were considered important enough to include in the list. In calculations for social hierarchy I used all 322 citizens, but for estimates of wealth I based my analysis on 313.

Among the skilled people who were assigned a monthly contribution were a *cirujano* (barber?) paying 4 reales; two shoemakers assigned 4 reales; a small store owner (*pulperos*) eight reales; two tailors: one paid 6 reales and the other 4 reales; and three carpenters: one paid 6 reales and the other two 4 reales. Except for the small storeowner, the rest of the professionals belonged to the low-income bracket. Two things are clear: there was a ranking based on wealth among the skilled people and the income of some of them rivaled that of a few cacao growers. These people, inhabitants of the city and not of its jurisdiction, contributed a monthly total of 239 pesos to the Church. This represented a gift of 2,868 pesos a year. To have an idea of how much this sum meant to the people of the time, imagine that this amount was enough to pay the daily salary of a worker (3 reales) in the province for 20 years and it was more than enough to pay the wage of

Table 16: Tithe Auctions on the Barquisimeto Roads and Trails

Vereda	*Year*	*Amount*
Barquisimeto	1711	360 pesos
	1720	800 pesos
	1722	665 pesos
	1724	815 pesos
	1725	920 pesos
	1729	1,000 pesos
Total		4,560 pesos
De Los Valles	1703	2,370 pesos
	1705	3,001 pesos
	1721	3,000 pesos
	1722	3,800 pesos
	1723	4,800 pesos
	1724	3,300 pesos
	1725	4,100 pesos
	1726	3,100 pesos
	1727	3,000 pesos
Total		30,471 pesos

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 235, Fls. 22vo. to 30 and Tomo 34, Fls. 56 to 65.

an unskilled worker in one of the best paid jobs in Spain for the same number of years.

There is no doubt why the De La Parra family did not want to give San Felipe its political autonomy—cacao cultivation meant riches. A list of the amount at which the mule trails and roads of the Barquisimeto jurisdiction were auctioned for the collection of tithes further illustrate this point. Listing of the auction prices in Table 16 speaks for itself.[195]

The roads and trails conducive to the city of Barquisimeto attracted lower bids than those of *de los valles* which in this context means the San Felipe jurisdiction, located in the valley of the Yaracuy River, and at the time of the donations still under the aegis of the city of Barquisimeto. The "valles" were also the place where most cacao was grown in the 1710s and 1720s.

As the series is not continuous, we can compare the two road tolls in only three years: 1722, 1724 and 1725. The comparison between the two towns' road tolls illustrates why the De La Parra family opposed San Felipe's quest for political autonomy. The

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[195] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 235, Fols. 22–33. The 1725 entry reads "principal cacao trail of the valleys."

Barquisimeto auction in the years 1722, 1724 and 1725 adds up to 2,400 pesos. Yet the Valles trail auction in 1722 alone brought a bid of 3,800 pesos, an accrual of 1,400 pesos more into the treasury than the three years of the Barquisimeto road put together. The trails of the valley contributed 11,200 pesos in the three comparable years or 467 percent over what Barquisimeto's roads contributed to the treasury. It is obvious that the auctioneers were going after the cacao trails. They had no interest in the city road. What they wanted was to be found not in the *Caminos reales* but in the hardly passable, narrow mule trails. Here huge loads of cacao passed on their way to the international market.

The roads and trails of the primate city of Caracas jurisdiction are a better example of the phenomenon. The road leading to the city of Caracas was auctioned for 6,585 pesos for the period covering the years 1695 to 1699. For the same years the trail leading to the valley of Ocumare, a place covered with cacao groves and with a rustic church, was auctioned for 17,971 pesos, that is, almost three times (273 percent) more than the road leading to the provincial capital. The same road and trail brought into the royal exchequer from 1705 to 1711 the following amounts: Caracas 15,267 pesos and Ocumare 25,556 pesos—a difference of 10,289 pesos or 67 percent more than the Caracas road. The auctioneers knew the cacao trade thoroughly. The implication is clear: cacao dictated where the bidder wanted to invest his money.[196]

These sums were bids, not the actual amounts collected. The nature of these tithes, however, permits one to assume that these bids reflected wealth generated in the region. A tithe was a 10 percent duty on the value of the goods passing through the roads. One can assume that bidders knew what the roads could produce in terms of tithes, so that they rarely overbid. These bids reflected, then, the lower extreme of what the road, or roads, servicing the region could produce. Since cacao was by far the major contributor to local wealth, it is not exaggerating to argue that tithes represented income generated by the cacao economy. The road of Los Valles, San Felipe's road, attracted in bids of 30,471 pesos in seven years. By dividing this amount by 10 percent tithe, one obtains the approximate total income cacao generated legally for the region: 304,710 pesos—an average of nearly 33,857 pesos per year. This total could be low because it is based on prices computed for the purpose of taxation and, as already stated, these might have not reflected market activities. Also,

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[196] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 33, 34 and 35. See also Appendix M.

Table 17: Annual Income for the Region in Nine Selected Years

Year	*Income*	*Price per Fanega*	*Fanegas*
1703	23700	13.1	1809
1705	30010	12.5	2400
1721	30000	11.5	2608
1722	38000	12.5	3040
1723	48000	10.75	4465
1724	33000	8.88	3716
1725	41000	9.00	4556
1726	31000	9.00	444
1727	30000	10.38	2890

On the table "Price per fanega" is the Royal Treasury officials' appraisal of a fanega for each year.[197] The column "Fanegas" was computed by dividing "income" by "Price per fanega."

during these Barand they certainly paid higher prices. Alcabala based for the most part on cacao exports for these years should have amounted to nearly 15,236 pesos, with an annual average of 1,693 pesos.

It should be noted that in 1705 tithes amounted to 3,001 pesos, while sixteen years later (1721) auctions brought the same amount. This is symptomatic of stable cacao output in the region. It seems that in sixteen years the region did not experience any major disruption of its productive capacity. The same prognosis is applicable for the rest of the period. Since for twenty-two years (1705–1727) output hardly changed, one can surmise that 1723 represents the upper extreme of what the area serviced by the road could produce. If the conjecture is admissible, over 4,500 cacao fanegas, almost half a million pounds, passed this road to the ports. Contemporaries estimated that the region produced an average of 15 fanegas per 1,000 trees.[198] If that was the case, there should have been no less than 300,000 trees in the area. But there were more.

This information could serve to approximate the number of fanegas that escaped legal channels of trading. According to the same sources the San Felipe jurisdiction exhibited no less than 800,000 cacao trees in the 1720s. After subtracting from that total the trees of the political subdivisions that for their geographical location did not use the Los Valles road, the regional total is left with 638,908 trees that could have possibly been serviced by this road.[199] If 1,000 trees produced 15 fanegas, total output in fanegas for the area in the 1720s was no less than 9,585. Then, more than half (5,085 fanegas) the output ended in the bottoms of Dutch ships. Based on these computations, it is plausible to conclude that income generated in this area more than trebled the amount shown on legal documents.

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[197] Prices for the computations came from sources mentioned in Appendix B.

[198] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 278.

Income for the region bore strongly on cacao exported. On its way to world markets, cacao cultivated in the region passed through San Felipe, and here it was charged a peso per carga. The peso per carga totals are listed in Appendix J. One carga contained two fanegas. This duty allows us to compute the number of cacao fanegas produced in the area for later years (1757–1766). To obtain the number of fanegas leaving for the port, one multiplies one carga times two. These are the results per year:

Year	*Fanegas*	*Income (pesos)*	*Year*	*Fanegas*	*Income (pesos)*
1757	15,590	167,592	1762	14,078	183,014
1758	13,198	141,878	1763	15,034	199,200
1759	12,332	129,486	1764	12,340	172,760
1760	13,588	168,219	1765	9,548	133,672
1761	14,532	188,916	1766	7,984	111,776
Total	69,240	796,091		58,984	800,422

At royal treasury prices these fanegas produced what the column on income shows.[200] The table opens with a peak. It suddenly decreases in 1758, reaching a valley in 1759 and then steadily increasing to almost 200,000 pesos in 1763. The down slide that starts in 1764 was a provincial phenomenon, not only a regional one.[201] This could signal either a shift to contraband sources, or tree disease. Whatever the cause, the down slide reached bottom in 1767, when it started an upward trend topping almost 59,000 fanegas in 1768.[202] The table demonstrates that in thirty years, from 1727 to 1757, income to the region sextupled. This was the result of both Company presence in the area and increased production due to more acreage brought to cacao cultivation. Had all these fanegas reached the port, (according to my sources not all did,) the royal exchequer would have levied a considerable amount in taxes. The crown treasury should have collected 79,826 pesos just on sales taxes in those ten years (1757–1766). But for fiscal years 1757–1766 San Felipe collected only 37,707 pesos (See Appendix K). Annual average projections of sale duties based on pesos per carga reached 7,983 pesos. Same computations based on actual alcabala collections amounted to 3,771 pesos, a difference of 4,212 pesos per year. The difference was either levied in Puerto Cabello or went into contraband channels. Negligible quantities of fiscal income indirectly entered the domestic economy in the form of soldiers' and other government employees' wages and construction expenses for forts and other imperial physical plants.

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[199] I subtracted the following towns and their jurisdictions' totals from the grand total: San Nicolas, Aroa, Chivacoa, Cocorote and Urachiche. See Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general,* 278.

[200] These prices are found on the tomos listed on Appendix B.

[201] This is true of Arcilas Farias totals, as well as, with mine. See his *Economía,* 153–157.

[202] Prices and cacao fanegas are listed in Appendix G.

To confirm further the impact of the cacao economy on intraregional economic growth, one can use sales taxes as a proxy of that growth. Any increase in sales taxes is a reflection of growth in the cacao economy, because cacao was the major source of income in the area. A comparison of alcabalas collected for the twenty years period from 1753 to 1772 and the fiscal year 1788 suggests that the export-led economy of the Yaracuy River valley system, including San Felipe and Puerto Cabello, grew more than fifty percent during those years. For the years 1753–1772 San Felipe and Puerto Cabello together collected more sales taxes than the rest of the province, with the exception of Caracas. In those years San Felipe levied a total of 99,627 pesos—annual average of 4,981 pesos—, while for the entire period Puerto Cabello received 195,258 pesos on equal tax—an annual average of 9,762 pesos. Monthly sales taxes collected for the fiscal year starting in November 1787 and ending in October 1788 were 10,144 pesos. These are the totals by months:

For San Felipe, the total for the fiscal year 1788 (10,144) represents more than half the average total for the years 1753–1772 (4,981). Puerto Cabello's average (9,762) is less than San Felipe collected in 1788. Sixteen years later San Felipe alone was collecting close to the amount both the city and the port levied in previous years. Even if one argues that more efficient collection techniques could have accounted for such a staggering increase in tax collections, later in the section we will see that the record shows production expanded during the second half of the period under study (1693–1770).

Table 18: Summary of Sale Taxes for the Jurisdiction of San Felipe

	Fiscal Year 1787–1788	
Noviembre	1787	679ps 4rs
Diciembre	1787	457ps 5rs
Enero	1788	466ps 2rs
Febrero	1788	1191ps 2rs
Marzo	1788	674ps 6½rs
Abril	1788	423ps 2rs
Mayo	1788	710ps 6rs
Junio	1788	1519ps 6rs
Julio	1788	460ps 6rs
Agosto	1788	243ps 1rl
Septiembre	1788	1105ps 4rs
Octubre	1788	2211ps 3½rs
Total		10,144ps Ors

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1753 fol. 141, Signed in San Felipe, 31 de Octubre de 1788 by Pablo Maria Freguer.

The city of San Felipe was the headquarters for the regional crown tax collector. Royal agents came to the city to deposit their collections with the crown representative.[203] Money levied in this manner was delivered to the lieutenant of the royal forces in Puerto Cabello. From June to November 1756, royal couriers delivered 4,716 pesos to Puerto Cabello.[204] They also carried libranzas (drafts) to Caracas in the name of the Compañìa Guipuzcoana.[205] The city did not depend on the royal exchequer income for its budget. All taxes: alcabala de tierra (sales tax), almojarifazgo (export-import tax), armada and armadilla (duties to upkeep the navy), alcabala de salida (export tax) and peso de carga (fee for transportation), went to the royal exchequer. Tax collectors dutifully remitted fiscal earnings to Puerto Cabello at the end of the fiscal quarter.[206] Road repairs and other expenses came out of the hacendados pocket.

Colonists, not the royal government, built dirt roads in the sixteenth century and later. Encomienda Amerindians built the first ones. A sort of *mita,* that prevailed until 1797, was used to clear the roads. Mita were laborers drafted from among tributary Amerindians. At one time, over a hundred and fifty Amerindians worked for three reales per day. The cabildo and/or encomenderos paid for the food and tools. The cabildo was the financial source for the infrastructure needed for the commercial development of the region.[207] Evidence shows that in 1575, horses, mules and donkeys were substituted for human carriers for the first time.[208] Colonists built these roads over the trails Amerindians used for years before the arrival of the Europeans. Black slaves kept mule and horse trails cleared. Hacendados with their slaves took this task upon themselves.[209] These roads were of two kinds: some dirt roads led from haciendas to haciendas; others from town to town.

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[203] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, San Felipe, fols. 143v and 164.
[204] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fols. 113vo–114vo.
[205] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 114.
[206] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, fols. 143v., 165v., 191v., 212 and 233v.

Puerto Cabello, the port for the Yaracuy River valley system economy, had several roads leading to the nearby cacao regions. These were built under entrepreneurs' influence on the cabildos. To keep contraband in control, royal soldiers preferred only one road. Growers and cacao traders, however, lobbied for several more roads and won. Eight roads connected the port to various towns and their cacao haciendas. There were 8 *caminos comerciales*—literally, business roads—and one Pica radiating from Puerto Cabello to the hinterland. One of them, "camino de valle seco," was reconditioned by the Compañía Guipuzcoana when it arrived in the province. Since 1733 this road appears on every map of the city. The "Pica de Mi Quija" was an alternative route in times of floods. The "camino de la Mayor" went west to the town of Orón, where it forked toward Coro and San Felipe.[210] In the late eighteenth century builders had to rely on salaried workers (we now know they were Amerindians and freemen) to erect the roads. The distribution of their income is important in itself, but it also permits comparison with that of other workers of the time.

Close to fifty workers found employment in the construction of the road from San Esteban, in the east, to Puerto Cabello, in the northwest, in the late eighteenth century. They worked five days a week. A foreman, *maestro de obra*, earned seven silver pesos a week, 11.2 reales per day; a skilled worker, *albañil*, made 4 pesos 4 reales per week, 7.2 reales daily; and an unskilled worker, *peon*, received 2 pesos 4 reales a week, 4 reales for a day of work.[211] A comparison of wages of similar workmen in Madrid and Caracas shows interesting facts about the economy of both places, mainly that unskilled workers earned approximately the same wages, while skilled laborers wages were far apart. Daily earnings of both workers follow:[212]

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[207] Asdrubal Gonzalez, "El Real consulado y los caminos coloniales de Puerto de Cabello," in *Memoria del cuarto congreso venezolano de historia*, del 27 de octubre al 1° de noviembre de 1980, Tomo II, Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1983: 35–36.

[208] Ermila Troconis De Veracoechea, *La tenencia de la tierra en el litoral central de Venezuela*, Caracas: Editorial Equinocio, 1979: p.32

[209] Miguel Acosta Saignes, *Vida de los Esclavos Negros en Venezuela*, Prologo de Roger Bastide, Caracas: Hesperides Ediciones, 1967: 173

[210] Asdrubal Gonzalez, "El Real consulado y los caminos coloniales de Puerto de Cabello," in *Memoria del cuarto congreso venezolano de historia*, del 27 de octubre al 1° de noviembre de 1980, Tomo II, Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1983: 34–35.

Skilled Wages Daily (reales)		*Unskilled Wages Daily (reales)*	
Madrid	20	Madrid	5
Caracas	7.2	Caracas	4

A foreman in Caracas had a lower salary than a skilled worker in Madrid. Daily earnings for an unskilled worker in Caracas compared favorably with his counterpart in Madrid, but the workers in Madrid had one of the best paid jobs in the region—working in the restoration of the king's palace. In the colony they were merely constructing a road. It should be noted that a peon, an unskilled worker in a cacao hacienda, earned between three to four reales per day, this compares similarly to his counterpart building palaces.

Compared to the rest of the province's towns and cities, San Felipe appears by far to be one of the most important centers of production and trade in the region. I have used sales taxes (alcabalas) to measure the importance of San Felipe in commercial terms. For the period 1753–1772 San Felipe ranked third in the province in terms of collection of sales taxes for the royal exchequer. In that period Caracas collected 727,678 pesos; Puerto Cabello—the Port of San Felipe traders—gathered 195,258 pesos; San Felipe brought in 99,627 pesos; and La Guayra reported 74,342 pesos in sales taxes. The rest of the jurisdictions did not surpass the 35,000-pesos mark in sales taxes collected.[213] Most of these sales taxes represented cacao transactions in the San Felipe jurisdiction.[214]

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[211] Asdrubal Gonzalez, "El Real consulado . . . ," 36.

[212] The data on wages for workers at Madrid is found in Earl J. Hamilton, *War and Prices in Spain, 1651–1800*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969).

[213] AGN, Real Hacienda, Alcabala (5%), Tomos 475 and 522. See Appendix N. The reader should be warned that most sales taxes collected in jurisdictions without royal accountants, and there were several of these jurisdictions, sent their taxes through their teniente and Cabo de Guerra, who was paid 6 percent of the total alcabala collected, to the royal exchequer in Caracas. Thus, in some instances, the city of Caracas total includes those of other jurisdictions.

The total for Caracas should be taken with some reservations. Within Caracas's total there are alcabalas from other jurisdictions that did not have treasury collectors and had to send their collections to the primate city. This could give the impression that Caracas and its jurisdiction were producing more than others, but, for example, parts of the jurisdiction of Valencia sent their income from sales taxes to Caracas and these counted as Caracas fiscal income. San Felipe did the same since its jurisdiction reached the coast and it was advantageous for people there to send their collections to Caracas. The sea route offered lower freight rates than did following the mule trail into San Felipe. Thus, the total for San Felipe was higher for two reasons. First, Puerto Cabello, second in alcabalas, formed part of the same producing region as San Felipe, the Yaracuy River valley. Second, thousands of fanegas left San Felipe for the port and did not pay sales tax until they reached the port. These two facts, and Caracas over-accounting, easily made the region San Felipe-Puerto Cabello second in production in the province.

San Felipe cacao market shows the intricacies of the cacao market better than Caracas's market. In August, 1759, the following entry was inscribed in a fiscal document:

> Me hago cargo de 10 pesos 4 reales que corresponden a su magestad por el real derecho de alcabala de 210 pesos ½ real valor de 22 fanegas 5 libras de cacao que varios cosecheros han vendido a la Real Compañia Gùipuzcoana a 8.5 pesos fanega y 1 fanega 62 libras de dicho fruto que varios mercaderes han comprado a seis pesos fanega, y las mismas que han vendido a la citada Real Compañia a los dichos 8.5 pesos fanega como consta por menos de la relación dada por Don Miguel Antonio de Indurra factor de ella.[215]

In the semester July–December of 1758 the Company bought an average of 42 percent of cacao transacted in the market. In 1759 the Company bought 29 percent (1,084 fanegas) of the total cacao presented for sale in the legal market. The following year growers and merchants sold 45 percent (2,678 fanegas) of their cacao to the Company. This trend continued. In 1761 the Company factors bought or exchanged for merchandise 54 percent (3,742 fanegas) of the cacao brought to the market. In 1762 the Company bought 53 percent (3,908 fanegas) of the cacao in the market. The last two years for which we have data the Company's performance was as impressive as in previous years. In 1763 they acquired 53 percent (2,572 fanegas) of the San Felipe cacao market. In 1764 Company factors broke all previous records when they bought 75 percent (2,684 fanegas) of the cacao presented for sale.

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[214] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, 2249 and 2251. The accountant entered the totals in the royal exchequer books daily. I regrouped them on a monthly basis and then totaled them by years. See Appendix L. In the year 1759 a total of 3,687 cacao fanegas were traded in the San Felipe cacao market. The following year 5,825 fanegas were exchanged. In 1761 the number of fanegas transacted reached 6,972. The next year cacao traders bought 7,318 cacao fanegas. In 1763 the cacao traders and growers exchanged 4,859 fanegas. In 1764 the amount traded decreased to 3,602 fanegas.

[215] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, fol.128vo.

Besides the Company there were some familiar faces in the area like Don Esteban de Otamendi. Don Esteban, who as we saw, was active in the Caracas market, surfaced in San Felipe also, where he was involved in heavy cacao trading. From July to December 1758 he bought 360 fanegas.

We are fortunate to have consulted documentation that shows the intricacies of cacao trading in San Felipe. The manuscripts are part of the trial of a cacao merchant. Francisco Rodriguez Camejo, a 37-year old priest, was arrested on 5 September 1730, for failing to substantiate the way in which he spent 12,000 pesos that the captain general, Don Lope Carrillo, gave him to buy cacao. After receiving the money Licenciado Rodriguez Camejo traveled to the Yaracuy valley to buy cacao on behalf of the governor and captain general.[216] Instead of buying cacao for the captain general the priest made several cacao transactions that did not balance with the money given him. The documents show in considerable detail how cacao trading parties carried out the transactions.

Rodriguez Camejo was the personal confessor of Captain General Don Lope Carrillo. On 9 June 1730, he left Caracas for the Valleys of Barquisimeto, later to be known as the San Felipe region. He was accompanied by a page who earned 8 pesos per month or almost two reales per day. Rodriguez spent close to four months (114 days) in the region buying cacao and preparing it for shipment. He stayed from early June to 1 October 1730, estimating a per diem of 2 pesos for himself and his page.

As soon as he found accommodations Rodriguez Camejo went to nearby haciendas and bought cacao—at 8, 10, 11 and 12 pesos per fanega. He bought a total of 826 fanegas of cacao from different hacendados in the environs of Los Cerritos de Cocorote (San Felipe). Securing transportation for the cacao, the freight from the haciendas to a *bodega* (warehouse) in Cerritos was 4 reales per carga (two fanegas of 110 pounds each). For renting the bodega he paid 10 pesos, three pesos per month. To prepare the cacao for transportation to the port he bought 826 zurrones (hide sacks) at 4 reales each. Sun drying and sacking (enzurronar) the cacao cost 3 reales per 15 zurrones. All these expenses had an income-multiplier effect on the local economy.

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[216] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta no. 25, fols. 3 to 8vo.

Rodriguez Camejo left an interesting description of how fanegas of cacao were prepared for transportation in the bodega. Peons stored cacao in grain in one house. After sun drying the grains, these laborers moved the cargo to another house where they weighed and sacked the precious fruit. The unit of weight was a fanega. Fanegas in the province were of 110 pounds, but in the Cerritos region they scaled 113 pounds. Sacking the cacao added 3 more pounds per fanega so that each zurron weighed a total of 116 pounds. On account of this arrangement the priest protested that he was losing several hundred pounds, because on arrival to the port fanegas were weighed at 110 pounds.[217] Due to the peculiar way of handling cacao in the bodega, Camejo argued, 4 percent of it was lost at processing. He ended up with 33 fanegas less than the 826 he originally bought. To this loss he also added 100 pesos paid for the henequen baskets the peons used to collect cacao. The cost to conduct the fanegas to Puerto Cabello was 6 pesos per carga. The entries on Table 19 list all the costs Señor Rodriguez claimed he had incurred:

The approximate cost per fanega unloaded at the port of Puerto Cabello was nearly 15 pesos.[218] Father Rodriguez Camejo had two agents waiting for the fanegas in Puerto Cabello, his cousin Adrian Rodriguez Camejo and Don Mathias Bezana. They delivered the fanegas to Captain Don Francisco Marchan. Rodriguez Camejo sent the fanegas to the port on mules. From 4 July to 27 July 1730, twelve muleteers were charged with delivering 484 fanegas (242 cargas) of cacao. From 8 August to 22 August 1730, eight muleteers left Los Cerritos with 342 cacao fanegas (171 cacao cargas) for Puerto Cabello. Every muleteer carried a guia specifying the date the guia was issued, to whom they entrusted the cacao, the number of cargas involved, the person in the port authorized to receive the cargo, and the length of time the cacao

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[217] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 25, fol. 109. It is clear from the sources that the shipmaster opened and inspected the zurrones before shipping.

[218] Rodriguez Camejo lost, or so he claimed, 33 fanegas. After subtracting this amount from the original fanegas (826), we are left with 794 fanegas ready for shipment. Costs incurred divided by the number of fanegas left gives costs per fanega at the port, 15 pesos per fanega.

Table 19: Rodriguez Camejo's Costs in Obtaining Cacao

Item	*Cost Per Item*	*Total Cost*
826 Fanegas	10 pesos	8,260 pesos
413 Cargas Freight to Puerto Cabello	6 pesos	2,478 pesos
826 Hide sacks (zurrones)	4 reales	413 pesos
Freight Per carga haciendas to Los Cerritos	4 reales	206 pesos
33 fanegas, 4 % lost in the Bodega	10 pesos	330 pesos
Rent of the Bodega	10 pesos	10 pesos
Baskets of Henequen		100 pesos
Per Diem for Sr. Camejo and page	2 pesos/day	228 pesos
Monthly Salary of the Page (114 days)	8 pesos/month	30 pesos
Sun drying and packing the cacao (826 fanegas)	3 rs/per 15 Fgs.	21 pesos
Two trips to Caracas		40 pesos
Two trips to Puerto Cabello		20 pesos
Total		12,136 pesos

Source: AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 25, Fls. 49–50vo.

owner granted the muleteer to get to the port. The document was signed by the cacao trader or his agent. The brother of the priest, Juan Rodriguez Camejo, signed the guia.

On arrival at the port the frigate captain, Don Francisco Merchan, or a representative would endorse the Guia acknowledging receipt of the load. The ship crew verified the amount of cacao stated in the Guia and in the *recibo* or acknowledgment. This important document for the history of the colonial domestic economy read as follows:

> Cerrito, y julio quatro de mill Septo y treinta años. Por la presente concedo guia y lizencia a Dn. Santiago de Torres para que pueda conduzir a Puerto Cabello veinte y cinco cargas de cacao a la fragata del cargo de Dn. Francisco Merchan,res para que pueda conduzir a Puerto Cabello veinte y cinco cargas de cacao a la fragata del cargo de Dn. Francisco Merchan, en termino de ocho dias, y me traeja [traiga?] esta respaldada del Capn o maestre y recivo de haver quedado a su bordo y para que conste lo firme = (signed) Juan Rodriguez Camejo.

The acknowledgment or recibo was written on the following terms at the end of the guia or on its back:

> Recivo Quarenta y seis fanegas de cacao y veinte y siete libras de cacao, en sinquenta surrones y quedan a bordo de la fregata La Dichosa del cargo del Capitan Dn. Francisco Marchan Agosto ocho de mil septo. y treinta años= Bartholome Sanchez (signed)= Son quarenta y seis fanegas, y veinte y siete libras.[219]

One interesting note is that the shipmaster, Bartholomé Sanchez, acknowledged that he received fifty sacks (surrones) but not fifty fanegas as is claimed in the Guia, where it states that 25 cargas were being sent. The shipmaster signed the guia for 46 fanegas and 27 pounds. Based on the guia record, there should have been 50 fanegas not 46, thus there was a loss of 4 fanegas (5 per cent or 440 pounds of cacao) on the way to the port. It is not stated in these sources but in some other instances the 5 percent "loss" was the captain's charge for the freight. In this case we are not sure. Municipal council minutes from the city of Caracas offer another plausible explanation for the loss. In a meeting of the municipal council Caraqueños complained of shipmasters weighing their loads on a *romana* scale instead of a *peso de cruz.*[220] Hacendados asserted that scaling the cargo in this manner would benefit carriers, not the growers. Perhaps Camejo ordered the muleteers to sell some of the loads in contraband. One, or a combination of all, of these cases could explain the losses.

The shipmaster received more underweight sacks. On the next delivery 90 pounds were unaccounted for on arrival. After these two trips eighteen mule trains left for Puerto Cabello and, in all but six of them, some cacao was reported lost (*merma*). The reported losses fluctuated from 4 percent to 15 percent. All the guias accepted as having no loss read "all these loads are mine" meaning they belonged to Francisco Rodriguez Camejo. The mule train took, on the average, 9.4 days to travel from Cerritos de Cocorote to Puerto Cabello; with a minimum of 5 days and a maximum of 13 days.

In one of the guias, an anonymous writer said: "I paid 30 pesos for the mules of this guia." The guia records leaving Cerritos on 26 August 1730. The mule-train carried 35 cargas of cacao; one mule per carga. The mule freight cost only about 6.9 reales per carga.[221] In the list of expenses Rodriguez Camejo itemized the freight as 6 pesos per carga. Other sources state that each carga paid six pesos in freight. In the trial one witness, Juan De Fuentes, confirms that six pesos was the usual freight. It should be noted that the prosecutor accepted the six pesos per fanega freight.[222] Thus there must have been an agreement between the person who wrote the 6.9 reales per carga freight and the muleteers. One can surmise that the difference was to be paid in cacao fanegas sent on consignment on the part of the carriers. This is evidence of a flexible system of trading in the region. Cacao traders were capable of making, and made, more flexible agreements than is manifest in the official records. In their testimony, hacendados as well as royal officers state that the freight for one carga in the San Felipe jurisdiction was six pesos.[223] But it is apparent that growers and traders agreed to pay in cash and/or cacao to the muleteers.

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[219] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta no. 25, fol. 82.

[220] Nuñez, *Cacao*, 109.

[221] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta no.25, fol. 101.

A more interesting point is that some of the hacendados seem to have sold cacao and also contracted with Camejo for hauling the cargo to the port. For example, on 5 July 1730, Don Felix del Castillo, an hacendado, carried on his mules 11 cacao cargas (22 fanegas) to Puerto Cabello for Señor Rodriguez Camejo.[224] Freight for 11 cargas amounted to 66 pesos. It took the party nine days to get to the port. According to estimates, 4 reales were enough for sustenance of a peon per day. Supposing that two muleteers were enough to guide 11 mules to Puerto Cabello, the round trip cost Don Felix 18 pesos per diem for two persons and 13 pesos 4 reales in wages, 3 reales per worker per day. Freight (66 pesos) minus trip expenses (31.5 pesos) left a profit of 34.5 pesos (about 52 percent). If one adds to this handsome profit the dividend accruing from selling that cacao, the rewards are obvious. Thus, Don Felix earned a profit from selling and hauling the loads. This type of business arrangement must be examined before determining profitability for cacao growers. Many hacendados were not only cacao growers. They had other income accruing from a variety of enterprises endeavors, as we will see in more detail later.

Freight was admitted as acceptable by the prosecutor but he did not allow other expenses to pass as proper charges. His decision was based on the declaration of witnesses. Their testimony accounted for the inflated expenses and illustrated the trade mechanism used in the area of San Felipe. Don Francisco Gonzalez Ahedo testified that Rodriguez Camejo bought some cacao in the town of Cerritos and others he bought from the growers in their haciendas. He further asserted that cacao in grains (not sacks) was stored in a nearby house paying 3 pesos per month. These were makeshift warehouses, that is, houses temporarily converted for a monthly fee. Witness accounts suggest that these were hacendados' houses, probably those of the same growers who sold cacao to Camejo, moreover, in the sacking process they used more than one house. Warehousing thus became another form of income for hacendados.

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[222] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta no. 25, fol. 69.

[223] AA, Sección Obras Pìas, Hacienda Cumanibare.

[224] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 25, fols. 102–108 and Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 270.

Don Ahedo estimated that one peso was enough per diem for a person and his page living in the area. Another witness, Don Fernando Michenel, affirmed that a salaried worker in the San Felipe jurisdiction earned from 45 to 50 pesos per year; from 3.8 to 4.2 pesos a month. He confirmed the previous witness's contention that one peso per day was enough to sustain a lord and his servant. After accounting for inflated costs the judge corrected Rodriguez Camejo's expenses as Table 20 shows:

Table 20: Adjusted Rodriguez Camejo Expenses For Cacao

	Cost Per Item	*Total Cost*
748 Fanegas 35 lbs.	8 pesos	5,987 pesos
Mule Freight per carga to Puerto Cabello (374 cargas)	6 pesos	2,244 pesos
748 Hides sacks	4 reales	374 pesos
Freight per carga from the haciendas to Los Cerritos	4 reales	374 pesos
4% (30 fgs) loss (merma) on the trip to the port	8 pesos	240 pesos
Bodega (warehouse) Rent	10 pesos	10 pesos
Per diem Sr. Camejo & page	1 peso/day	114 pesos
Peon work for 4 1/2 months	1 real/day	18 pesos
Sun drying & packing cacao (3rs/15 surrones)	3 rls.	18 pesos
Total		9,379 pesos

Source: AA, Seccion Judiciales, Carpeta No. 25, Fls. 66vo.-68.

These new estimates set the cost of a cacao fanega unloaded at the port of Puerto Cabello at close to 12.5 pesos per fanega. A difference of 3 pesos per fanega from Rodriguez Camejo's estimate of 15 pesos. There were other circumstances which lowered expenses. That Rodriguez Camejo bought 150 cacao fanegas in San Felipe and the rest in haciendas lowered the cost of the fanegas.

The 150 he bought in San Felipe did not pay the 4 reales per carga freight; this lowered costs by 75 pesos. Judicial authorities did not deduct this overcharge from expenses. They did write a warning, however, into the decision stating that the 75 pesos on freights did not proceed but was allowed. Camejo also admitted not only that 100 fanegas left directly from the haciendas to Puerto Cabello, but that 40 fanegas were already sacked (enzurronadas) when he bought them. These two items decrease costs by about 51 pesos.[225]

Although the fiscal conceded 748 fanegas to Sr. Camejo, the guias showed that the muleteers delivered 796. On arrival at the port the shipmaster registered only 471 fanegas (235.5 cargas) as owned by the Captain General Lope Carrillo. A study of the guìas showed that out of those fanegas 325 (162.5 cargas) were ascribed to Francisco Rodriguez Camejo. He wrote in the guias, "These cargas are mine." It seems that the priest had in mind reaping some profits for himself. Perhaps he thought that by sending 471 fanegas on consignment to Cadìz or Veracruz he could have paid back the 12,000 pesos plus a profit to the captain general. We can make some preliminary estimates with the data at hand to determine the amount and feasibility of a profit, using three markets to determine profitability: Cadìz, Veracruz and Curaçao.

To arrive at a proper port price for cacao fanegas at the time, one has to add 16 percent duties (about 3 pesos based on a custom price of 17 pesos)[226] to the 12.5 pesos price of a delivered fanega to Puerto Cabello. The freight per cacao fanega to Cadiz was five pesos.[227] In Cadiz the trader had to pay duties which amounted to no less than 13 pesos per fanega.[228] The 471 fanegas' price would have increased from 15.5 pesos to 33.5 pesos in the port of

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[225] AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 25, fols. 53vo.–54.

[226] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 298.

[227] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 298–299. In 1720, duties in Veracruz on a cacao fanega amounted to 10 percent of the official value of a cacao fanega. For the same year, duties in Caracas totaled 16 percent of the official value of a fanega. Freight to Veracruz was 5 pesos per fanega. According to Gonzales, *El comercio*, 24 and Walker, *Spanish Politics*, 242 freight to Cadiz was the same, five pesos per fanega. However, on a Royal Cedula of May 16, 1732, the Crown increases freights from 6 to 6.5 pesos per fanega, implying that before May 1732 freight to Spain was 6 pesos per fanega. See Nuñez, *Cacao*, 149.

[228] Based on Francisco Miranda's private correspondence, I decided to use 33 maravedies per pound as the correct duty. Consult Francisco De Miranda, *Colombeia: Miranda subdito español, 1750–1780*, Introducción, bibliografia, prólogo y notas: Josefina Rodrìguez de Alonso, Tomo I, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1978). "Asuntos Económicos De Miranda, Años 1771–1772 Libro General De Cuentas. Madrid, Año De 1771," 290. But see also Hussey, *Caracas Company*, 59; Garcia-Baquero, *Càdiz y el Atlàntico*, 202; Francisco Morales Padron, *El comercio canario-americano*, 374; and Matheus Gonzalez, *El comercio*, 45.

Cadiz. Based on computations made on a previous section each fanega would have sold in Cadìz for nearly 45 pesos.[229] The 471 fanegas total price would have been 21,195 pesos. After deducting the investment of 15,778.5—this included the 15.5 pesos per fanega in Caracas plus the duties and freight paid in Cadiz—we have a profit of about 5,416.5 pesos or close to 34 percent return on the investment made. Other returns show that this one could have amounted to a bit less, but certainly not less than 20 percent.[230]

To ascertain Cacao prices in the province, merchants' profit, insurance and freight should be deducted. Unfortunately, we do not have that information. But reasonable estimates can be computed based on available data. It is a well established fact that Dutch merchant marine was cheaper than any other at the time. The Dutch had lower overhead costs than the Spanish. For example, Dutch crews were paid 12 to 14 guilders (5 pesos) per month, while Spanish crews earned 10 to 12 pesos per month.[232] Duties were also lower for Dutch than for their Spanish counterparts. This allowed Dutch merchants to pay higher prices for cacao. We established on a previous section that Dutch cacao prices were consistently 50 percent higher than royal custom prices. Based on this piece of information, it is sensible to assume that Dutch merchants in 1730 offered 34 pesos for a cacao fanega on the coast of the province.[233] Then, the 471 fanegas sold to the Dutch would have produced a net income of 16,014 pesos. Less the 5,887.5 pesos invested, (remember that Camejo did not have to pay duties because this is contraband), the priest ended with a net return of 10,126.5 pesos. We should take this amount with some clarification. Dutch merchants exchanged cacao for merchandise, although in some instances they paid in silver. However, the profit margin when they exchanged merchandise for cacao was wider, because they acquire merchandise at lower prices than in the market. They really bought cacao at a discount. Nevertheless,

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[229] In Part I we saw that the retail price of a fanega was 118 pesos in 1772. The Company valued a cacao fanega in their warehouse at 40 pesos—This was for "cacao from Caracas and Maracaibo." The difference between the retail price and the wholesale price is 78 pesos or 66 percent of the retail price. The price of retail cacao fanega in 1730 was 133 pesos. I deducted 66 percent (88 pesos) from the retail price per fanega. This subtraction gave me a 45 pesos wholesale fanega.

[230] For example, Francisco Miranda had a return of 28 percent on his investment of fanegas sold in Cadìz. See Part I.

[232] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general*, 301.

[233] This computation is based on Table 15. The monthly donations for the church construction were taken as a proxy for size of landholding because the assigned contributions were based on size of wealth. Obviously the only wealth around was cacao.

Father Camejo also had an additional 325 fanegas he could sell to the Dutch that would produce a handsome profit for him.

The Rodriguez Camejo's case also illustrates the pattern followed in internal cacao trade transactions. There were two ways of acquiring cacao. One way was to buy cacao directly from sellers in the town of San Felipe. The other was to go to the haciendas and purchase it from the growers. Cacao prices varied according to which one of the two mechanisms one used to purchase it. Prices also differed depending on the stage of the processing at which the trader bought cacao. If bought in the pod, the buyer had to consider expenses such as peon salary to collect the pod and extract the beans; sun drying and sacking (enzurronar) the cultigen; finally, warehousing. There is no doubt that traders were keenly aware of costs when determining at what prices they would buy cacao.

CHAPTER V: CACAO: INTRICACIES OF ITS MARKET AND ITS INFLUENCE

The city of San Felipe owed its foundation to cacao. Although some connection between copper mines and inhabitants of the region was established, the prolonged stay of people in the territory was mostly due to the cacao boom. "Riches" were not in precious metals but in cacao. San Felipe society was integrated by blacks (slaves and freemen), Amerindians, whites (European and creoles), and Pardos.

The size of the units of production was skewed toward small landholdings at the local (San Felipe jurisdiction) and provincial level. In the early eighteenth century San Felipe small cacao grove owners composed 68 percent of total owners in the region.[233] In 1720 the province of Caracas showed 48 percent of the growers owning cacao groves of less than 2,000 trees. (See Table 13). The proliferation of small landholdings assured the success and harmony in the relations between traders and growers. Traders knew the intricacies of the internal and foreign commerce. Growers obviously did not have the capital necessary to engage in direct trade of their produce with foreign markets and relied on cacao traders and the Dutch for their livelihood. Only a few cacao growers engaged in cultivation and export of the produce, but it is suspected that not a small number engaged in hauling the staple to the port, earning an additional income.

The analysis of the San Felipe market sheds interesting results. Seasonality in this market was more marked than in the Caracas market. When months are grouped into trimesters, the seasonality is clearly highlighted. In 1759 close to 40 percent of cacao loads were traded during the months of January, February and March. In the months of April, May, and June, 34 percent of the total amount of cacao was transacted. Thus seasonality in this year was not as sharply drawn. That was not the case for the rest of the period. For the five-year period of 1760–1764 the scenario changes. In these five years more than 48 percent of all cacao was traded in the trimester of July–September. In 1760 cacao bought or sold reached 50 percent of the total cacao traded that trimester. The next year (1761) the same percentage of cacao was negotiated in the same trimester. In 1762 the percentage was 48; in 1763 it was 60 percent; and in 1764 the trimester sold 52 percent of the cacao for the year.[234] The behavior of the market suggests that in San Felipe cacao growers sent their cacao to the market immediately after harvest. This is indicated by the high percentages of output following the month of June, which, as has been noted, is one of the two months that the growers considered traditionally as the proper time for beginning the harvest.

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[233] This computation is based on Table 15. The monthly donations for the church construction were taken as a proxy for size of landholding because the assigned contributions were based on size of wealth. Obviously the only wealth around was cacao.

Similar results as those of the regional level show at the hacienda level. Quinquennial tables on cacao harvest of haciendas Cumanibare and Choronì reveal a strong seasonal component. Hacienda Cumanibare collected more than half (55.7 percent) of its 1717–1721 harvest in the months of May to July. In the years 1727–1730, cacao harvested in the same months constituted 60.9 percent of the four years crop.[235] Cacao yield in hacienda Choroni, located in the north central coast of the province, confirm the presence of seasonality found in Cumanibare. For the same months, Choroni's cacao yield attained 50.2 percent of the crop for the years 1693–1697. In the next five years (1698–1702), the trend continued with a total harvest for similar months of 50.9 percent.[236] Both tables also show low yields in the months of December and January, months that, according to sources,[237] should have yielded as much as the months of May, June and July.

According to figures in Appendix L, cacao growers did not waste much time in releasing the crop to the market, a month or two at the most. Quinquennial totals, as well as decennial totals, show that approximately 20 percent of cacao loads arrived at the market in the month of September. The table suggests that, contrary to what some hacendados advised, growers did not wait long to sell their crops. In a municipal council meeting, one member argued that it was to the planter's advantage to store cacao and wait for better prices.[238] If the councilman was right, the growers should had waited until the months of October or November, when cacao in the market was scarce due to lower tree yields and prices were supposed to be higher. Instead, growers had most of the cacao intended for the legal market already there by the month of September. Warehousing did not play such an important role for the growers in the regional market, but this is not to say that it did not play an important role for the merchants. Clearly, growers did not influence the market by withholding production.

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[234] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 2247, 2248 and 2251. See Appendix L.

[235] See Appendix O.

[236] See Appendix P.

[237] Agustin Codazzi, *Resumèn de la Geogràfia de Venezuela: Geografia Fisica*, Tomo I, (Caracas: Biblioteca Venezolana de Cultura, 1940): 156

[238] Nuñez, *Cacao*.

The difference in seasonality between San Felipe and Caracas may be attributed to the peculiar climatic conditions of each region. Caracas at 900 meters altitude has a more benign climate than San Felipe, which is only 252 meters above sea level. There was less risk of spoiling the beans by keeping them in the warehouse in Caracas than in San Felipe. Conditions similar to those of Caracas were found in Tenochtitlan. There is documentary evidence to the effect that in the Mexican plateau cacao was preserved for years. These conditions, however, were not obtained in the San Felipe region. No doubt climatic conditions carried some weight in growers' minds when they released cacao into the market. However, there are two other hypotheses with as much plausibility as climate to account for growers behavior: one, demand was so high that prices attained an attractive level for the growers, and second, provincial merchants and the Company had some growers at their mercy.

First, consider the aspect of demand. Hacendados complained that the royal treasury imposed prices were too low and did not reflect real costs nor fair market prices. The minutes of the city of Caracas recorded some hacendados grievances. In 1779, a grower contended that from 1730 to 1768 regulated cacao prices went from 7 pesos, 8, 9, 10 up to 14. These prices, he continued, fluctuated from time to time, but they never exceeded the last quote (14 pesos). In concluding, the hacendado stated that these prices never reflected cultivation costs. Seventy years before (1709), a grower objected to official cacao prices for the same reasons.[240] Costs in general forced cacao traders to circumvent official prices; this was eased by lax fiscal overseeing.

Exchequer entries demonstrate that cacao transactions, and other commodity exchanges for that matter, were effected by the buyer and the seller away from royal exchequer supervision. Mer-

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[239] Ibid., 262

[240] Ibid., 128

chants, brokers and the Real Compañìa agents made the purchase at the hacendado's door. After the buyer closed the deal, he went to the treasury headquarters and paid the sales tax. The exchange took place in this manner: the buyer, whether a Company agent, a merchant or a broker, went to the cacao hacienda. If both parties agreed, the buyer would pay the concerted amount but the grower would pay the sales tax (alcabala), or at least that is what the exchequer books stated. Thus, after the sale was finalized the buyer would go to the city, in this case San Felipe, where he would present the sales tax to the royal treasury. At this time the buyer would state his name and that of the seller, *how many cacao pounds or fanegas* he bought, *how much he paid for them,* and he would sign the entry if he knew how to write, otherwise, the royal accountant would ask a witness to sign on the buyer's behalf. The buyer acted as Royal Exchequer agent.

The Company, too, acted as a royal treasury agent. From 1 July 1753 to 31 December 1754, Gilberto Ignacio de Fuentes, the Company factor in Caracas, delivered to the treasury the sales taxes the Company collected.[241] In June 1756, the crown ordered the representative of the exchequer in San Felipe to prevent the Company from collecting anymore taxes.[242] It is not clear why the Company was collecting taxes, but it can be assumed that, like merchants, it also collected taxes and then brought them to the treasury. The reasons for stopping collections is not stated in the sources. Corregidores in Indian towns also represented the royal exchequer. For example, Don Geronimo Clavijo, corregidor in the Pueblo de Guama, delivered 85 pesos of taxes on land sold in his Pueblo to the royal exchequer.[243]

In some instances the seller would bring the tax to the royal treasurer. For example, in one entry the royal exchequer and the royal accountant state:

> We take charge of thirty pesos product of six hundred pesos in which, according to his statement -de acuerdo a su relación-, Don Sevastian de Echeverria bought one hundred fanegas from several growers at six pesos fanega, on behalf of Don Bruno Moragrega who paid and signed with me.[244]

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[241] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 475, fol. 9.

[242] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 79vo.

[243] Ibid. fol. 167 (Oct. 31, 1757).

[244] Ibid. fol. 79 (julio 2, 1756). (My emphasis)

On another date, one entry reads: "We take charge of ten pesos six reales that Bernardo De Tovar has kept with him of the cacao he bought from several growers as is attested in his relation."[245] The next entry unmistakably shows that growers, not the buyers, were supposed to pay the alcabala. After registering the customary items, the royal accountant states ". . . which growers' taxes he (the buyer) kept with him."[246]

Records reveal that the treasury gave subjects time to pay the alcabala. This was in reality a dispensation of credit to the trader to pay sales taxes on a future date. On 18 September 1756, Manuel Leon de Zamora paid alcabala on 98 cacao fanegas shipped to a foreign market in July of the same year. It took him 48 days to pay the duties.[247] On 13 February 1756, a grower sent a load to the port and paid the alcabala fifteen days later.[248] There is evidence that to give credit to a trader was an established practice on the part of royal authorities. The royal treasurer in Caracas kept a book on traders who did not pay the alcabala at the time the transaction took effect. The entry displayed the date, the name of the trader, the staple bargained, value and amount of the staple and duties owed. On the margin of the entry the accountant stated the date the alcabala was paid. Some took as much as a year to pay the duties.[249] This credit was needed because some traders had a liquidity problem. But, not everybody had cash flow problems. One cannot assume that there was a provincial liquidity problem. Eduardo Farias who studied extensively the Veracruz market states that trade with Veracruz generated a 500,000 silver pesos income into the provincial economy. According to Farias all this income was in silver pesos.[250] This amount was enough to keep the provincial economy working. The major contribution of this duty system of credit might have been the entrance of new entrepreneurs into the regional economy. Consequently, fading entrepreneurs were replaced by new, and this kept the export-led sector dynamic and competitive.

These entries unquestionably show that the exchange between crown subjects, or the Company, and the royal exchequer was in reality an act of faith; it was a matter of trust. As the previous quotation shows, the royal accountant emphasized in his entry that he was accepting face value the amount the subject stated as being correct. Now, given the fact that in 1709, and later in 1779, the grower protested that royal government prices did not reflect costs, how would one expect them to sell at royal treasury lower prices? Although qualitative evidence to the contrary, I maintain that it was against good economic reasoning to sell at prices not determined by demand.

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[245] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 42 (Dec 30, 1755). (My emphasis).

[246] Ibid., fol. 66vo (June 3, 1756). ". . . cuia alcabala retubo en sì."

[247] Ibid., fol. 95vo.

[248] Ibid., fol. 56.

[249] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 480.

[250] Farias, *Economia,* tomo I p. 151 and footnote 54.

In another section we saw how regression analysis of production on prices sustained growers' contention, treasury prices might have not reflected market conditions. Thus, treasury books merely register, correctly, how much sales taxes certain commodities accrued to the royal exchequer. One cannot assume that these books did not faithfully depict the intricacies of the market; the dealings of the market can be discerned from the entries. Since government agents apparently were not able to supervise every deal, buyers and sellers concerted agreements to their mutual benefit. Given costs and excessive fiscal burdens growers, merchants and the Company might not have followed official prices in their trades, especially, when hacendados were aware of what profits were adequate to their costs. The Veracruzan market in Mexico and the Dutch in Curaçao were two factors rendering official prices obsolete.

The third hypothesis, that the Compañìa Guipuzcoana forced growers to sell early, has some validity but only in some cases. First, the Compañìa Guipuzcoana paid cacao loads to the growers with wares. Since the Company listed its wares at higher prices, they obtained the cultigen at a discount. In this manner the Company bought cacao at lower prices, high priced merchandise lowered cacao prices. Due to liquidity problems, some growers, but not all, tied their future crops to the Company in order to get needed tools and other commodities. In this sense, hacendados lost some of their bargaining power and had to deliver their cargo at the whim of and for the benefit of the Company. Nevertheless, considering the cacao market in general the Dutch connection made for a competitive market.

Given these conditions, it is conceivable that growers reserved some of the harvest for the Dutch market. The presence of *Trojes*—makeshift storages in the form of tables with grid top—and store rooms (*bodegas*) in the house of the hacienda has been documented. To some extent, hacendados used them to control extraneous factors affecting the market, buying insurance for lean times. A combination of these factors worked together to influence the time at which cacao reached the market, not to say much about seasonal roads. All three hypotheses: demand, climate and company power, helped explain the time of release of growers' cacao into the market.

A closer look at the collection of duties will clarify in more detail how the Dutch modified the cacao market in San Felipe. The manner in which crown officials collected duties is certainly extremely important in explaining that influence. Some treasury officers levied taxes in the "fields" but they rarely intervened in levying taxes on cacao. They gathered duties on cattle and other commodities. Treasury books did not register any cacao duties collected in the haciendas. In fact, one entry shows two cacao growers going to San Felipe and paying taxes on the cacao crop from their hacienda![251] Of the ten years scrutinized (1755–1764), on only three occasions, not three years but three entries, did the books have duties on cacao collected outside the city of San Felipe ("tierra adentro"). On one of those entries the royal accountant asserts that from 18 November 1755 to 7 January 1756, Juan Miguel Rodriguez, a royal subject he commissioned, levied 108 pesos in sales taxes on 2,106 pesos worth of cattle and groceries (comestibles y ganado vacuno).[252] Even if the treasury agent considered cacao as one of those "comestibles," three entries cannot amount to much.

Civilian archives do not record any judicial proceedings on the part of the royal treasury against hacendados for underreporting their haciendas' cacao harvest, or the prices at which they sold it. Ecclesiastical archives do contain instances of Church authorities questioning the acknowledged harvest in an hacienda under Church administration, but even these cases go on to show that government officers could not, or did not, always enforce collection of cacao duties.[253] This case relates to a lease of hacienda Cumanibare, a pious work. Church authorities found, in a review of the hacienda's administration, some cacao harvest underreporting on the part of the lessee. Thus, it was not a conscious effort to curb tax evasion, but a simple audit to "balance the books" before delivering the hacienda to a new lessee.

This is not the same as saying that authorities to some extent did not curb contraband. The argument here is on agreements concerted between buyers and sellers. I argue that it was impossible for royal authorities to corroborate the veracity of the transactions made by the parties and this prompted some underreporting to avoid duty payments. A case in point was that of Baltazar de Leon. To avoid paying taxes, Mr. De Leon hid 38 cacao fanegas among others he intended to sell. Unfortunately, he was caught and forced to pay twice the duties he would had paid.[254] In another case, Claudio Dominguez was fined double taxes because he was transporting commodities without a guìa—crown license.[255] They transported cargo without a guia to smuggle it to the Dutch. In one instance, not one but several residents of the region were caught in a scheme to sell illegally various items. A royal officer, Bruno Moragrega, confiscated the items and ordered an auction on them.[256] Illegal trading continued into the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.[257]

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[251] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 8vo. (June 1755).

[252] Ibid., fol. 119.

[253] AAC, Sección Obras Pìas, Hacienda Cumanibare, Tomo 3, Expediente 4, fol. 375vo. and fol. 398vo.

A comparison of legal cacao figures and contemporary assessments of local production will further illustrate the premise. According to my figures, in the nine years from 1756 to 1764 royal treasury officers registered 44,363 cacao fanegas legally transacted in the San Felipe jurisdiction. This totaled an annual average of 5,095 cacao fanegas (See Appendix L). In 1720, contemporaries estimated that San Felipe cacao region could produce annually 12,116 fanegas.[258] In a "visita" he made in 1782, Bishop Mariano Martì was told that the city of San Felipe and its jurisdiction, including the *Pueblos* of Guama, San Francisco Javier, Cocorote, Tinajas, Cañisos and San Nicolas, harvested between 13 thousand and 14 thousand fanegas of cacao per year.[259] This last total does not include the pueblos of Chivacoa, Quara and Urachiche, thus the region was producing more. If annual average cacao taxed in San Felipe amounted to slightly over five thousand fanegas, and contemporaries estimated production to be between 12,000 to 14,000 fanegas, clearly, cacao traders were not finalizing all their transactions in the city. Where did these missing fanegas go? To contraband?

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[254] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 522, fol. 15 (1766–1772).

[255] Ibid., fol. 31vo. (1766–1772).

[256] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, fol. 61vo.

[257] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1753, (10 July, 1788).

[258] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general,* 278. In this context, San Felipe refers to cacao region not political boundaries.

[259] Obispo Mariano Martì, *Documentos relativos a su visita pastoral de la diócesis de Caracas, 1771–1784.* Tomo II Estudio preliminar y coordinación por Lino Gomez Canedo, O.F.M. Fuentes para la Historia Colonial de Venezuela, (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1969): 381–382. "Visitas" were ecclesiastical audits of the bishop's diocese, in which the prelate checks the church's records of baptisms, deaths and marriages and also the general "moral and Christian" conduct of his parishioners.

Fortunately, data are available to answer these questions. Royal treasury officials charged a peso per carga (two fanegas) on loads intended for transportation outside San Felipe jurisdiction.[260] This peso per carga was known as "peso de guìa"—guia was a sort of transportation license issued by the government. In it traders registered commodity cargoes and their destination. Appendix J contains the monthly totals of peso per carga charged for cacao and tobacco loads leaving San Felipe for the years 1757 to 1766. According to these license records, most of the loads, if not all, were bound for Puerto Cabello. Royal treasury books also show that cacao taxed in San Felipe was destined for Puerto Cabello.[261] Unfortunately, the peso per carga data are a monthly summary of treasury books entries and, for some years, it is not possible to distinguish cacao cargas from tobacco. However, there is one year (1762) in which cacao appears alone in ten of the twelve months. In these ten months, 5,376 cacao cargas (10,752 fanegas) left for Puerto Cabello. That same year, royal officers, stationed in the city of San Felipe, levied taxes on 7,318 cacao fanegas.[262] The San Felipe total (7,318 fanegas) is already in the peso per carga total (10,752 fanegas). It seems that the difference between the San Felipe total and the peso per carga total (3,434 fanegas) were cacao fanegas that would pay taxes in the port. It was not unusual to pay taxes in the port and not in the city. It should be emphasized that these were not city taxes but crown duties, thus, traders could pay them anywhere there was a royal treasurer. Contemporaries were correct in their assertions that the region was producing from 12 to 14,000 fanegas per year, and more so if one adds cacao not accounted for in the remaining two months of 1762. The answer to the question is that the missing loads did not go to contraband. But this assertion is not entirely faithful to what was happening at the time.

Before accepting this conclusion entirely, there is one further point to consider. Based on the Rodriguez Camejo case that we analyzed in a previous section, it is clear that not all cacao cargo registered with the treasury under the peso per carga ended up in Puerto Cabello. An examination of Puerto Cabello treasury books and that of San Felipe tend to confirm this. One way to verify this affirmation is by rearranging the entries in the treasury books in alphabetical order, first by buyers, in San Felipe, and then by sellers, in Puerto Cabello. The logic beneath this arrangement is that buyers in San Felipe were sellers in Puerto Cabello. Available data for Puerto Cabello consist of only a few months, August to October 1753 and July to October 1759. There were no records for San Felipe covering 1753, but there were entries for the months of July through October 1759. Since comparable quantifiable records for 1753 were not available, matches between 1753 (Puerto Cabello) and 1759 (San Felipe) were based solely on names of traders, not quantity transacted. Results were significant.

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[260] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2515, fols. 65–88. See also Appendix J. When reading Appendix J bear in mind that figures there are registered in terms of cargas. To make the conversion into fanegas multiply the number of cargas times two; there were two fanegas (220 pounds) per carga.

[261] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 2247 to 2248 and Tomo 2251. The entries on these books were made daily. In some of the entries, cacao load destinations are not specified, but the only legal port in the region was Puerto Cabello. There is no doubt that those who paid taxes planned to ship their cargo to Puerto Cabello and paid the peso per carga, thus taxes paid on cargo in the city of San Felipe are already shown in the total of peso per carga.

[262] See Appendix L.

Seven cacao traders in the San Felipe 1759 exchequer books appeared in Puerto Cabello 1753 treasury books. The interesting part is not that there were cacao traders from San Felipe trading in Puerto Cabello, but that the entries for 1759 hint at what some of them did along the mule trail to the port; they sold cacao loads to smugglers, mainly the Dutch. Andres Vidal, for example, a merchant and a grower,[263] bought 100 cacao fanegas in San Felipe and, out of those 100, he sold only 31 cacao fanegas in Puerto Cabello.[264] Sixty-nine cacao fanegas did not reach the port. Joseph Freytes, a broker for Juan Manuel Olaechea, bought 204 fanegas in San Felipe and legally sold 50 in the port. Many of these cacao traders were merchants and, like Olaechea, some of them conducted business through brokers. Others were priests, soldiers and even treasury officers. But some, like Geronimo Molina and Bruno Pascual Moragrega, distinguished themselves from their peers.

In 1753, the royal treasurer classified Geronimo Molina as a "bodeguero y pulpero"—warehouser and retailer.[265] From August to October 1753, Molina bought 145 cacao fanegas in Puerto Cabello. Although stationed in the port, he also had brokers representing him in the hinterland. In San Felipe, Francisco Dias attended to Molina's cacao business. In July 1759, Dias bought 94 fanegas for Molina, of which only 33 were sold on arrival at the port, suggesting that perhaps the missing 61 fanegas were exchanged with the Dutch.[266] Geronimo's increasing economic and social importance is evident in the treasury books. First entered in the records in 1753 as "Geronimo," he becomes "Don Geronimo" in 1759. In just three months, from July to August of that same year, Don Geronimo bought legally 879 cacao fanegas in 109 transactions. By the standards of the day Don Geronimo was indeed a very successful merchant.

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[263] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 30 (Oct. 30, 1755).

[264] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1707 (agosto 8, 1753 to octubre 10, 1753) and Tomo 1709 (julio 1758–octubre 1759); and San Felipe, Tomo 2248 (July 1758 to October 1759).

[265] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1707 (agosto 1753–octubre 1753) and Tomo 1709 (julio 1758 to octubre 1759). Unless otherwise stated, all references to Geronimo Molina come from these two tomos.

A more interesting character was Bruno Pascual Moragrega. In 1756, this man was a lieutenant in the royal infantry.[267] Among his several duties with the royal government, he was a courier for royal treasury deliveries to the royal infantry in Puerto Cabello, earning 6 percent of the money he carried to that port. This money, product of the sales taxes in San Felipe, was to be used on royal government expenditures. Lieutenant Moragrega, later captain, was also a merchant. From November 1756 to February 1757, he sold 3,491 pesos worth of merchandise from Castile in his San Felipe store, a substantial amount when one ponders it was sold in only four months.[268] In addition, he sold tobacco from Guarenas and Barquisimeto to the Real Compañìa;[269] owned a house, a warehouse and other properties that increased considerably his estate income. The entry states that the warehouse alone generated 1,300 pesos in the fiscal quarter;[270] and, to crown these achievements, he traded in cacao. Treasury books list him as buying 1,021 cacao fanegas from 15 June 1755 to 31 May 1758, that was 12 percent of all the cacao transacted during the period.[271] Only Francisco Mora, a cacao broker, bought more than he—1,200 fanegas.

Bruno Moragrega was a soldier, merchant, royal treasury courier, cacao trader, tobacco broker, warehouser and realtor. As Captain Moragrega, there were others who performed several tasks at the same time. In Caracas, we met other government functionaries engaged in several extra-governmental activities. There was also the Marquesa Del Valle. She was a noble, cacao hacendado, cattle person and merchant. Even captains general, the representatives of the king in the province, traded in cacao and other commodities. This sort of conduct must be examined from the point of view of life in a frontier society and functional needs of the cacao economy. Spanish society did not characterize itself for social mobility, less so with priests and soldiers who were merchants, hacendados, cacao brokers and even administrators. This multifarious citizen was truly inconceivable in a society that stressed membership in guilds. In many respects, the profession of the individual defined his position in society. To see a soldier conducting business was unthinkable. Nevertheless, the strength of the foreign market disturbance on the regional economy forced some to improvise. Many transgressed through Old World sociological limits, constraints imposed on the individual for centuries, and bargained in cacao and other goods. They were fully accomplished entrepreneurs.

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[266] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248 (julio 1758 to octubre 1759).

[267] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 107 (octubre 1756).

[268] Ibid., fol. 129 (febrero 28, 1757).

[269] Ibid., fol. 92 (septiembre 8, 1756).

[270] Ibid., fol. 79vo. (junio 1756). The royal treasurer and the royal accountant levied taxes on merchant (mercaderìa) and retail (pulperìa) stores every four months, starting in February of the current year and ending in February of the following year.

[271] Ibid., fols. 2 to 189 (junio 15, 1755 a mayo 31, 1758).

Contraband was part of the daily trading and as such increased demand and raised prices. A competitive market and other factors encouraged growers to sell immediately after harvest. Dutch merchants' presence in the region prompted these market conditions. Merchants, some growers and the Company competed among themselves and with Dutch merchants for growers' cacao. But it is also correct to assert that all three bought and sold cacao to each other. Statistics show, however, that most of the cacao the Company bought in the San Felipe and Caracas legal market came from growers. From 15 June 1755 to 31 May 1758, the Company bought 1,872 cacao fanegas most of them from growers. That amount constituted 17.9 percent of all cacao sold in the San Felipe market at that time.[272] Other sales tax treasury books confirm that the Company bought more cacao from hacendados than from merchants. After May 1758, treasury books differentiate between fanegas the Company bought from merchants and those it obtained from growers. From July 1758 to April 1761, the Real Compañìa Guipuzcoana bought in San Felipe a total of 5,266 fanegas, 40 percent of what the market had to offer. These records show that the Company acquired more cacao from growers (3,384 fanegas or 64 percent) than from merchants (407 fanegas or 8 percent).[273]

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[272] Ibid., fols. 2 to 189 (junio 15, 1755 a mayo 31, 1758). Unless otherwise indicated, these statements, and those that follow on the Company performance in the San Felipe market, are based on this source. There was an outlay of 50 pesos per fanega. However, I considered it a sampling error and did not used it on my computations.

Before June 1756, royal accountants recorded total amount paid by the Company for all fanegas bought, not single quotes per fanega. After that date, royal officers registered individual Company quotes on cacao per fanega for the first time. At that time Juan Joseph Valenzuela sold cacao to the Company at 8.5 pesos per fanega.[274] Treasury entries lead one to believe that the Company, at least in San Felipe, was following some sort of rationale when it bought cacao, but this is not easily discernable from the data at hand. On 26 August 1756, the Company bought cacao at 8.5 pesos fanega. Ten days later, they bought cacao at 10 pesos per fanega.[275] Although one could attribute the discrepancy to the influence of market forces, close examination revealed that the incongruity in prices was not due to performance of the cultigen in the market.

From June 1755 to May 1758 cacao was sold at an average price of 9.36 pesos. During this period, Company cacao prices ranged from a maximum of 16 pesos per fanega to a minimum of 6.5 pesos per fanega.[276] This is surprising because, according to other sources and historians, the Company paid fixed prices for cacao in the market. A frequency distribution of the quotes dispels any doubts about the matter. There were 129 Company's entries. Out of this total 107 entries (83 percent) ranged from 8.5 to 10 pesos per fanega. Fifteen of the other entries (12 percent) reached the upper extreme of the values (11 to 16 pesos). Five other (4 percent) ranked within the lower quotes (6 to 7 pesos). Three quotes were too far off the spectrum to be accurate, one each of 2, 29, and 50 pesos. These outliers are only explained as errors in sampling. Since the vast majority of the cases (107) lay within the fixed price range (8.5 to 10 pesos), perhaps the upper (11 to 16 pesos) and lower (6 to 7 pesos) quotes are due to some sort of Company criteria used in establishing a price differential. What criteria did the Company use to establish the price differential?

The answer is difficult without the sources on the Company decision-making apparatus. The only relevant and indirect documentation available is treasury books. In June 1756, these specifically listed the Company's cacao prices quotes in San Felipe. On that date, Juan José Valenzuela sold cacao to the Company at 8½ pesos per fanega.[277] A few days later, 2 July 1756, the Company bought cacao for the first time at ten pesos per fanega.[278] It is from this date on that a price differential appeared in the Company's cacao transactions in San Felipe's customs books. On 26 August 1756, cacao traders sold cacao to the Company at 8½ pesos. Ten days later custom books list cacao sold to the Company at 10 pesos per fanega.[279] The disparity in prices is not explained by the sources. However, one thing is clear—this difference in Company prices is patent in Caracas's customs books already in 1753,[280] giving the impression that it was practiced in all the province and that it began at an earlier date. The Company was not the only one listing cacao with two prices. On 1 August 1743, custom officers valuated confiscated cacao at two different prices. One load at 14 pesos 4 reales per fanega and the other cargo at 16 pesos.[281]

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[273] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248 (julio 1758 a abril 1761).

[274] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 71vo.

[275] Ibid., fol. 89vo.

[276] Ibid., fols. 2 to 189 (junio 15, 1755 a mayo 31, 1758).

An initial scrutiny of the custom books creates the notion that the Company criteria was to differentiate among sellers, one price for growers and another one for merchants. But that perception is distorted. One entry reveals that the Company quoted two prices to the same seller when necessary. On 10 April 1757, Don Manuel Velazquez traded 53 cacao fanegas to the Company, thirty of those fanegas were paid at 10 pesos and the rest (23) brought 8½ pesos.[282] Other entries reveal that the Company bought cacao at the same price from different sellers. In August 1759, Don Manuel Indurra, a Company agent, quoted the same price per fanega (8½ pesos) to growers as well as merchants.[283] Other cacao transactions disclose that the Company paid two disparate prices to growers as well as merchants. In the month of June 1760, the Company listed prices of 8½ and 10 pesos to both merchants and growers.[284] The criteria for price disparity was not the nature of the sellers, whether they were growers or merchants.

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[277] Ibid., fols. 71vo.
[278] Ibid., fol. 81 (julio 2, 1756).
[279] Ibid., fols.90 (agosto 26, 1756 and septiembre 6, 1756).
[280] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 63A, fol. 40 (agosto 8, 1753).
[281] AGN, Diversos, Tomo 1, Fol. 61 vo.
[282] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 131 (abril 10, 1757).
[283] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, fols. 128vo. and 132vo. (agosto 1759).
[284] Ibid., fol. 190 (junio 1760).

There are three plausible explanations: quality of the beans, freight and taxes and distance from the Company warehouse. The latter was not a factor in pricing because when Diego Bustillos, a grower, delivered cacao to the Company warehouse, he was paid 8½ pesos per fanega.[285] Had distance been a factor in pricing, the Company should had paid him ten pesos per fanega. Besides, one of the grievances of the Juan Francisco de Leon rebellion was precisely that the Company did not take into account in its pricing freight, incurred in carrying cacao from the hacienda to the Company factory in San Felipe. While the Company might have not taken distance into account at the time of valuing fanegas at 8½ or 10 pesos, cacao traders did compute their prices based on expenses and distance from the trade center. Rodriguez Camejo paid 4 reales on freight from the haciendas to San Felipe. From San Felipe to Puerto Cabello, traders paid 6 pesos per carga. Freight varied according to distance. In Caracas, traders paid one peso to transport one cacao carga from that city to La Guaira.[286]

At what phase cacao was when going to the market—bean or grain, which meant higher costs—has some plausibility as an explanation but it is only conjectural. We examined the Rodriguez Camejo case and it did state that the form in which cacao was bought, in grain or beans, merited different prices. If still a bean, buyers had to pay for drying and sacking the loads. They also had to pay for the freight to bring the cargo to Company warehouses. But, as we saw in Father Camejo's case, both items increased the price of one fanega by only 4.2 reales,[287] and the difference between one price (8½) and the other (10) is one and a half peso.

Sales taxes do offer a possible clarification, but again only an indirect one. Cacao traders paid taxes on sales and resales. On 26 August 1756, Don Nicolas Melendez bought 3 fanegas and paid sale taxes (5 percent) on them. The same day he sold the same fanegas to the Company and paid sales taxes again. When he bought the load, the grower paid the taxes. In the resale, however, Don Nicolas paid the taxes. It is clear there was an increase in price as a result of the sale and resale of the cargo. But, how much did the price increase? When Don Nicolas bought the cargo, he paid 6 pesos per fanega. At current taxes (5 percent), the grower paid the royal exchequer 7.2 reales for the entire load. Taxes augmented the price of a cacao fanega by only 2.4 reales, reaching the new price of 6 pesos 2.4 reales. But when Don Nicolas sold them to the Company, the fanegas were appraised at 8½ pesos,[288] a difference of almost two pesos. Another variant of the case is that of a merchant who paid sale and resale taxes on one part of the load and only sales taxes on the other. On 13 September 1756, a trader presented 8 cacao fanegas to the treasury for taxation. Of those 8 fanegas, he paid sales and resale taxes on 3 of them and sales taxes on the rest.[289] The payment in taxes account for some of the price increase, but not all.

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[285] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 81.

[286] ARPC, Sección Civiles, 1713 S (julio 4 de 1713). No folios in the original.

[287] Drying costs amounted to 3 reales per 15 fanegas. This resulted in 6.8 maravedis per fanega. A real was worth 34 maravedis, a money of account. Thus, 6.8 maravedis was .2 of a real. Hauling a fanega from an hacienda to San Felipe was 4 reales per fanega.

Up to now we have considered freight, taxes and distance from the Company's warehouse as variables that could have affected Company pricing. We concluded that although these three raised the price of a cacao fanega, they alone did not account for the price differential. One other variable to be considered is the quality of the bean. And here again the evidence is ambiguous. Earlier, we stated that royal officers in one instance valuated cacao with two prices. After confiscating a ship for contraband, officers went to the task of selling the cargo to collect the taxes. At the time of appraising the load, they put two prices on the cargo: one load was valued at 14 pesos 4 reales per fanega and the other at 16 pesos per fanega. Since these prices relate to the same load, it is proper to conclude that they were based on quality of the bean. I do not see any reason why government officers should take into consideration freights, taxes or distance in their pricing the same cacao loads. Uniform pricing in this case should have been the norm. Thus the disparity must be accounted for in terms of quality of the bean. Still, the criteria the Company used to price cacao lacked firm footing. I do think, however, that freight, taxes and quality of the bean accounted for part of the Company's pricing mechanism.

This conclusion remains tentative since contemporary testimony asserted that there was one excellent quality bean in the region: criollo (Creole). This name for the Caracas variety was adopted in the nineteenth century because of encroachment into the cacao market of a variety from Trinidad.[290] Cacao from Trinidad was named Forastero (foreigner), meaning from out of the province. This name had the connotation of being of inferior quality. This preponderance of Caracas cacaos over that from other regions was readily accepted by merchants in the region. It has already been stated that Caracas cacao was of such a quality that Dutch merchants listed it in the bill of lading separate from other cacaos.[291] As a matter of fact, only Caracas commanded distinctive quotes in the Amsterdam exchange. It was not until the late eighteenth century that another cacao deserved listing in the exchange. Cacao from Surinam was quoted for the first time in 1746, at lower prices than cacao from Caracas. Surinam was a Dutch colony at the time; this re-enforces the validity of the claim that Caracas cacao had a superior quality to that of other regions. Nevertheless, the sources I consulted do mention the presence of cacao from Trinidad in the vicinity of Caracas, but not in the hinterland, where San Felipe was located.

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[288] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 89vo. (agosto 26, 1756).

[289] Ibid., fol. 93 (septiembre 13, 1756). The entry read: Me hago cargo de 4 ps (pesos) 2 rs (reales) producido de 85 ps a saver de la venta y reventa de 3 fgs (fanegas) de cacao, y de la venta de 5 fgs y 17 lbs (libras) que todo importó en la Real Cia. Guipuzcoana 67 ps y en la primera compra de las tres expresas 18 ps.

One further point to mention about sales taxes is the income increase the treasury had as a result of this collection mechanism, charging taxes on sale and resale of the same item. In the first case, the treasury, instead of collecting 7.5 reales, charged 18.23 reales (nearly 2 pesos 2 reales), the 5 percent duty on the load on the original sale (primera venta) plus an additional 5 percent on the second sale (segunda venta). These two cases show the importance of the fiscal linkage. Documentation reveals that charges on sales and resales were common with the Real Compañìa. The research, however, did not find any other instances, outside those of the Company, in which taxes were levied twice. Notwithstanding, it is correct to suppose that given the circumstances of a second sale, duty would have been levied for a second time.

These cases suggest that the Company was not a market for growers or merchants. The monotonous graphics of Company cacao prices, 8½ and 10 pesos, along a time span of a year or more demonstrate that demand and supply were of no relevance in establishing Company prices. This circumstance explains why the Company, notwithstanding its de jure monopolistic power, de facto did not enjoy absolute influence upon merchants' and growers' supply. When Company prices effectively changed, they shifted suddenly and without connection to market conditions. On 26 February 1760, the Company lowered its top price from ten to nine and a half pesos.[292] In May of the same year, growers paid a low of 8½ and a high of 10 pesos. In the meantime, merchants paid the same low but a high of 9½ pesos for no apparent reason.[293] In June 1760, the Company went back to the usual low (8½) and top (10) prices.[294] For all of 1760 the lower price remained at 8½ pesos.

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[290] The reasons why Caracas cacao was named criollo and the one from Trinidad Forastero is discussed in Part I.

[291] See Part I.

This stubborn reliance on fixed prices is one of the reasons why merchants remained in the cacao market; the Company did not have the proper market tools to displace them. When the Company needed some fanegas to complete the load, they relied on the merchants. This preponderance of the merchants must have meant that they had a better deal to offer growers but it probably also meant that their organization was more efficient than the Company's. The merchants' knowledge of the market is further reinforced by their having bought cacao at lower prices than the Company and still stocked their warehouses until they could sell at the prices they wanted.

A close study of the documentation in San Felipe shows that merchants were clearly in control of the legal market. It has been stated that the Company in a time span of almost three years possessed approximately 40 percent of the legal market. Close to 60 percent of the market was in the hands of the merchants. In thirty-three months, July 1758 to April 1761, the Company bought 5,266 cacao fanegas. The remainder, close to 7,762 fanegas, were bought by merchants. The thirty-five months from June 15, 1755 to May 31, 1758 depict a more striking picture. In those months, merchants transacted more than 78 percent (8,206 fanegas) of cacao traded (10,453 fanegas) in the legal market, while the Company acquired a mere 1,872 fanegas (nearly 18 percent) of the cacao offered in the market.[295] Those identified as growers bought close to 4 percent of the market supply.

Who these merchants were is difficult to determine. Some appear in the lists the treasury books provided, but others did not. Several of those who did appear on the lists were not only merchants but hacendados and retailers as well. Others were simply merchants as far as one can tell from the documentation. But, using Bruno Moragrega and Andres Vidal as examples, it is appropriate to conclude that most of these people were merchant-growers, soldier-merchant-growers, priest-merchant-growers and, still others, muleteer-merchant-growers. The export-led economy in need of entrepreneurs demanded these people perform different tasks at the same time. And this is faithfully depicted on the impact the income-multiplier effect had on the domestic economy.

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[292] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, fol. 164vo. (febrero 29, 1760).

[293] Ibid., (mayo 1760).

[294] Ibid., fol. 190.

[295] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fols. 2 to 189 (junio 15, 1755 to mayo 31, 1758).

The influence of cacao exports on the regional economy through the final demand linkage was considerable. Local stimulus forced some cacao growers to cultivate staples for regional consumption, not for export. There are innumerable entries in treasury books which indicate growers sold vegetables and other foods.[297] On 15 June 1756, Pedro Figueroa bought "fruits and food from several growers."[296] These "growers" were cacao hacendados who had a surplus and sold it in the neighboring market. As the monoculture prevailed, some people started cultivating orchards. Many of these growers were Amerindians who had small tracts of land -*labranzas*- and planted roots and vegetables to enhance the available consumer products.[298] These Amerindians were actually selling to cover demand, rarely were these farmers cacao growers, although some of them were, at the same time, salaried workers and muleteers. In some parts of the region impassable roads made it necessary for hacendados to provide food. When possible they delivered the surplus to the market.[299]

In the 1750s and 1760s, the Yaracuy regional market offered cows, tiles, onions, papelones (brown sugar), cheese, mules, tobacco, sugar, cloth, chairs, hides, flour, slaves, hammocks, beans, garlic, fish, sandals, and even bedspreads for sale. Almost thirty years later, but with a few exceptions, commodities remained the same. From 2 November 1787 to 31 October 1788, San Felipe city market sold the following commodities: apples, cattle, papelones, fish, cheese, hammocks, garlic, onions, sugar, bacon, cacao, indigo, cloth, pork, ajies, barley [*cebada*], mules, horses, hides, chairs, and even slaves.[300] All these came into San Felipe from other centers of the province. These goods represented the contribution the cacao economy turned into the domestic economy. Most of the region was represented in the market: cows came from Iraure, Higuire, San Carlos, Guanare, Araure, Ospino and Barinas. Sugar arrived from Tocuyo, Barquisimeto, Yaritagua and Quibor. Other supply centers were Trujillo (flour), Tocuyo (garlic, flour and onions), Guama (tobacco), Ospino (cheese) and Puerto Cabello (salt).[301] Stimulus from the cacao economy reached as far south as Los Andes (Trujillo), as far east as Los Llanos (San Carlos), north to the Caribbean rim (Puerto Cabello), and west (Tocuyo).

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[296] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 1753, 2247 and 2248.

[297] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fol. 64vo. ". . . frutos y comestibles a varios cosecheros." My translation.

[298] Angel Altolaguirre y Duvale, *Relaciones geográficas*, 132.

[299] Ibid., 133.

[300] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 1753, fols.2–299.

Many of these goods were sold in *pulperias* (grocery stores) and *tiendas de mercader* (merchant stores). Pulperias were really retail stores that sold cacao per pound, not fanegas, liquor, dried beef, and other *comestibles* (groceries). Because of the nature of their commodities, these retail stores rarely sold more than a merchant store.[302] The inventory in a pulperia consisted of consumer goods. Close examination of treasury records confirm that pulperias had lower income than merchants stores. From February to November 1756, pulperos paid 4,996 pesos in sales taxes on groceries sold at their stores. For the same months, merchants paid 11,231 pesos, nearly half (45 percent) more than pulperos.[303] Don Domingo Tinoco, a pulpero, sold an average of 9.5 pesos per month from 1 March 1755 to 31 October 1755, eight months.[304] In June 1756, Don Bartolomé Antiqui, a merchant, paid 15.5 pesos on taxes for 314 pesos in wares he sold in that month. Don Bartolomé, as most of the other merchants, brought their wares from Puerto Cabello.[305] Some merchants, like Don Francisco Mora, even had more than one store.[306] It seems that merchants specialize in tools and wholesale sales, while pulperos controlled the consumer market. Descriptions of goods pulperos sold corroborate this argument.

Almost all entries on pulperia taxes say that the alcabala was based on "*comestible*" pulperos sold in their stores. Comestibles translate literally into "things to be eaten."[307] Merchants entries never used that word. Instead of "comestibles" merchants' entries read *efectos* (wares) "that he sold." Merchants, with very few exceptions, almost always had administrators in their stores. An entry in the treasury books reads: "We take charge of 31 pesos 7 reales accrued from 279 pesos that Don Agustin de Abreu merchant of (mercader de) Don Nicolas de Arzola has sold in the store up to today as can be seen in his accounting book."[308] Pulperos always tended their stores themselves. There was at least one pulperia in every subdivision of San Felipe.

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[301] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, fols. 2, 2vo., 10vo., 11–12, 17–18vo., 19vo., 20, 22vo., 23, 32vo., 34vo.

[302] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248 (mayo 1761). For a thorough analysis of the commercial role of pulperìa in the Caracas' economy see Jay Kinsbruner, *Petty Capitalism in Spanish America*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).

[303] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247, for junio 1756, see fol. 66; for octubre 1756, see fol. 98vo.; and noviembre 1756 fol. 109vo.

[304] Ibid., fol. 43.

[305] Ibid., fol. 77vo.

[306] Ibid., fol. 77.

[307] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2248, diciembre 1758. There were no folios in the original.

Pulperos and merchants kept accounting books that they showed to the royal exchequer at the time they paid taxes. Based on these books the treasury levied duties on goods sold. In some cases, however, the treasury charged almost the same amount of taxes month after month, as if it were a fee, not sales taxes.[309] These taxes were collected quarterly in the months of February, June, and October. Some entries do appear in months outside those that belonged to the fiscal year, but these were collected under unusual circumstances, as when one single merchant arrived at the treasury in November 1756 to pay taxes on 2,433 worth of wares sold in the region.[310]

In 1756, San Felipe counted 53 pulperias and 44 mercaderias.[311] In 1788, treasury books identified 18 mercaderias and 47 pulperias in the San Felipe Jurisdiction. The difference in the number of pulperias and mercaderias in 1788 can be interpreted as a contraction of the cacao economy, but that judgment is risky because we do not know if government bookkeeping practices changed over the years. It may have been that the towns within the jurisdiction reported directly to the royal exchequer in Caracas, or that they kept separate books from San Felipe while at the same time reported to the city treasury agent. All the mercaderias were located within the environs of the city; pulperias were found in the sitios (wards) and towns of the jurisdiction. There were pulperias in the Indian towns of Guama, Cocorote, San Francisco Javier, Caño, Cañiso, and in the sitio de la Venta.[312] The proliferation of pulperias was due to the nature of their customers, people buying daily and in small amounts. While merchants sold cheese in cargas (200 pounds), pulperos sold cheese in pounds. Pulperos also offered garlic, onions, fish, dairy and sugar products.

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[308] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247 folio 7.

[309] This can be seen in AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 1753, 2248 and 2247.

[310] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247 fols. 109vo.

[311] Ibid., fols. 66, 98vo., 109vo.

[312] AGN, Real Hacinda, Tomo 1753, February 29, 1788.

There was one characteristic, however, that made the market at Yaracuy stand out from Caracas—the number of heads of cattle sold in the San Felipe market. From July 1758 to December 1762, the cacao economy consumed a total of 8,981 heads.[313] This impressively active cattle market was the outcome of the income-multiplier effect generated by the export-led sector in the Yaracuy River valley region. Specialization on cacao cultivation shifted the factors of production (land, labor and capital) toward that cultigen and away from other endeavors. The need to feed the crews created a demand on cattle. Since land and labor were allocated for cacao cultivation they had to find another source of food, one of them being cattle.

Cattle were located mostly in the Llanos and they were cheap. There in the Llanos the income-multiplier—or final demand linkage—stimulated the domestic economy. This was the result of years of cattle growing and multiplying in the wilderness by the thousands; supply exceeding demand. Captain Sebastiàn Dìaz de Alfaro introduced cattle to the Llanos late in the sixteenth century. In 1608, a census listed twenty thousand heads of cattle in the Llanos, only in the jurisdiction of San Sebastian. Six years later Caracas felt the oversupply of beef. In 1614, Caracas paid 4 reales per arroba (25 pounds) of meat. That same year the number of cattle heads in the market reached such proportions that the price of one arroba of beef decreased to half a real (17 maravedis).[314]

Abundance of cattle made hides cheap, and cattlemen slaughtered thousands of heads for their hides, leaving the meat to rot. Hides were exported to the Caribbean and to Europe. Thus, the advent of cacao to the province attracted beef output to cacao regions. Because of its impermeability, hides in these regions were used to prepare zurrones (hides sacks) to pack cacao for export.

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[313] A.G.N., Real Hacienda, Tomos 2248, 2249, and 2251. Monthly average cattle sold in 1759 was 165. In 1760 an average of 213 cows were bought in the San Felipe market. In 1761 the hacendados and *Tasajeros* (butchers) bought an average of 231 cows per month. The semester total of cows sold in 1758 was 1,675. In the year 1759 customers bought a grand total of 1,982 head of cattle; in 1760 San Felipe consumed 2,552 cows; and in 1761 the total of cows transacted in that market reached 2,772.

[314] Lucas Guillermo Castillo Lara, *San Sebastian de los Reyes: la ciudad trashumante*, Fuentes para la historia colonial de Venezuela, (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1984): 188–194. Not much has been written on the history of cattle ranching during the colonial period in Venezuela. This is the first serious attempt on the subject. However, young scholars at the Universidad Central are currently working on the subject. Elizabeth de Diez is writing a dissertation on cattle ranching in the Llanos in the nineteenth century that promises to open new lines of inquiries into that field.

Increasingly, ranchers bypassed the primate city to allocate live cattle in the provision centers for the export-led economy. By 1645 the city complained about beef shortages and regulation of the industry grew tighter. Beef and hides were the most important byproducts of the cattle industry.

Cacao growers took advantage of the opportunity and generated not only a rationalization for cattle growing but the sustained growth of a new industry. Initially, cattle roamed wild in the Llanos and interested persons organized parties that went there to round up and transport the heads to the market. Later, when a more defined demand existed, cattlemen founded their *hatos,* cattle ranches, close to the towns. But as newcomers arrived, hatos had to be established farther from the towns. What in the beginning was unlimited use of the land, grew to be legally delineated properties. Authorities requested use of the branding iron to limit squabbles among ranchers about ownership. Branded droves of cattle arrived in San Felipe from Iraure, Higuire, San Carlos, Guanare, Araure, Ospino and Barinas.[315] The large supply of cattle heads made beef cheap.

In December 1758 one cow cost 1.6 pesos; a pound of dried beef cost approximately 11 maravedis. There were 34 maravedis in a real and 272 maravedis in a peso. For the semester of July to December 1759 prices fluctuated from that amount up to a maximum of 4.35 pesos per cow. There was one exceptional case in which cattle were sold at 6 pesos per head. However the middle range price for cattle went from a low of 1.1 pesos per head to a high of 2.7 pesos per head. These limits were low considering the price of a cacao fanega at the time. In the city of San Felipe in 1758 twelve butcher shops sold 877 pesos on retail meat in the month of July alone. Notwithstanding low cattle prices, the income-multiplier effect generated by the cacao export sector was patent. Cacao haciendas from the Yaracuy River valley region absorbed the surplus of the already saturated cattle ranching in the Llanos. This phenomenon was not only peculiar to the San Felipe region. The Informe of 1720 states that the Caraqueños consumed more than two thousand heads of cattle a month;[316] this refers to the inhabitants of the whole Caracas jurisdiction, not only the city.

Thus the export sector was tied to the cattle industry. The linkage was strong for two reasons: first, the cacao industry used the hides for packing the cacao for shipment. Second, the price of meat was really attractive to the growers who needed to feed the laborers and the slaves.

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[315] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247 Folios 2, 10vo., 11, 17 and 32vo.

[316] Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general,* 257.

There was a matured backward linkage in the local cacao economy in the form of mules and warehouses. Along with the mules there were canoes that carried cacao down the Yaracuy River to the coast or to Puerto Cabello.[317] The inflow of capital from the cacao economy through these channels can be approximated using the data in Appendix J. Muleteers loaded one carga per mule. Royal customs officers charged one peso per carga leaving the San Felipe jurisdiction. Each peso per carga represented one freight. Freight per carga in the region was 6 pesos. By multiplying the peso per carga by the freight one sees the income this linkage generated into the regional economy. Table 21 lists the results.

These estimates are as accurate as possible since the peso per carga, compared to other duties, was frugal. There was no need on the part of the haulers to avoid that duty even if the cargo was bound for contraband. Rodriguez Camejo's case strengthens the reliability of the computations. He used 398 mules to carry his loads to the coast and he was only one trader. To the muleteers, Camejo's loads yielded an income of 2,388 pesos. Francisco Mora, a cacao trader, paid 3,330 pesos to muleteers to carry 1,111 fanegas to the port.[318] There were certainly more traders around than recorded and, indeed also more muleteers and canoers. In addition to that direct income, this backward linkage in turn created an income multiplier effect into the domestic economy in the form of wages and per diem for the muleteers. This multiplicative effect cannot be quantified because we do not know the number of muleteers involved. But one should keep in mind that this income was not taxable and, thus, its impact into the domestic economy must have been considerable.

The town of Cerritos de Cocorote was founded on cacao which converted it into the city of "San Felipe El Fuerte." It was this staple that structured the society of the times. As a result of its low capital demand on investors, cacao allowed for people of all walks of life to enjoy wealth forbidden to their own kind in other economies, i.e., sugar cane plantations. Slaves, poor whites, Amerindians and women possessed cacao haciendas that made their

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[317] The presence of canoes is attested in pictographic maps in the Academia Nacional de la Historia and at the Biblioteca Nacional. In one specific map at the Academia one sees the mules carrying cacao loads from the haciendas to the river into canoes.

[318] AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2247 fols. 94, Sep. 15, 1756.

Table 21: Income Accruing To The San Felipe Region From A Backward Investment Linkage: Mules

Year	*Freight (Pesos)*	*Year*	*Freight (Pesos)*
1757	46,770	1762	42,234
1758	39,594	1763	45,102
1759	36,996	1764	37,020
1760	40,764	1765	28,644
1761	43,596	1766	23,952

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Alcabala de Tierras, San Felipe, Tomo 2247.

living comfortable. Through work in their small cacao plots, some slaves bought their liberty and that of their loved ones. Counts and marquesas made their fortune, and some even bought their noble titles, with cacao.

Of the several nodules that developed from this export-led economy, the income multiplier effect, final demand, and backward linkage were the strongest, while the fiscal and forward linkages were the weaker. The presence of a final demand linkage—or income multiplier—in the form of cattle of the Llanos was established for San Felipe region. The high consumption of beef and its low price are a clear sign, not only of strong demand, but of high supply. Hides were an essential by-product of the cattle industry for the cacao economy. Sacks made of this material were on high demand in the region. Hide prices fluctuated from three to four reales per hide, almost the exact price of an arroba (25 pounds) of beef. Demand from cacao regions prompted the organization of the cattle industry. The city of Caracas complained of beef scarcity precisely because cattle were driven to cacao zones. The study on diezmos de veredas,[319] road tolls, asserted that entrepreneurs went after the riches found in the humid and hot cacao regions, not in comfortable cities. But cattle was not the only commodity growers bought into the market. All sorts of goods were sold in San Felipe or at the doors of the haciendas: fish, cheese, sugar, tobacco, bricks, timber, cloths and others. This was an additional income into the regional economy accruing from the export of cacao.

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[319] *Diezmos de Veredas* is the term used in the sources to identify a road toll imposed on growers by the Church which would auction the toll to entrepreneurs on a yearly basis, sometimes more than a year. Based perhaps on forecasted yield, the auctioneer would bid different amounts for a different set of years. The toll was levied on the right of passage through the road. In other words, if the carrier did not pay the road toll, he could not used the road to haul his load to the port. "Expediente . . ." AANH, Escaparate II, Libro 63. "Auto ante el eclesiastico, 26 de junio de 1725." fo. 7vo. ". . . la primera que siendo el centro de la vereda principal de que salen los diezmos en tres mil pesos y algunos años que han llegado a cuatro mil precisamente dandole demarcacion a dicha villa precisamente los diezmos de nuestras haciendas le habian de pertenecer a su iglesia. . . ."

Muleteers and canoers made the backward linkage in the San Felipe hinterland. The freights they charged became another source of income for the region, because the crew to manage a mule train consisted of only a few peons—meaning low overhead costs from this activity was high. Canoes were also highly profitable. One canoe carried approximately 30 cacao fanegas and needed only two crewmen. Freight costs were lower with canoes than with mules because of lower overhead costs. The use of mules and canoes increased some hacendados income because they carried the cacao sold to cacao traders. The amount of wealth that cacao generated in transatlantic freights can be estimated at almost seven million on cacao carried to Spain and nearly 6.3 million on loads to Veracruz for the period 1701–1777.[320]

Taxes collected through fiscal linkages were impressive, but these earnings were channeled to the metropolis. Infrastructure and municipal government needs were attained through community resources. Hacendados with their work force constructed and maintained roads. Although road tolls (tithes) generated income, these were not used on repairing or building them. Earnings from these tithes went to private coffers, not public works. Taxes levied on cacao went to Spain, to maintain the royal army in the province, to regular priests (missions), to government bureaucrats and to build forts. This set of circumstances left Caraqueños to care for themselves—self reliance that might have prepared them for their future independence.[321]

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[320] Arcilas Farias, *Economía*, 158.

[321] Miranda, *Colombeia*, The grower who wrote the account was Don Sebastian de Miranda, uncle of Francisco de Miranda, a leader of the Venezuelan independence movement. The second tract containing information on the administration of a cacao hacienda is anonymous. This important document was published by the great bibliographer, Don Pedro Grases, "Memoria sobre el cafè y el cacao, en 1809" in *Memoria del cuarto congreso venezolano de historia del 27 de octubre al lro de noviembre de 1980*. Tomo II, (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1983), 45–116.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

This study shows the virtues of the staple thesis model as an analytical tool for regions with a predominant export sector. The flexibility of the model and its characteristic of exploring the staple performance from the vantage point of its linkage to the domestic economy makes it an appropriate tool for analysis. These physical linkages, forward, backward, fiscal and final demand linkage (income-multiplier effect), help explain the performance of the cultigen in foreign markets as well as in the domestic economy. Closely tied to the physical linkages of the crop are its botanical features, which explain in many cases the peculiar development of export regions. The addition of the fiscal linkage to the model contributes a significant element of analysis and enhances its explanatory power.

Emphasis on the export-led paradigm in the historiography of Latin America's colonial economy has in most instances been based on premises that applied to economic development in other regions, Europe, for example. The staple thesis model utilizes economic concepts adequate for developing conditions of some regions in colonial Latin America. The thesis encompasses the fact that for Europeans Latin America was a newly settled region; that most enterprises were capitalist ventures intended for the exploitation of a cultigen or raw material for export; and that in most export-led regions, resources intended for other economic endeavors were shifted to exploit the new–found source of wealth. The model does not fit all economic conditions in colonial Latin America. In some parts of the Peruvian highland and in the Mexican plateau the peculiar economic arrangement of tributary demands left the local and regional socioeconomic structure relatively intact.

Economic conditions during the colonial period in other parts of Latin America did not reflect those of the highlands, however. In Central America the predominance of monoculture persisted, especially in the twentieth century. In the colonial period the search for precious metals founded towns and expanded land under cultivation. Precious metals were exported and around them cities and societies thrived. Precious metals were followed by cochineal, indigo, cacao, cotton and sugar. In Brazil the same cycle of production for export was the distinctive mark of the colonial period and beyond. In the early stages of colonization the staple was dyewood (palo de Brazil), later sugar, gold, coffee, cacao and others.

One of the most useful elements of the staple model is the emphasis it places on the study of the cultigen's botanical properties. In the case of cacao the study of these features helps to explain the cultigen's performance in Latin America. In Pre-Colonial Central America cacao was cultivated in some regions for the purpose of tribute. After the arrival of the Spaniards cultivation techniques were altered to allow more sun into the groves. This resulted in increased yield of cacao per acre but decreased life for the tree. This phenomenon created a cycle in the cultivation of cacao in the region. The output of cacao in Tabasco declined and forced the Spaniards to look for another suitable region in which to cultivate cacao. They found it initially in Soconusco. There they introduced the technique of reduced shade and more sun, and results similar to Tabasco's obtained. Production then moved to Suchitepequez and from there to Izalco, the cycle of increased sun light, higher short-term yields, but the cycle of premature soil depletion continued.

Previous explanations for the decreasing yield in cacao were based either on demographic variables or on cultural ones; for example, the loss of the religious significance of agriculture after the introduction of impersonal economic relations in the cultivation of cacao. Although these factors partly explain the decline in cacao production, they do not exhaust all the possible variables. To the demographic and cultural parameters we must add the botanical-ecological variables. The depletion of the soil progressively created clearings that affected the rest of the cacao groves and made recovery impossible. In some regions of Central America those clearings were steadily used for cattle growing.

The demise of the Tabasco-Soconusco-Suchitepequez-Izalcos cycle brought Güayaquil and Caracas into the picture. In the case of the Province of Caracas the equivalent of the highlands' precious metal was cacao. The need for a rain forest habitat restricted the cultivation of cacao to certain territories of the Province. The humidity, rain and soil conditions for the cultivation of this cultigen existed in northcentral, northeast and northwestern Venezuela. The zones of cacao cultivation extended from the Yaracuy River valley in the northwest to the Unare River basin in the East.

Since by the seventeenth century, Caracas cacao was being exported to New Spain, news of the demand for cacao beans in the

Mexican plateau must have reached the South American entrepreneurs including the Caraqueños late in the sixteenth century. Since the trees take approximately eight to ten years to yield a profitable crop, that date must lie within the reasonable limit of when cacao was first cultivated in the province. This contention is corroborated by contemporaries' testimony in the region of San Felipe.

By the early seventeenth century, the growers had mastered the technique of cacao cultivation. The demand from the Mexican plateau for Caracas cacao brought more land into cultivation. As resources were shifted from subsistence agriculture to cacao production, more labor was needed. Amerindians and black Africans were brought in. Some Indian pueblos owned land and cacao trees and, it seems, families cultivated them. Exports of cacao to Veracruz grew steadily. The merchants and growers preferred that port because there they were paid in silver pesos.

Merchants dominated Caracas legal export to Veracruz. The growers, clergy and tithers also exported to Veracruz, but they never sent the loads the merchants were legally exporting. It was the merchants who reaped the profits of the Veracruz trade, not the growers. Statistical analysis reveals that these circumstances originated in the seventeenth century. The absence of major legal entanglements against the merchants can be taken as a sign of mutual agreement and shared advantages between growers and merchants. One thing is made clear in the analysis of the data: merchants were not taking their exported fanegas away from the lot the growers kept for their own exports. A close analysis of the San Felipe cacao market reveals that even the Guipuzcoana Company at times obtained cacao from the merchants to reach the budgeted cacao loads. This suggests that the merchants remained at the marketing end of the economic spectrum, while cacao growers, most of the time, depended on them to sell their output.

On arrival in Veracruz, Caracas cacao fanegas seem to have been diverted into the underground economy. The staggering amounts—reaching 87 percent in some years—(not accounted for on arrival in Veracruz) imply that the Veracruz connection generated far more profits than the official accounts might allow us to establish. Although these conclusions were documented for the years 1774, 1775 and 1776, there is documentation to the effect that this started much before, in the 1750s or earlier.

In the 1730s the Güipuzcoana Company made its entrance into the provincial cacao economy. The bulk of Company trade was toward Spain, not Veracruz. However, the Company made two attempts, one in 1737 and another one in 1738, to penetrate the market, but they did not succeed. Opposition from the merchants and two powerful carriers—Marques del Toro and Conde De San Javier—stopped the Company.

There was no forward linkage based in Caracas as far as the Veracruz market was concerned. Documentation does not reveal any cacao paste or chocolate going to Veracruz. All of the cacao exported to Veracruz went either in sacks (zurrones) or loose (*granos*). On the other hand, there were signs of a forward linkage in Mexico. A grinding implement was invented in the seventeenth century in Mexico. To what extent this created jobs in Mexico is not certain because of the simple process involved in the manufacturing of cacao paste or chocolate. Certainly the output of cacao paste and chocolate increased with this invention and this must have been a response to increasing demand for processed cacao.

The Dutch market in Curazao was the second most important market before the arrival of the Company. Trade with the Dutch was illegal. The amount of cacao traded illegally cannot be established at the moment but contemporary accounts estimated it at between 40 to 50 percent or more of the total cacao production of the Province of Caracas. The commercial relations between the Dutch, the growers and the merchants were very well organized. Letters from Caraqueño growers addressed to their Dutch merchants show an impressively well planned and executed commerce. The letters served as a kind of bill of lading. The detail of the amount of cacao, tobacco or any other produce sent for exchange and the meticulously listed items the growers wanted in return make these letters nothing less than formal business orders.

From confiscated Dutch ships we learn of how valuable the Caracas cacao was to the Dutch merchants. In the ship registers Caracas cacao is listed separately from other cacaos. The register specifically states the amount of "Caracas cacao" and "other cacaos." This attests to the quality the Dutch merchants ascribed to Caracas cacao. When the cacao loads arrived in Amsterdam, all were listed in the Amsterdam Exchange as "Caracas Cacao." Perhaps the Dutch were mixing their best cacao with cheaper versions to increase their returns. Only Surinam cacao was identified as such and drew cheaper price quoting than Caracas cacao.

The third legal market chronologically to open to Caracas was Spain. The Spanish market was available before the arrival of the

Company in 1730 through the Dutch connection. However, little cacao legally reached Spain before that date. With the arrival of the Company an increasing volume of cacao was diverted to the Spanish market. This cacao the Company obtained not from merchant's or grower's stocks for legal exports but from those intended for the Dutch market.

The Dutch offered the merchants and growers cheaper but higher quality merchandise than the Company. The Güipuzcoana Company instead of offering competitive prices resorted to their political power. Coast guards were put in place to curb contraband. Police groups, *compañias de volantes,* were organized to stop smuggling on land. Both corps were successful in at least diminishing the flow of goods through illegal channels. The results of the Company success were three rebellions and numerous written protests of abuses. The skirmishes ended in compromises between the Company, growers, merchants and the government.

To salvage the Company from failure, the directors and factors resorted to accounting practices that evaded paying duties. They even sold cacao outside both the legal market and the Spanish market. In this manner they obtained higher returns that allowed them to pay dividends steadily almost to the Company's dissolution in 1784.

There was a Caracas forward linkage to the Spanish market. Hundreds of pounds of cacao paste or chocolate were shipped to Spain annually in the Company's vessels. But this did not compare to the amount of chocolate arriving in Càdiz from the Americas. In fact, in most cases the cacao paste or chocolate had to be considered private shipments for personal use. The forward linkage in this case was not important. Raw cacao was imported by the millions of pounds. The little benefit the forward linkage could bring into the domestic economy was based in Spain.

The pressure the Company put on the growers resulted in more land being brought into cultivation. Analysis based on the reports and relaciones made in 1684, 1720, and 1744 suggests a progressive increase in land cultivated. The intensive technique of cultivation—allowing more sunlight into the groves—was not present in the province of Caracas. The existence of nurseries in the haciendas does point to a transplanting technique. There is no documentation, however, to the effect that transplants were used to increase production but to replace decaying old trees. The only two extant descriptions on how to found and administer an hacienda do not make any references to the sunlight exposure technique. The solution to the Company's demand for more cacao was to resort to the extensive cultivation of the soil as opposed to intensive production.[321] Thus it was during the Company period, not in the seventeenth century, that more land was brought into cultivation. That slave importations in the eighteenth century were twice as high as in the seventeenth century is another sign of increase in land cultivated and crop yield.

Merchants, the Company and the growers were united by the market. We studied the markets of the city of Caracas and San Felipe. Each market showed peculiar features that distinguished one from the other. The Caracas cacao market involved nobles, merchants, growers, royal officers, muleteers, soldiers, slaves and brokers. In this market the growers' cacao consignments to Càdiz in Company ships predominated. There were cacao traders, like Don Esteban de Otamendi, who owned a ship and a warehouse in the port. Royal officers also traded in cacao. Sergeant Thomas Alvarez acted as cacao broker and he even bought cacao for himself. Those individuals who were classified as merchants (mercaderes) by the royal exchequer were seldom seen in the market. One saw more of the aristocrats' administrators dealing in the market than of the merchants.

As demonstrated in the case of Caracas, we saw the merchants traded directly with the hacendados in the San Felipe market. In the case of Father Francisco Rodriguez Camejo we learned of the intricacies of this market. The expenses were so diverse and onerous that most growers were better off cultivating the fruit and selling it to the merchants. The expenses of the market made it too difficult for a moderate grower—as most of the growers were—to engage in the whole process of cultivation, packing, shipment, and sale of the cacao in foreign markets. The division of labor worked well for most of the growers. Some of them ventured into shipping and dealing in foreign markets and were successful. This is illustrated by the number of years they continued shipping their cacao at their own risk.

The preponderance of the merchants in the internal market created the conditions for the emergence of a strong backward investment linkage in the form of mule-trains, canoers and ships. Muleteers earned at least 6 pesos per cacao carga unloaded on the port and so did the canoers. Freight for a fanega of cacao to Spain averaged five pesos per fanega. Thus, although a weak forward investment linkage existed in the province, as in the metropoli, due to the rudimentary process involved in turning cacao into paste or chocolate, there was a strong backward linkage in the colony and in the metropoli. The case of Rodriguez Camejo suggests the extent to which the carrying trade generated income into the regional economy. Quantification of this linkage is extremely difficult because there is no statistical evidence. However, Rodriguez Camejo's case leaves the impression that the backward linkage effect into the domestic economy was substantial. Rodriguez Camejo alone needed 413 mules to transport his loads to the port. If you suppose that most cacao loads leaving San Felipe were carried by independent muleteers; in one single month there would be at least from a hundred to two hundred muleteers involved in the trade. For example, in one month 2,478 mules hauled cacao to the port of Puerto Cabello. Further, merchants paid for living expenses to the San Felipeños and that translated into more regional income. It cannot be argued that the placement of the forward linkage in Spain, or Europe, took jobs away from the colonial domestic economy.

The existence of cattle in the province before the expansion of cacao production does not allow us to attribute the origin of that industry to the effect of the cacao income-multiplier (final demand linkage). It is patently clear, however, that the cacao industry did sustain the later development of the cattle industry.

The fiscal linkage was minimal. Most of the rents accruing to the royal exchequer were used for ecclesiastical, governmental goals or for subsidizing other regions. None of these funds were used to enhance the infrastructure of the domestic economy. The provincial economic development was left to private initiative. The royal government presence in the province was conspicuously geared to protect and maintain the imperial apparatus—not to stimulate the local economy. During these few years studied —1714–18; 1730; 1748–49—the royal exchequer financial statements show a constant lack of funds. Officers either borrowed or confiscated money from private coffers to pay their budget commitments. One governor had eight years in arrears for salaries.

The cacao economy of the province of Caracas was a dynamic entity that changed with time. In the seventeenth century the major source of stimulus to the region economy came from Mexico. The Veracruz market was the predominant one. The presence of the Dutch in Curaçao in the 1630s influenced the economy of the province and an expansion of cacao production began. This increase cacao production is evident in the Informe of 1720. The advent of the Company in 1730 accelerated what was already in progress. The Company diminished, but did not end cacao smuggling. The growers, who depended on the cheaper merchandise they bought from the Dutch, had to bring more land into cultivation. From 1750 on the Company, merchants, growers and Dutch unofficially and officially compromised their disputes and shared production. The cacao trade continued. The presence of the Company and the Dutch, plus the increase in cacao production brought into the market, made Europe, not Veracruz, the most important market for the Province of Caracas in the eighteenth century.

A close examination of the 1720–21 report surmises that many cacao growers with low capital did enter the cacao economy and took advantage of it. Eighty-five percent of the cacao haciendas were composed of from 2,000 to 10,000 trees. Cacao haciendas were owned by Amerindians, some slaves, poor whites and Pardos. The remaining cacao growers participated in several economic enterprises. As the case of the Marquesa Del Valle illustrates, cacao hacendados that fell within the other 15 percent of the report invested in different economic ventures. The marquesa, and other members of the upper classes, bought and sold cacao, sold dairy products, sugar cane, meats of all sorts, and owned stores and vessels that participated in the Veracruz cacao trade. These were the leaders of the province and their power was based on cacao.

Another important finding of this study is the demand the export-led economy placed on the members of this society. Almost all members of this community had several social and economic roles. For example, Rodriguez Camejo was a priest, a cacao trader and a confidant of the captain general. Sergeant Thomas Alvarez was a member of the royal army, a cacao broker and a trader, a muleteer and a retailer. Don Bernardo de Matos was a captain in the royal army, a respected member of the Cabildo (municipal council) in San Felipe, a cacao grower, a merchant, a cacao trader and member of the church board. Captain Esteban Otamendi owned a ship and a warehouse, was a cacao trader, owned a cacao hacienda, posed as a merchant in Caracas, Puerto Cabello, San Felipe and Veracruz, Mexico. Obviously, the export-led economy and the frontier conditions in this region demanded that the participants play several roles at the same time.

The most revealing finding is that this export-led region economy hardly depended on any extra provincial source to please local demand. As the close scrutiny of the San Felipe markets showed, most local demand for commodities and foodstuffs was satisfied within the region. This quantitative conclusion is sustained by qualitative data. A French traveler proclaimed in the early nineteenth century that the Venezuelan economy was difficult to penetrate because they relied mainly on themselves to satisfy their needs.

Theoretically, this study surmises that the dependentistas' claims of local entrepreneur passivity in front of foreign encroachment into the local economy, when an export-led economy is concerned, must be revised. Provincial entrepreneurs were seldom, if ever, mere pawns in the hands of the export sector. This finding further indicates that the extent to which a local export sector remains at the mercy of foreign entrepreneurs is a function of the botanical properties of the cultigen. Cacao, for example, allowed for participation of entrepreneurs with low capital. It also generated a strong income multiplier-effect and backward investment linkage that benefitted the local economy. However, the forward investment linkage accrued to the foreign economy but this loss was not of major consequence to the domestic economy. In other words, during the colonial period, the performance of export-led economies, as far as it pertained to benefits to the local economy, is not a function of the actions of foreign entrepreneurs but of the nature of the staple. Volition to mend the economy in favor of foreign interest had to wait for later technological advances and, even then, I surmise, it can be shown that the performance of some export-led economies is a function of the nature of the staple. Expatriation of wealth generated in the eighteenth century Province of Caracas cacao economy did not take effect because the botanical properties of the staple created strong local linkages and discouraged those of foreigners.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Total Caracas Cacao Export By Sectors: 1693–1771

Year	*Merchants*	*Grower Tither Church*	*Grower*	*French Co.*	*Basque Co.*
1693	11,438	4,408	1,232		
1694	8,924	1,076	3,176		
1695	11,340	3,087	503		
1696	9,020	1,917	1,986		
1697	9,514	4,070	686		
1698	7,913	4,762		13	
1699	10,627	2,947		117	
1700	4,716			64	
1701	19,238			1,637	
1702	14,719			1,059	
1703	17,196	12		176	
1704	6,375			2,184	
1705	10,427	254		882	
1706	14,003	346		1,504	
1707	19,685	799			
1708	20,593	511		958	
1709	7,979	439		1,189	
1710	17,662	331		1,695	
1711	13,219			2,931	
1712	13,540	26		4,945	
1713	16,469			514	
1714	13,135			1,591	6,624
1715	5,591			607	5,068
1716	18,229	68			267
					English Co.
1717	14,631	22			73
1718	25,038	421			3,174
1719	18,182	400			14
1720	16,457	238			

Total Caracas Cacao Export By Sectors: 1693–1771

Year	*Merchants*	*Grower Tither Church*	*Grower*	*French Co.*	*Basque Co.*
1721	43,517	451			
1722	29,451	326	2,972		
1723	25,541	310	5,682		637
1724	20,626	224	3,732	1,455	
1725	17,022		70	1,979	850
1726	12,064	234		703	2,810
1727	29,030	387	4,947		781
1728	22,484	954	2,563		
1729	22,974	1,084	1,765	2,594	
1730	26,341	1,608	2,626	3,052	
1731	20,006	1,297	4,059	7,573	12,663
1732	26,284	276	6,611	3,541	5,656
1733	20,752	793	8,217	6,040	18,329
1734	25,039	1,232	5,552	3,364	22,631
1735	21,705	1,106	6,323	1,418	24,447
1736	18,093	613	5,753	5,625	24,232
1737	18,385	366	4,418	4,221	24,233
1738	6,617	494	2,295	2,604	32,328
1739	24,302	365	7,280	3,130	32,399
1740	19,432	177	4,303		29,951
1741	11,043	181	2,665		20,601
1742	18,975	367	2,027		4,160
1743	17,033	251	1,689		22,010
1744	25,549	199	3,004		2,610
1745	39,901	807	4,755		2,300
1746	36,781	821	13,865		22,405
1747	18,068	989	6,166		20,559
1748	29,951	447	4,517		
1749	11,865	831	3,570		17,547
				King	
1750	25,770	4,971	1,269	7,804	13,919
1751	25,117	1,463	3,503		18,191
1752	29,626	2,482	5,507	2,910	20,978
1753	12,955	2,391	4,633	1,000	29,858
1754	17,442	2,811	2,840	2,850*	42,335
1755	9,119	1,536	2,454	1,037	26,824
1756	35,487	2,596	4,455		21,097
1757	28,826	2,486	2,706		26,502
1758	26,265	2,788	1,545	2,850*	32,917
1759	13,073	2,444	1,876		38,953

Total Caracas Cacao Export By Sectors: 1693–1771

Year	*Merchants*	*Grower Tither Church*	*Grower*	*French Co.*	*Basque Co.*
1760	22,354	3,907	1,109		28,393
1761	27,894	4,373	4,010		28,603
1762	13,152	1,935	1,715		19,524
1763	26,853	4,125	2,381		44,660
1764	10,725	4,219	1,166		49,709
1765	24,927	2,169	1,972		23,470
1766	11,562	929	1,519		23,117
1767	26,824	917	1,847		29,779
1768	24,752	1,417	2,090		30,219
1769	16,575	21	60		41,221
1770	20,341		16,364		23,069
1771	28,671			24,573	

*Royal Army Officer Joseph Caraveo

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 33–39; 41–47; 49; 51–59; 61–63; 66–69; 71–72; 75–76; 78–79; 82; 471–472;and 477. For the reliability of the figures see the text. As one can tell from the headings there were instances in which it was not possible to separate the cacao fanegas exported by the Church and tithers from that of the growers.

APPENDIX B

Monthly Totals For Caracas Cacao Legally Exported: 1693–1771

		(Five Years Totals)			
Period	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*March*	*April*	*May*
1693–1697	0	3,585	4,101	13,210	0
1698–1702	721	3,316	5,270	15,393	6,480
1703–1707	8,163	298	4,868	6,703	979
1708–1712	524	2,841	2,396	815	10,685
1713–1717	4,334	4,116	9,565	1,597	17,247
1718–1722	2,448	38	11,603	1,998	11,652
1723–1727	9,797	4,278	7,592	7,256	15,477
1728–1732	263	2,913	2,489	16,491	22,817
1733–1737	890	9,414	22,319	8,857	14,741
1738–1742	216	13,106	31,889	8,332	60
1743–1747	31,234	15,213	21,328	41,531	18,004
1748–1752	19,090	16,977	12,091	4,184	40,661
1753–1757	27,044	22,190	20,665	14,669	24,737
1758–1762	6,745	0	14,515	31,571	25,409
1763–1767	185	18,688	11,736	14,651	28,128
1768–1771	18,961	573	2,300	14,956	24,453
	June	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*
1693–1697	8,798	3,723	17,397	3,368	10,756
1698–1702	12,287	0	6,095	6,684	324
1703–1707	20,690	6,368	532	40	0
1708–1712	19,812	4,309	1,479	14,192	17,174
1713–1717	14,135	6,414	13,441	827	6,884
1718–1722	9,555	21,611	7,526	298	6,312
1723–1727	20,610	11,474	10,408	5,280	18,648
1728–1732	8,034	36,086	13,075	53	32,364
1733–1737	30,457	39,988	27,670	12,603	16,778
1738–1742	10,356	25,156	2,861	23,949	56,971
1743–1747	15,495	7,901	10,841	7,019	31,276
1748–1752	12,614	16,982	16,769	2,809	49,384
1753–1757	42,381	24,960	48,104	14,112	31,628
1758–1762	13,837	71,297	40,155	250	36,670
1763–1767	21,788	20,061	29,427	198	31,161
1768–1771	12,171	12,171	37,576	18,814	45,598

Monthly Totals For Caracas Cacao Legally Exported: 1693–1771

	(Five Years Totals)	
Period	*Nov.*	*Dec.*
1693–1697	13,867	1,047
1698–1702	3,952	0
1703–1707	15,008	10,194
1708–1712	7,000	6,279
1713–1717	7,646	0
1718–1722	32,941	25,845
1723–1727	10,888	7,844
1728–1732	31,162	10,181
1733–1737	21,183	41,138
1738–1742	8,219	30,705
1743–1747	4,733	34,739
1748–1752	18,639	28,244
1753–1757	13,295	7,993
1758–1762	23,636	18,162
1763–1767	22,765	64,216
1768–1771	12,866	38,532

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos: 33–39; 41–47; 49; 51–59; 61–63; 66–69; 71–72; 75–76; 78–79; 82; 471–472; and 477.

Appendix C

Caracas Cacao Prices in Amsterdam: 1683–1840

(Guilders per Pound)

Year	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*
1683	.63	1738	.91	1767	.83	1794	.91
1686	.38	1739	.89	1768	1.00	1795	.90
1688	.71	1740	.86	1769	.94	1796	.76
1689	.74	1741	.73	1770	.90	1797	.87
1691	1.13	1742	.51	1771	.81	1798	.96
1692	1.09	1743	.58	1772	.80	1799	1.05
1693	.93	1744	.48	1773	.73	1800	.74
1694	.71	1745	.49	1774	.71	1801	.74
1701	.73	1746	.48	1775	.75	1802	.74
1703	.53	1747	.47	1776	.78	1808	1.90
1705	.56	1748	.48	1777	.78	1811	2.00
1706	.48	1750	.41	1778	.72	1812	2.00
1708	.60	1751	.44	1779	.80	1813	2.08
1709	.59	1752	.49	1780	.87	1818	.78
1710	.51	1753	.50	1781	.85	*	
1718	.43	1754	.50	1782	.98	1828	.73
1719	.43	1755	.51	1783	.58	1829	.77
1722	.41	1756	.51	1784	.49	1830	.83
1728	.66	1757	.51	1785	.52	1831	.67
1731	.95	1758	.73	1786	.52	1832	.60
1732	.91	1760	.81	1787	.52	1833	.63
1733	.98	1761	.83	1788	.63	1834	.59
1734	.99	1762	.88	1789	.59	1835	.51
1735	.97	1763	.73	1790	.63	1836	.57
1736	.82	1764	.66	1791	.70	1838	.52
1737	.79	1765	.65	1792	.74	1839	.53
		1766	.68	1793	.75	1840	.50

Source: Nicolas W. Posthumus, *The History of Prices in The Netherlands 1943.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946. Table 83: 195–197.

*After 1828 the prices are for half dutch pound.

APPENDIX D

Cacao Arriving in Spain in Company Ships: 1731–1784

Year	*Amount*	*Year*	*Amount*	*Year*	*Amount*
1731	4,161	1749	14,904	1767	30,510
1732	14,234	1750	9,021	1768	21,759
1733	14,611	1751	5,089	1769	37,605
1734	4,507	1752	14,787	1770	27,370
1735	36,648	1753	8,894	1771	35,019
1736	24,629	1754	CNR	1772	36,808
1737	28,368	1755	CNR	1773	43,945
1738	12,102	1756	16,914	1774	24,428
1739	23,272	1757	18,026	1775	43,155
1740	34,608	1758	24,644	1776	52,552
1741	4,672	1759	41,223	1777	31,545
1742	17,221	1760	27,972	1778	44,100
1743	9,548	1761	38,238	1779	22,696
1744	5,907	1762	7,897	1780	—
1745	6,646	1763	34,754	1781	512
1746	33,289	1764	46,710	1782	8,846
1747	—	1765	23,797	1783	—
1748	17,348	1766	27,211	1784	3,180

Source: Roland D. Hussey, *The Caracas Company.* (Cambridge: University Press, 1939): 305–318, APPENDIX 2. CNR = Cargo not Registered.

APPENDIX E

**Retail Chocolate Prices in Madrid (New Castile)
(Maravedis per Pound)**

Year	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*	*Year*	*Price*
1702	279	1730	329	1758	272	1786	297
1703	—	1731	331	1759	272	1787	307
1704	419	1732	321	1760	281	1788	276
1705	419	1733	323	1761	285	1789	241
1706	401	1734	322	1762	321	1790	—
1707	—	1735	321	1763	306	1791	289
1708	314	1736	307	1764	269	1792	335
1709	384	1737	300	1765	256	1793	392
1710	—	1738	306	1766	246	1794	393
1711	340	1739	306	1767	248	1795	—
1712	333	1740	320	1768	272	1796	—
1713	306	1741	—	1769	278	1797	491
1714	321	1742	314	1770	279	1798	464
1715	322	1743	305	1771	307	1799	393
1716	—	1744	298	1772	291		
1717	306	1745	299	1773	280		
1718	306	1746	272	1774	269		
1719	309	1747	272	1775	—		
1720	306	1748	272	1776	281		
1721	295	1749	246	1777	—		
1722	291	1750	248	1778	—		
1723	288	1751	261	1779	—		
1724	276	1752	272	1780	—		
1725	297	1753	246	1781	351		
1726	265	1754	248	1782	351		
1727	297	1755	246	1783	—		
1728	309	1756	251	1784	271		
1729	321	1757	255	1785	261		

Source: Earl J. Hamilton, *War And Prices in Spain. 1651–1800.* New York: Russell and Russell, 1969. Appendix I: Table B (Item 22) and Table C (Item 25). 1 ounce = 28.75 grams; l pound = 460.10 grams, 1 pound = 16 ounces (P.229).

APPENDIX F

Spain Cacao and Chocolate Imports From America

I-fleets

Year	*Cacao*	*Cocoa**	*Year*	*Cacao*	*Cocoa*	*Year*	*Cacao*	*Cocoa*
1718	9	222	1734	2,099	11	1767	983	4
1721	229	303	1737	2,931	417	1770	104	
1724	98	701	1758	151	178	1774	1,431	
1727	8	84	1761	507	38	1778	161	
1730	726	732						

II-Registers

Year	*Cacao*	*Cocoa*	*Year*	*Cacao*	*Cocoa*	*Year*	*Cacao*	*Cocoa*
1717		198	1734	11,740	386	1759	36,238	40
1718	48	16	1735	38,073	257	1760	24,957	37
1719	135	12	1736	26,425	46	1761	45,749	16
1720	210	92	1737	28,369	—	1762	9,873	—
1721	5,750	12	1738	14,458	—	1763	32,271	53
1722	637	4				1764	49,272	107
1723	1,497	245	1747	5,430	129	1765	42,709	26
1724	—	112	1748	17,532	58	1766	33,859	25
1725	33	—	1749	22,704	433	1767	36,980	19
1726	133	76	1750	13,017	145	1768	39,109	
1727	5,564	—	1751	—	—	1769	31,734	16
1728	—	—	1752	41,938	94	1770	73,476	28
1729	9,686	379	1753	56,257	175	1771	34,861	
1730	—	—	1754	33,581	142	1772	56,598	36
1731	6,135	97	1755	7,861	42	1773	45,923	51
1732	20,272	372	1756	21,393	12	1774	53,909	13
1733	14,611	—	1757	20,654	66	1775	56,138	
1734	11,740	386	1758	33,658	17	1776	53,697	
1735	38,073	257				1777	27,229	

Source: Antonio Garcia Baquero Gonzalez, *Càdiz y el Atlàntico (1771–1778)*: *El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano.* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-americano, 1976. Cuadro No. 37 :221–247. *We are using the word cocoa to mean chocolate.

APPENDIX G

Cacao Fanegas and Custom Prices in Caracas 1693–1770 in reales

Year	*Price*	*Fgs.*	*Year*	*Price*	*Fgs.*
1693	190	17074			
1694	178	13218			
1695	142	14926			
1696	112	12922			
1697	112	14268			
1698	115	12682			
1699	129	13934			
1700	144	4780			
1701	132	20875	1727	83	34692
1702	128	15778	1728	92	23759
1703	105	17384	1729	112	28757
1704	100	8559	1730	137	33745
1705	100	11559	1731	132	35647
1706	96	15853	1732	143	39595
1707	121	20484	1733	132	51425
1708	97	22072	1734	130	62948
1709	75	9608	1735	144	54745
1710	67	19688	1736	137	54316
1711	93	16146	1737	126	63377
1712	59	19012	1738	111	44206
1713	56	24105	1739	96	102955
1714	60	21946	1740	90	54120
1715	60	11265	1741	75	34484
1716	77	18560	1742	87	25392
1717	100	14732	1743	92	40945
1718	82	28629	1744	78	31639
1719	80	19643	1745	80	47149
1720	99	16688	1746	75	73892
1721	92	34274	1747	75	47643
1722	100	32114	1748	72	34912
1723	86	33270	1749	74	33501
1724	71	25963	1750	96	55814
1725	72	20649	1751	88	49707
1726	72	20504	1752	86	60144

Cacao Fanegas and Custom Prices in Caracas 1693–1770 in reales

Year	*Price*	*Fgs.*	*Year*	*Price*	*Fgs.*
1753	91	47267	1762	104	36336
1754	89	65197	1763	106	77553
1755	86	40968	1764	112	65549
1756	86	62999	1765	112	46850
1757	86	59747	1766	112	37127
1758	86	36421	1767	112	29588
1759	84	55542	1768	114	58478
1760	99	55763	1769	128	33255
1761	104	64845	1770	128	59618

Source: These are totals of the figures on appendix B. Price data come from the same tomos listed in that appendix.

APPENDIX H

Royal Duties Collected From January 1714 To December 1718

Duty	*Quinquennium*	*Yearly Average*
Almojarifazgo	41,009 Pesos	8,202 Pesos
Alacabalas	26,004 Pesos	5,201 Pesos
Armadilla	45,853 Pesos	9,171 Pesos
Armada	35,102 Pesos	7,020 Pesos
Total	147,968 Pesos	29,594 Pesos
Tithes	12,169 Pesos	2,434 Pesos
Other Duties	109,617 Pesos	21,923 Pesos
Total	269,754 Pesos	

Source: Pedro José De Olavarriaga, *Instrucción general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de Venezuela en los años de 1720 y 1721.* Fuentes para la historia colonial de Venezuela.(Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia. No. 76, 1965), 409–410.

APPENDIX I

Royal Duties Collected in the Years 1748 and 1749

Duty	*1748*	*1749*
Almojarifazgo	14,167 Pesos	23,813 Pesos
Alcabalas	17,558 Pesos	15,626 Pesos
rmadilla	17,109? Pesos	7,506 Pesos
rmada	12,355 Pesos	8,476 Pesos
Total	61,189 Pesos	55,421 Pesos
Tithes	4,746 Pesos	6,667 Pesos
Other Duties	22,824 Pesos	15,262 Pesos
Total	88,769 Pesos	77,350 Pesos

Source: Eduardo Arcilas Farias, *Economía colonial de Venezuela* Tomo 1 (Caracas: Italgráfica, 1973):306.

APPENDIX J

Duty for Transportation San Felipe to Puerto Cabello 1756–1766

Period	*% as of Total*	*Peso per Carga*	*Produce*	*Period*	*% as of Total*	*Peso per Carga*	*Produce*
12/56	2.4	190	C and T	01/62	13.5	953	C and T
01/57	2.1	161	C and T	02/62	10.6	749	cacao
02/57	5.1	395	C and T	03/62	10.1	710	C and T
03/57	37.2	2,899	C and T	04/62	3.2	225	cacao
04/57	6.0	466	C and T	05/62	4.2	297	cacao
05/57	3.4	267	C and T	06/62	6.7	474	cacao
06/57	4.9	384	C and T	07/62	11.2	786	cacao
07/57	14.4	1,121	C and T	08/62	11.9	839	cacao
08/57	13.0	1,014	C and T	09/62	13.8	970	cacao
09/57	8.8	685	C and T	10/62	9.6	676	cacao
10/57	1.9	147	C and T	11/62	3.1	221	cacao
11/57	.8	66	C and T	12/62	2.0	139	cacao
12/57		DNS					
Total		7,795				7039	
01/58	2.0	129	C and T	01/63	.7	55	cacao
02/58	5.8	380	C and T	02/63	2.7	202	cacao
03/58	4.0	120263	C and T	03/63	2.7	206	cacao
04/58	10.9	717	C and T	04/63	16.4	1,236	cacao
05/58	13.3	875	C and T	05/63	8.7	654	cacao
06/58	18.8	1,239	C and T	06/63	10.5	792	cacao
07/58	15.8	1,040	C and T	07/63	9.2	690	cacao
08/58	9.8	647	C and T	08/63	18.5	1,389	C and T
09/58	8.0	526	C and T	09/63	20.5	1,538	C and T
10/58	.8	53	C and T	10/63	3.4	253	C and T
11/58	6.1	401	C and T	11/63	3.5	261	cacao
12/58	5.0	329	C and T	12/63	3.2	241	cacao
Total		6,599				7,517	
01/59	11.3	695	C and T	01/64	7.3	448	cacao
02/59	4.8	297	C and T	02/64	4.9	304	cacao
03/59	9.7	599	C and T	03/64	11.8	729	cacao
04/59	14.3	880	C and T	04/64	3.0	185	cacao
05/59	13.2	814	C and T	05/64	9.4	578	C and T
06/59	12.1	746	C and T	06/64	3.9	239	cacao

Duty for Transportation San Felipe to Puerto Cabello 1756–1766

Period	% as of Total	Peso per Carga	Produce	Period	% as of Total	Peso per Carga	Produce
07/59	13.7	845	C and T	07/64	7.3	450	C and T
08/59	4.6	283	cacao	08/64	8.5	523	cacao
09/59	2.4	145	cacao	09/64	15.9	983	cacao
10/59	4.7	291	C and T	10/64	18.1	1,118	C and T
11/59	3.1	193	cacao	11/64	4.5	279	cacao
12/59	6.1	378	cacao	12/64	5.4	334	cacao
Total		6166				6,170	
01/60	2.5	168	cacao	01/65	5.6	269	C and T
02/60	2.6	178	cacao	02/65	16.2	775	C and T
03/60	1.8	119	C and T	03/65	3.2	153	cacao
04/60	8.1	547	C and T	04/65	3.6	171	cacao
05/60	8.9	602	cacao	05/65	3.3	158	cacao
06/60	10.3	701	cacao	06/65	9.9	474	C and T
07/60	13.5	915	cacao	07/65	10.9	520	cacao
08/60	16.7	1,137	cacao	08/65	17.2	819	C and T
09/60	19.6	1,329	cacao	09/65	10.5	500	cacao
10/60	7.6	514	cacao	10/65	11.8	563	C and T
11/60	4.2	286	cacao	11/65	5.6	269	C and T
12/60	4.4	298	cacao	12/65	2.2	103	C and T
Total		6,794				4774	
01/61	4.3	312	cacao	01/66	7.1	282	C and T
02/61	6.5	474	cacao	02/66	8.2	327	C and T
03/61	7.8	570	cacao	03/66	6.0	241	cacao
04/61	6.1	445	C and T	04/66	6.4	254	cacao
05/61	5.1	374	cacao	05/66	10.9	437	cacao
06/61	10.6	767	C and T	06/66	9.0	360	cacao
07/61	13.4	976	cacao	07/66	28.7	1,147	cacao
08/61	22.2	1,616	C and T	08/66	9.2	369	C and T
09/61	9.2	671	cacao	09/66	4.4	175	cacao
10/61	5.5	399	C and T	10/66	2.3	90	cacao
11/61	3.1	226	cacao	11/66	5.8	230	cacao
12/61	6.0	436	cacao	12/66	2.0	80	DNS
Total		7,266				3,992	

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2515, fols. 65–88. The tobacco and cacao cargas were mixed in some of the entries. However, the ratio of tobacco to cacao favored the latter for the obvious reason that San Felipe was mainly a cacao region. It is my contention that in those mixed entries there were more cacao cargas than those of tobacco. This will allow for the analysis of cacao seasonality in the study of the structure of the cacao market in San Felipe. In the table, C stands for cacao while T means tobacco. DNS are the initials for "did not say."

APPENDIX K

Alcabala Collected in the Town of San Felipe (1756–1767)

	Period To	*Alcabala (Pesos)*	*Total Fiscal Year*
	19/11/56	765	
19/11/56	28/02/57	1,325	
01/03/57	30/06/57	2,003	
01/07/57	31/10/57	1,144	
			5,237
01/11/57	28/02/58	553	
01/03/58	30/06/58	900	
01/07/58	31/10/58	950	
			2,403
01/11/58	28/02/59	890	
01/03/59	30/06/59	1,422	
01/07/59	30/10/59	1,093	
			3,405
01/11/59	29/02/60	759	
01/03/60	30/06/60	1,258	
01/07/60	31/10/60	1,709	
			3,726
01/11/60	28/02/61	1,004	
01/03/61	30/06/61	1,266	
01/07/61	31/10/61	1,881	
			4,151
01/11/61	28/02/62	1,254	
01/03/62	30/06/62	1,444	
01/07/62	31/10/62	1,976	
			4,674
01/11/62	28/02/63	739	
01/03/63	30/06/63	904	
01/07/63	31/10/63	1,996	
			3,639
01/11/63	28/02/64	938	
01/03/64	06/30/64	1,076	
01/07/64	31/10/64	1,685	
			3,699
01/11/64	28/02/65	762	
01/03/65	30/06/65	681	

Alcabala Collected in the Town of San Felipe (1756–1767)

	Period To	*Alcabala (Pesos)*	*Total Fiscal Year*
01/07/65	31/10/65	1,689	
			3,132
01/11/65	28/02/66	677	
01/03/66	30/06/66	1,178	
01/07/66	31/10/66	1,786	
			3,641
1/11/66	04/01/67	1,057	

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomo 2515, fols. 1–64. The dates should be read day/month/year, i.e., 19/11/56. 28/02/57 reads alcabala (sales tax) from 19 of Nov. 1756, up to 28 of February 1757. As the reader can tell, the fiscal year was divided in four months periods. In the original reales and maravedis were listed, but I left them out for the sake of simplicity. No rounding was attempted.

APPENDIX L

Cacao Transacted in the San Felipe Jurisdiction

I

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Year						
1755						65
1756	0	1134	301	0	0	84
1757	237	151	905	303	662	761
1758	158	0	0	304	109	0
1759	552	472	442	0	760	481
Total	947	1757	1648	607	1531	1391
%	5.9	10.9	10.2	3.8	9.5	8.6
1760	13	220	585	564	468	325
1761	348	556	433	198	452	711
1762	397	659	917	330	379	681
1763	137	56	108	83	151	718
1764	122	260	375	65	448	445
Total	101 7	175 1	241 8	1249	1898	2880
%	3.6	6.1	8.5	4.4	6.6	10.1
Grand Total	1964	3508	4066	1856	3429	4271
%	4	8	9	4	8	10
Annual Harvest		1756	1757	1758	1759	1760
		5362	4112	2626	3687	5825

	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
1755	66	190	0	9	0	0
1756	187	504	2848	84	48	172
1757	137	359	44	390	95	68
1758	392	788	309	90	121	355
1759	262	121	125	99	144	229
Total	1044	1962	3326	672	408	824
%	6.5	12.2	20.6	4.2	2.5	5.1

1760	1162	598	1170	466	254	0
1761	889	1503	1072	218	303	289
1762	989	614	1783	426	103	31
1763	477	1336	1132	272	190	199
1764	718	706	427	36	—	—
Total	4235	4757	5584	1418	850	519
%	14.8	16.6	19.5	5.0	3.0	1.8
Grand Total	5279	6719	8910	2090	1258	1343
%	12	15	20	5	3	3
Annual Harvest	1761	1762	1763	1764		Total
	6972	7318	4859	3602		44363
Annual Average		5095				

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 2247 to 2248 and Tomo 2251. Annual average is based on the years 1756 to 1763 because the years 1755 and 1764 had gaps.

APPENDIX M

Yearly Auctions on Mule Trails

Mule Trail	*Year*	*Auction*	*Month and year paid*
San Sebastian			
	1st. Muletrail		
	1692	352	04/1693
	1692	2,185	04/1693
	1695	1,800	02/1696
	1696	1,437	11/1697
	1697	1,437	02/1699
	1698	1,510	09/1699
	Total	8,721	
	1701	1,522	03/1703
	1702	1,794	02/1703
	1702	5,439	05/1705
	1702	3,106	10/1706
	1704	3,220	10/1706
	1704	1,250	10/1706
	1705	2,530	08/1707
	1706	2,731	12/1706
	1707	2,520	08/1707
	1707	1,189	08/1707
	1708	5,145	12/1708
	1709	1,748	11/1709
	1710	3,800	02/1711
	Total	35,994	
	2nd. Muletrail		
	1695	2,000	05/1696
	1696	1,400	04/1697
	1697	1,525	04/1698
	1698	1,400	09/1699
	1699	1,200	01/1700
	1700	1,380	08/1701
	1701	1,380	07/1702

Yearly Auctions on Mule Trails

Mule Trail	*Year*	*Auction*	*Month and year paid*
	1702	1,100	03/1703
	1703	903	01/1704
	1705	1,058	10/1706
	1706	1,500	03/1707
	1707	1,522	06/1709
	1708	1,460	04/1709
	1709	1,250	12/1710
	Total	19,078	
Caracas			
	1695	1,200	01/1696
	1696	1,293	04/1696
	1697	1,570	02/1699
	1698	1,200	07/1699
	1699	1,322	03/1700
	1700	1,732	03/1701
	1701	1,890	02/1702
	1702	2,198	08/1704
	1703	2,198	02/1704
	1705	2,887	05/1706
	1706	2,415	10/1709
	1707	2,415	06/1708
	1708	2,000	12/1708
	1709	1,805	10/1709
	1710	1,960	02/1711
	1711	1,785	11/1711
	Total	29,870	
Ocumare			
	1695	5,197	02/1698
	1696	2,500	05/1697
	1697	3,050	02/1698
	1698	3,675	11/1701
	1699	3,549	11/1701
	1700	4,436	04/1701
	1701	4,436	03/1702
	1702	4,200	06/1703
	1704	5,025	06/1705
	1705	5,486	05/1706
	1706	5,039	04/1707
	1707	1,785	08/1707
	1707	3,120	04/1708

Yearly Auctions on Mule Trails

Mule Trail	*Year*	*Auction*	*Month and year paid*
	1708	3,128	02/1709
	1709	3,128	11/1709
	1710	2,728	03/1711
	1711	2,927	10/1711
	Total	63,409	
Pariaguan			
	1695	1,260	01/1696
	1696	1,035	11/1697
	1697	1,322	02/1699
	1698	1,510	09/1699
	1701	1,522	12/1701
	1702	2,300	09/1702
	1702	2,900	08/1703
	1709	2,012	11/1709
	Total	13,861	

Source: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 33, 34 and 35. In the original the name used for the roads is "veredas"—a dirt road—but I preferred "mule trail" because that was the main purpose of the road. Amounts are expressed in pesos.

APPENDIX N

Appendix N: Sales Tax by Jurisdiction: 1753–1772 (Alcabalas in Pesos)

Jurisdiction	*Sale Tax*	*Jurisdiction*	*Sale Tax*
Caracas	727,678	Calabozo	6,740
Pto. Cabello	195,258	Tocuyo	6,041
San Felipe	99,627	Ocumare	4,865
Guayra	74,342	Capaya	4,196
Turmero	31,655	Choroni	3,719
Coro	19,060	Carora	1,893
San Carlos	15,831	Araure	1,211
Vitoria	14,811	Hospino	1,154
S. Sebastian	12,250	Trujillo	1,154
Valencia	11,695	Caucagua	888
Savanare	10,717	Sta. Lucia	880
Guarenas	8,787	S. Ocumare	852
O. del Tuy	7,244	Nirgua	778
S. Luis Cura	7,183	Cupira	704
Aragua	7,152	Pao	632
		Curique	248

Sources: AGN, Real Hacienda, Tomos 475 and 522. The jurisdictions have been ranked according to alcabala collected. Some data were missing, but the purpose of the table is to show the fiscal importance of some jurisdictions over others. The distribution obviously follows the cacao regions.

APPENDIX O

Hacienda Cumanibare Harvest in Fanegas (110 pounds)

YEAR	*JAN*	*FEB*	*MAR*	*APR*	*MAY*	*JUN*
1717	0	0	2	5	7	22
1718	4	6	6	8	28	12
1719	6	0	9	12	12	18
1720	2	6	0	4	11	13
1721	3	2	10	4	0	13
TOTAL	15	14	27	33	58	78
%	5.5	5.1	9.9	12.1	21.2	28.6
1722	0	3	3	4	10	22
1723	1	2	0	2	10	6
1724	10	0	22	8	0	10
1725	0	1	2	2	0	3
1726	3	3	6	3	0	5
TOTAL	14	9	33	19	20	46
%	7.3	4.7	17.1	9.8	10.4	23.8
1727	4	2	1	0	2	9
1728	2	0	2	3	5	13
1729	5	5	2	2	0	5
1730	2	3	0	5	39	4
TOTAL	13	10	5	10	46	31
%	8.9	6.8	3.4	6.8	31.5	21.2
1749						
1750	3	5	7	13	14	27
1751	1	4	12	40	82	28

YEAR	*JUL*	*AUG*	*SEP*	*OCT*	*NOV*	*DEC*	*Total*
1717	7	4	3	0	0	3	53
1718	3	0	1	4	1	4	77
1719	3	0	0	0	1	2	63
1720	0	1	1	0	0	6	44
1721	3	0	1	0	0	0	36
TOTAL	16	5	6	4	2	15	
%	5.9	1.8	2.2	1.5	.7	5.5	

Hacienda Cumanibare Harvest in Fanegas (110 pounds)

YEAR	*JUL*	*AUG*	*SEP*	*OCT*	*NOV*	*DEC*	*Total*
1722	8	2	2	1	1	3	59
1723	1	0	0	3	1	0	26
1724	0	5	2	0	1	3	61
1725	2	2	1	1	1	0	15
1726	3	3	1	3	2	0	32
TOTAL	14	12	6	8	6	6	
%	7.3	6.2	3.1	4.1	3.1	3.1	
1727	5	3	1	0	1	0	28
1728	7	4	0	3	0	0	39
1729	0	6	1	0	0	0	26
1730	0	0	0	0	0	0	53
TOTAL	12	13	2	3	1	0	
%	8.2	8.9	1.4	2.1	.7		
1749				4	0	2	
1750	15	3	4	10	0	0	47
1751	9						

Source: AA Sección Obras Pìas, Hacienda Cumanibare, Tomo 3, Expediente No. 2, Fl. 54–55, Enero 1721 - Octubre 1723, Fls. 57vo.-58vo, Noviembre, 1723- Febrero, 1728, Fls. 156–157, Enero 1729 Diciembre 1730; Tomo 19, Expediente No. 5, Fl. 416-416vo., Octubre, 1749 - Julio, 1751.

APPENDIX P

Hacienda Choroní Cacao Harvest, 1693–1719 (Fanegas)

Year	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*
1693	1.00	.78	.50	.08	1.25	3.42
1694	3.50	3.25	1.17	1.25	2.25	2.75
1695	2.75	1.25	.50	.58	3.08	6.00
1696	.58	.42	.12	.42	.58	1.08
1697	.50	.17	.25	.42	.83	1.50
Total	8.33	5.87	2.54	2.75	7.99	14.75
%	10.70	7.50	3.30	3.50	10.30	18.90
1698	1.50	1.17	.17	.42	1.00	3.00
1699	1.83	4.50	1.75	1.00	1.00	2.12
1700	.58	.33	.08	.62	.92	2.00
1701	.33	.32	.12	.17	.50	4.12
1702	.42	.33	.21	.58	1.12	2.00
Total	4.66	6.65	2.33	2.79	4.54	13.24
%	7.30	10.40	3.70	4.40	7.10	20.70
1703	1.00	.25	.58	1.50	3.00	2.00
1704	.25	.33	.67	2.33	2.00	1.50
1705	.67	.12	.25	.42	1.67	1.00
1706	.25	.17	.08	.21	4.08	2.83
1707	1.50	.83	.25	.83	1.83	3.17
Total	3.67	1.70	1.83	5.29	12.58	10.50
%	6.10	2.80	3.00	8.70	20.80	17.30
1708	1.00	.75	.33	.92	1.50	3.00
1709	.42	.33	.67	.83	1.00	1.25
1710	.75	.58	.75	1.25	1.58	2.75
1711	1.08	1.00	.83	.75	.50	2.25
1712	.62	.50	.42	.58	2.75	3.81
Total	3.87	3.16	3.00	4.33	7.33	13.06
%	5.60	4.50	4.30	6.20	10.50	18.70

Hacienda Choroní Cacao Harvest, 1693–1719 (Fanegas)

Year	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*
1713	.37	.25	.25	.50	.50	1.00
1714	.25	.25	.33	1.00	1.17	1.50
1715	.75	1.00	.50	.75	.75	1.50
1716	1.75	2.00	1.33	.75	.54	.92
1717	.75	.50	1.00	2.75	1.00	.25
Total	3.87	4.00	3.41	5.75	3.96	5.1
%	8.30	8.60	7.30	12.30	8.50	11.10
1718	.75	.50	.50	1.00	.25	.50
1719	.17	.25	.50	.75	.54	.81
Total	.92	.75	1.00	1.75	.79	1.31
%	4.70	3.90	5.10	9.00	4.10	6.70

Year	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sep.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*
1693	6.67	1.00	.58	.50	.58	1.08
1694	1.54	.33	.21	.25	1.46	2.25
1695	5.00	2.17	.67	.21	.21	2.37
1696	.67	.50	.25	.37	.67	.83
1697	2.50	.50	.33	.42	.58	.96
Total	16.38	4.50	2.04	1.75	3.50	7.49
%	21	5.80	2.60	2.20	4.50	9.60
1698	2.17	.92	.17	.33	.25	.67
1699	4.50	1.17	.08	.08	.33	.21
1700	4.08	.50	.08	.25	1.08	1.00
1701	2.75	.50	.17	.12	.33	1.37
1702	1.25	1.42	.33	.25	1.00	2.25
Total	4.75	4.51	0.83	1.03	2.99	5.50
%	23.10	7.10	1.30	1.60	4.70	8.60
1703	1.50	.58	.42	.42	.33	.42
1704	.33	.33	.37	.50	1.17	2.33
1705	1.17	1.00	.83	.67	.17	3.04
1706	1.17	.25	.25	.83	.92	.92
1707	2.08	1.50	.50	.21	.33	.50
Total	6.25	3.66	2.37	2.63	2.92	7.21
%	10.30	6.00	3.90	4.30	4.80	11.90

Hacienda Choroní Cacao Harvest, 1693–1719 (Fanegas)

Year	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sep.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*
1708	4.00	1.00	.42	.54	.46	1.00
1709	1.67	1.50	.92	.71	1.83	2.00
1710	2.67	.75	.83	.81	.50	1.00
1711	2.75	.75	.50	.37	.50	1.12
1712	.83	.75	.54	.75	1.50	2.00
Total	1.92	4.75	3.21	3.18	4.79	7.12
%	17.10	6.80	4.60	4.60	6.90	10.20
1713	2.00	.75	.46	.33	.50	.67
1714	1.67	.58	.12	.50	.75	1.25
1715	1.42	.08	.08	.25	.50	1.00
1716	1.00	.83	.42	.25	1.08	1.42
1717	.50	.33	.25	.50	.29	.75
Total	6.59	2.57	1.33	1.83	3.12	5.09
%	14.10	5.50	2.80	3.90	6.70	10.90
1718	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	.37	.12
1719	.75	.83	1.83	1.08	1.21	.71
Total	2.25	2.83	3.33	2.08	1.58	.83
%	11.60	14.60	17.10	10.70	8.10	4.30

Source: AA, Sección Judiciales, Carpeta No. 14, 1690– 1699. "Producción mensual de cacao en fanegas y almudes." Hacienda Choronì of Maria Revolledo de Villavicencio. Ignacio Vazquez de la Cruz administrator and trustee of the estate. When the sources stated the harvest in almudes, these were converted into percent of fanegas. There were twelve almudes per fanega.

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AA	Archivo Arquidiocesano, Caracas
AANH	Archivo de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, Caracas
AGI	Archivo General de Indias
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación, Caracas
ARPC	Archivo del Registro Principal de Caracas

The disproportionate interest on the colonial city of Caracas has eased the path to the study of towns founded in the hinterland. That marked concern for the primate city of Caracas left other holdings intact. One of those holdings is the one that comprises a detailed documentation on the town, later city, of San Felipe. This research found primary sources on San Felipe in all four archives listed in the "abbreviations." Beyond the original sources, the monograph is based on several printed primary sources published by the Venezuelan government and various other private and public Venezuelan institutions.

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